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INTRODUCTION
We are experiencing a transformation as radical as the shift from religious to secular 
authority in medieval Europe and from monarchy to democracy in the western world of the 
eighteenth century.  Public power in western democracies is migrating from the national realm to 
the global one.1  The institutions through which we seek to protect ourselves from physical 
violence, promote economic prosperity, keep the environment clean, and further the other 
attributes of the good life are now as much global as national.  Domestic legislatures, executive 
branches, courts, and administrative agencies do not decide alone.  They are constrained by the 
decisions of international bureaucrats, they abide by the rules adopted by transnational networks 
of regulators, and they comply with the decisions of international tribunals.  By establishing, 
participating in, and adhering to global regimes, domestic polities today share power with 
government officials and citizens elsewhere in the world and with international organizations to 
an extent that is unprecedented in recent memory.
What shape will global authority take?  What configuration of public power and rights 
against government will emerge?  This Article takes a first step towards developing a positive 
theory of rights in institutions of global governance through a study of the European 
Commission, one of the oldest and most powerful international organizations in existence today.  
Rights, it turns out, are the creature of historical challenges to international organizations and the 
calculated, rights-innovative response of those organizations based on national constitutional 
traditions.
The Commission began in 1952 as a specialized international secretariat responsible for 
the administration of European coal and steel production in six member countries.2  In 1957, the 
same countries signed the Treaty of Rome, in which they made ambitious commitments to a 
common market in goods, services, capital, and labor.  The state parties entrusted the 
Commission with the far-reaching powers of a classic executive branch.3  Yet the Commission 
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was conceived as an organization responsible for administering an international regime, in which 
the participants were states, not citizens.  Hence individual rights were largely absent from the 
Treaty of Rome.
The transformation, half-a-century later, is remarkable.  The Commission must engage in 
a full, adversarial hearing when enforcing European law against individuals and firms.  It 
maintains a public, electronic register of all legislative and administrative documents and makes 
those documents immediately accessible to European citizens.  Before the Commission submits a 
legislative proposal to the Council and Parliament for a decision, it must invite public comment 
on an early draft and incorporate the comments in the final proposal.  In sum, European citizens 
are guaranteed a host of procedural rights familiar in national systems of democratic government.
Administration through adversarial hearings, extensive disclosure of government 
documents, and consultations open to all groups and citizens is familiar, but not universal.  
Another, equally liberal democratic outcome could have been imagined just as easily.  Rather 
than require a full adversarial hearing before the Commission, the Court of Justice might have 
used its extensive fact-finding powers to scrutinize the facts, law, and policy choices 
underpinning the Commission decision.4  (The Court of Justice is the highest court of the 
European Union and has jurisdiction over European legislative and administrative acts.)  There 
might have been no right to official documents.5  And public comment on draft legislation might 
have been staged at the very end of the legislative process, when the Commission proposal was 
under consideration in the European Parliament.6  The alternative, imagined Commission would 
have been a very different government body, yet it still would have met comfortably the 
standards of today's set of  liberal democracies.
Why do Europeans today enjoy this particular constellation of rights when the 
Commission exercises authority?  How do we explain the legal rules that constrain and shape the 
Commission's powers?  In this Article, I draw on the insights of the extensive political science 
literature on European integration and Europe’s system of networks, public-private partnerships, 
and transnational governance.  The theory of historical institutionalism, in particular, has much 
to tell us about the rise of individual rights in Commission decisionmaking. 7  Historical 
institutionalists posit a critical role for institutions in determining political outcomes.  They 
typically define institutions as the formal organizations of political and social life, including the 
rules and norms associated with those organizations, such as constitutions and administrative 
procedures.  In this school of thought, once institutions come into being, they show remarkable 
stability and affect collective results in predictable ways.  The institutions themselves are 
explained as responses to particular historical circumstances and not by reference to the 
contemporary functions that they are believed to serve.  Given the extraordinary staying power 
of institutions in the face of the changing material conditions of political communities, historical 
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highest court of the EU; and the Court of First Instance, established in 1988 to hear cases brought by individuals against 
European institutions, with a right of appeal to the Court of Justice.  The European legislative and administrative processes can be 
described, in very general terms, as follows.  Before 1993, European laws were passed by the Council on a proposal from the 
Commission.  Since 1993, European laws are passed by the European Parliament and Council acting on a proposal from the 
Commission.  Implementing regulations and decisions are issued by the Commission.  See generally Paul Craig & Gráinne de 
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institutionalists suspect that the original reasons for establishing institutions are not the same as 
those that make them necessary today.
Historical institutionalism has been used mainly to explain political and social 
developments within or across countries.  This study of individual rights in Commission 
decisionmaking contributes to the theory by revealing the dynamics of institutions and 
institution-building unique to global political communities.  First, I show that the rights and 
procedures developed within the confines of the nation-state are extremely influential in shaping 
the new rights and procedures that emerge to structure collective life in the post-national setting. 
The European Union emerged out of six, then nine, then twelve, and finally fifteen consolidated 
nation-states.8  Each has a highly formalized and deeply entrenched set of organizations and 
rules that developed largely independently of one another because of the territorially bounded 
nature of economic and social life in the era of nation-building.  National constitutional rules, 
such as the procedures that must be followed by government administration and the rights of 
citizens to object to government decisions, serve as powerful templates in designing European 
institutions.  When officials and citizens interact in international institutions, they do not set out 
to design, what, by common consensus, is the fairest and most efficient of organizations, rather 
they promote the different national models of democracy into which they have already been 
socialized.  Purposeful, strategic human action is constrained by the mental maps of democracy 
developed in national polities.
Second, consistent with historical institutionalism, I find that constitutional rules in 
global communities are created and altered at critical, historical moments, after which they 
remain fairly stable and shape political outcomes.  For historical reasons largely outside their 
control, the national and supranational officials in European institutions occasionally face 
challenges to their authority and they behave strategically to preserve their powers by changing 
the constitutional rules.9 While the bureaucratic politics replicate in some respects the dynamics 
of institutional change within the nation-state, the nature of crisis and adaptation in the 
international setting displays unique characteristics.  Challenge comes not only from individuals 
and groups responding to economic or technological imperatives but also from citizens with 
allegiances to national constitutional symbols and practices who seek to retain them in the face 
of growing European authority.
The response of international institutions at such moments also differs systematically 
from the response of national government bodies examined in country-specific studies.  The 
European Union has emerged through consent-based procedures involving states of roughly 
equal standing.  Compared to previous historical episodes of consolidation of political authority, 
force and power have been remarkably absent in the construction of a new European political 
space.  When European institutions respond to challenges, they cannot use force, power, or even 
majority decisionmaking mechanisms to tip the balance against the challengers.  European 
institutions, like most international institutions, are weak as far as organizations of political life 
go and they must appease and accommodate challengers.  The positive side of the story, with 
8
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respect to the European Commission, is that European citizens enjoy more extensive rights 
before the Commission than they do before their national administrations.  The irony is that the 
numerous checks on the Commission's powers risk undermining one of the rationales for the 
creation and perpetuation of pan-European governance: to reassert popular sovereignty in the 
face of problems and actors that escape the territorial confines of the nation-state.
By advancing a theory of rights specific to international organizations, this Article also 
contributes to the literature on international relations and international law.  Theories of 
international systems have sought to answer two related questions: why do states create 
international institutions and, once created, do international institutions behave autonomously 
and hence act as an independent causal force in international politics?  The field is divided 
between the realist and liberal institutionalist camps.  Realists take the view that international 
organizations are established to facilitate relations among states by handling minor tasks and do 
not have the power to shift outcomes away from the bargains that the states would reach in their 
absence.10   Liberal institutionalists attribute far more significance to international organizations, 
both in the functions that states confer upon them and in their power to shape outcomes in 
international relations.11  Yet both schools treat the international organization itself as a black 
box.  Courts and administrations in international regimes are presumed to operate according to 
certain functional imperatives that are common to courts and bureaucracies everywhere, 
regardless of whether they are national or international.  This Article moves the study of 
international systems one step further by asking a third question, “Why are individuals 
guaranteed certain rights before international organizations?” and answering with a set of 
interrelated, internally consistent hypotheses about national mental maps, historical challenge, 
and the strategic response of international actors.
The evidence for my explanation of European rights as the creature of historical crisis 
and strategic institutional response comes from the historical record.  In Part II of this Article, I 
demonstrate that rights before the Commission were created in three phases, each of which was 
the product of a strategic move by one or more European institutions to preserve authority in the 
face of opposition and each of which drew from a template of good government developed 
elsewhere.  As a result, today,  European citizens enjoy three major, historically distinct, sets of 
rights in their relations with Europe's executive branch: the right to a hearing, the right to 
transparency, and the right to civil society participation.
The first historical turning point was the accession of the United Kingdom in 1973.  The 
common law system of administrative law contained a number of anomalies compared to the 
continental systems that were already part of the European Community.12  In 1973, the risk was 
that English courts would not enforce Commission decisions that failed to abide by the common 
law's guarantees of fair and lawful public power.  I show that the Court of Justice and the 
Commission responded by adopting the common law right to a fair hearing in European 
competition proceedings, a right that then migrated to other areas in which particularized 
Commission decisions adversely affect the interests of firms or individuals.  The second critical 
moment was the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  I demonstrate that, to 
guarantee Danish ratification of the Maastricth Treaty second time around, the twelve Heads of 
State made a series of commitments to transparency, patterned on the Danish, and more 
10 See Joseph Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 
International Organization 485 (1988).  
11 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 85-109 (1984) (stating the 
original liberal institutionalist position).
12
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generally, northern model of open government.  The European Parliament then combined its 
long-standing institutional interest in more information on Commission policymaking--critical 
for the exercise of Parliament's legislative powers--with the northern transparency ideal to push 
for extensive access to documents legislation.  The third and final juncture was the resignation of 
the Santer Commission in 1999, in response to vitriolic criticism from a European Parliament 
intent on asserting its new treaty power to hold the executive to account.  I show that the 
Commission's response was to adopt legal measures guaranteeing that civil society--citizens and 
organized interests--would be consulted in the lawmaking process, hence improving its 
democratic credentials in the eyes of the general European public and creating allies among the 
civil society groups that were to be consulted.  This innovation was patterned both on the trend 
towards civil society participation in other international organizations and the European tradition 
of corporatist interest representation.
Understanding the European experience with rights is crucial for a number of reasons.  
First, as this Articles amply demonstrates, rights before Europe’s executive branch are very 
different from the rights guaranteed under American administrative law.  Yet this point is missed 
by American scholars and lawyers alike, to the detriment of their students and clients.  The 
similarities that Americans tend to discern between European and American administrative 
procedure have the quality of bad puns rather than true resemblances.  Only a sustained 
examination of the roots and evolution of European rights can do away with the misinformation 
caused by those bad puns and uncover the real nature of European rights.  Second, the causal 
theory that I develop to explain the creation of rights in Europe can be applied to other arenas of 
global governance, including those in which the U.S. is a direct participant.  As I show in the
Conclusion, the dynamic of competing national rights traditions and strategic institutional 
interests is one that we can expect to animate a variety of international bureaucracies and 
tribunals.  Therefore, the European experience contains useful lessons for Americans as they 
navigate today’s emerging system of global governance.  
My argument is organized as follows.  Part I presents the major positive theories of 
European rights, legal constitutionalism, intergovernmentalism, and neo-functionalism, together 
with my historical-institutionalist alternative.  In Part II, which constitutes the bulk of the Article, 
I recount the history of rights before the European Commission through the lens of historical 
institutionalism.  For each phase, this consists of a detailed examination of the nature of 
procedural rights before and after the critical historical event; a description of the event and the 
nature of the challenge it posed to European authority; specific evidence of the salience of 
national mental maps of rights following the event and the strategic use of the right by certain 
European institutions to consolidate their powers; an analysis of the evolution of the right after 
the historical moment; and a comparison the new, invariably more expansive, European right 
with the right in the place of origin.  Because mental maps of good government developed within 
each nation-state were critical, the account of rights before the turning point includes a review of 
the constitutions and administrative procedure laws of the Member States.  In Part III, I return to 
the competing theories of European constitutional design and demonstrate that the predictions 
they generate as to the nature of rights, the institutional proponents of rights, and the timing of 
rights are not borne out by the evidence.  Lastly, in the Conclusion, I take stock of rights before 
the Commission and argue that they are more extensive than in any of the places of origin 
because of the uniquely weak character of the Commission compared to a classic executive 
branch.  In the Conclusion, I also show that, like any good theory, mine generates a number of 
specific hypotheses and predictions for the future direction of constitutional change in the EU 
and another, still emerging, system of global governance, the World Trade Organization. 
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I.  EXPLAINING RIGHTS
 Theories that seek to develop positive explanations for rights have focused generally on 
national constitutions as opposed to international regimes.13  Until recently, citizenship was 
conceived exclusively as a matter of belonging to historical, territorially defined communities 
and hence the duties and entitlements of citizenship were developed within the framework of the 
political institutions that governed those communities.  Beyond the confines of the nation-state, 
there were international organizations, but they were believed to order relations among sovereign 
states, not individuals, and hence their operations did not give rise to duties and rights inhering in 
individuals, nor could those same individuals make direct claims on international organizations 
for protection and other collective goods.14  In this section, I canvass briefly the major 
approaches to explaining rights in national constitutional orders, with the aim of laying the 
ground for the discussion of  theories of European governance.  Any real exploration of theories 
of national constitutionalism is beyond the scope of this Article.   However, a passing familiarity 
with the principal schools of thought is necessary because their insights have animated the 
nascent debates on the nature of political institutions and individual rights in the European 
Union. 
A. National Constitutional Theory 
At the domestic level, broadly speaking, there exist two types of theories, one that treats 
rights as value choices by voters, legislators, public officials, and judges and the other that treats 
them as the product of strategic behavior designed to maximize the individual preferences of 
those same individuals, generally operationalized as material interests.  The first I label legal 
constitutionalism, in light of the prevalence of the approach in the legal academy, and the second 
I label rational choice constitutionalism.  Both make distinctive assumptions about two central 
elements of any explanation for the emergence and survival of constitutional rules:  human 
preferences and the way in which individuals collectively create and change the rules.  In the 
remainder of this section, I review the assumptions of the theories and give examples from the 
scholarship most relevant to the subject of this Article, that is, procedural rights in the 
decisionmaking of government administration. 
1.  Legal constitutionalism
Legal constitutionalists assume that individuals have preferences for certain types of 
collective life that go beyond self-regarding interest, what I call values.  When they come 
together to design or reform government, individuals give expression to their commonly held 
values or, if their values turn out to be different, some persuade others that their position is the 
better one.  Constitutional rules are designed to promote the moral choices of members of the 
political community.  The rules of government, in turn, guide human action because they are 
internalized by individuals, or, in other words, become norms of behavior.  Thus, a legal 
13
 By rights, I mean both classic liberal rights such as those contained in the American Bill of Rights and rights to participate in 
democratic decisionmaking through, for instance, the right to vote and have one's representatives influence public affairs.  By 
constitution, I mean all the rules that serve to constitute and define public authority in a political community.  These can be set 
down in a written founding document called a "constitution" but also in parliamentary laws, court judgments, and administrative
rules and practices.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 1 (2003) (defining "constitutional order" as a 
"reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the 
principles that guide those decisions").
14
 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 271, 
271-85 (1995) (describing classic and modified views of international organizations as “creatures of their Member States”).
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constitutionalist explains constitutions, parliamentary laws that set down basic government 
procedures and rights, and judgments of constitutional courts as a function of the substantive 
value choices made by national leaders at a constitutional convention, representatives in a 
legislative assembly, or judges on a deciding court.  Citizens act in accordance with the 
constitution, law, or judgment because they are automatically recognized as legally and morally 
correct and hence deserving of obedience.
For instance, in American constitutional law, the decision of the Constitutional 
Convention to divide legislative power between the Senate, the House of Representatives, and 
the President is explained as a function of Madison desire's to avoid the rise of factions.15  The 
institutional design that Americans live with today ensures balance--or put differently stalemate--
over action because Madison preferred the "enlarged and permanent" interest that would emerge 
over time to the "irregular passion" of majority action.16  Likewise, the right to property and 
contract contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is explained as an endorsement by 
the Founders of Locke's view of limited government.17  To move to a more recent statement of 
rights, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed in 1946 to structure the relations 
between federal administration and citizens, was taken by James Landis as a codification of what 
was fair and just.18  George Shepherd and Martin Shapiro explain the APA  as a compromise 
between what the Republicans in Congress thought was good government--an administration 
limited by the common law's protection of property rights --and what the Democrats believed 
was good government --an administration free to alter the status quo and use its expertise to 
create prosperity for all citizens.19
2.  Rational choice constitutionalism
Rational choice constitutionalism dates to the early 1980's and is informed by the 
disciplinary methods of economics and political science.  The behavioral assumptions of rational 
choice scholars depart significantly from the ones employed in legal constitutionalism.  They 
start from the premise that preferences of actors are fixed and self-regarding.  Although many 
scholars claim that any type of preference can be accommodated in their model of human action, 
including altruism, on closer examination preferences are generally operationalized as the 
preservation and improvement of material wealth or physical safety.  When citizens collectively 
decide how to govern their joint affairs, they do so by adopting rules that maximize individual 
preferences in a Pareto-efficient manner.  And once the rules are adopted, they are obeyed 
because they promote self-interest.  Thus, in this school of thought, constitutions and rights are 
explained as the self-interested decisions of citizens and legislators rather than as the expression 
of the type of public life they believe to be morally right.
Some of the most influential work by rational choice scholars conceptualizes 
constitutions as solutions to collective action dilemmas.  Jon Elster argues that rights and 
independent courts to enforce rights are enacted by today's legislators in order to afford them 
protection against the arbitrary actions of tomorrow's.20  Those with political power today tie 
their hands through constitutional rules such as majority voting and the right to a fair trial only 
15
 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 60-64 (1985).  
16
 See generally Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 195-96 (1972) (discussing Madison's political 
philosophy).
17
 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985).
18
 See James M. Landis, Administrative Process—The Third Decade, 13 Admin. L. Rev. 17 (1960-61).
19
 See George B. Sheperd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1557 (1996); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447 (1986).   
20
 See Jon Elster, Introduction, in Constitutionalism and Democracy 1, 8 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
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because they fear that, tomorrow, their opponents will hold the reins of government.  Likewise, 
political scientist Adam Przeworksi argues that constitutions are obeyed only when politicians 
have a material interest in doing so.21  According to Przeworksi, the most basic rule of any 
democracy, the rule that the individual or party that wins the majority of votes takes political 
office and allows the losers to keep their property, only is viable when property is distributed so 
widely that the losers have an incentive to respect the rule.  Election losers without property have 
nothing to fear from staging a rebellion and attempting to establish a dictatorship.  Election 
losers with property have a lot to fear because they know that if they fail, the winners might very 
decide to ignore the rule themselves and establish a dictatorship in which they expropriate all 
property.  Majority rule and property rights, therefore, are obeyed only when election losers have 
a material interest in doing so.
To turn to the rational choice approach to public administration, Matthew McCubbins, 
Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (McNollgast) argue that legislators enact procedural rights in 
order to protect the deal that is struck among competing interests in the legislature when that deal 
is sent to administration to be implemented.22   With administration, the analytical tool is the 
principal-agent relationship.  Unless the principal (legislator) has control instruments, the agent 
(the administration) will do its own bidding.  According to McNollgast, administrative 
procedures and individual rights prevent policy drift when government agencies are charged with 
implementing statutes.    First,  procedure empowers organized interests and hence ensures that 
the interests that lobbied successfully in the legislature can protect their gains in the 
administration.  Additionally, formal procedure facilitates oversight by legislators.23 It bears 
mentioning that, given the behavioral premises of rational choice theory, the policy choices 
contained in the original enabling act being implemented by the administration are themselves 
the product of  the self-interest of voters, organized interests, and legislators.24
A hypothetical will serve to synthesize the differences between legal and rational choice 
constitutionalists.  Take a constitutional rule prohibiting torture.   For a legal constitutionalist, the 
rule exists because citizens do not want themselves--or their neighbors--  to be subjected to 
arbitrary physical violence, because they all agree that freedom from arbitrary physical violence 
is the only moral way in which to organize their joint affairs, and because the rule against torture 
is so deeply engrained that they adhere to it without further reflection.  A rational choice 
constitutionalist would explain the same rule based on an individual preference for personal 
safety, a historical community in which resources are so widely distributed that individuals can 
guarantee their own personal safety only by agreeing with other individuals to a rule against 
torture applicable to all, and the persistence of historical conditions under which individuals 
suffer threats to their own physical well-being if they harm others.  The legal constitutionalist 
would criticize the rational choicer for the simplistic understanding of human motivation and the 
failure to account for norm-driven behavior, in which strategy plays no role.  The rational 
choicer would reply that the legal constitutionalist ignores the historical record, which is full of 
examples in which rules that would appear to be morally superior, such as a rule against torture, 
fail to materialize or are routinely flouted.  The relationship between values, collective outcomes, 
21 See Adam Przeworksi, Why Do Political Parties Obey Results of Elections, in Democracy and the Rule of Law 114, 131 (Jose 
Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworksi eds., 2003).  
22
 See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. L. Econ. Org. 180, 183-89 (1999).
23
 See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 (1989). 
24
 See Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 20-73  (2000) (discussing interest of legislators in obtaining and preserving 
power by winning elections and interest of citizens and organized interests in improving material well-being through voting and 
campaign contributions).
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and rule-abiding behavior is natural for the legal constitutionalist, problematic for the rational 
choicer.
B.  European Constitutional Theory
As in the domestic context, students of European governance have developed radically 
different accounts of rights depending on their disciplinary affiliations.   In this section, I present 
the leading theories and develop their implications for procedures and rights before the 
Commission.25  Each generates predictions for three aspects of participation rights: the type of 
rights, the European institution responsible for promoting rights, and the timing of the emergence 
of rights.   In Part III of the Article I return to these theories of rights to explore how their 
predictions fare when put to the test of the historical record presented in Part II and when 
compared to my historical institutionalist analysis.  
1.  Legal constitutionalism
European legal scholars are principally concerned with describing and normatively 
assessing the state of individual rights based on higher principles derived from constitutional law 
or universal theories of justice.  Sometimes, however, European legal constitutionalists examine 
the origins of individual rights and, when they do so, they work with the same assumptions about 
human motivation and the interaction of individuals in collective life as do their domestic 
counterparts.  The citizens, legislators, and judges who decide rights and obey them are 
motivated by the values and higher principles that serve as the basis for the normative 
evaluation.26  The focus of legal scholars is generally the Court of Justice's jurisprudence but 
logically can, and does, extend to Europe's legislators, especially when they are engaged in acts 
of high constitutional politics such as drafting the European Charter of Fundamental Rights or 
the Constitutional Treaty.
Of the European legal constitutionalists who focus on rights before the Commission, the 
work of Hanns Peter Nehl is exemplary, both for the breadth and the incisiveness of the 
analysis.27  Nehl concentrates on the jurisprudence of the Court.  He argues that the Court was 
driven by concerns for fairness, rationality, and administrative efficiency in developing the 
principles that, today, guide Commission decisionmaking.  Nehl is influenced by the neo-
functionalist approach, explored in detail below, in which rights serve the institutional interest of 
the Court in expanding its powers, but ultimately he is wed to the normative understanding of the 
Court's past and future case law.  In Nehl's account, the Court was motivated by the imperative 
of protecting the dignity of European citizens against the arbitrary exercise of government 
powers, promoting administrative rationality, and preserving a workable administrative process.  
The Court will continue to grapple with this set of concerns in deciding future cases.  Nehl's 
legal constitutionalist approach is manifest in the following passage from the concluding chapter 
of his book:
[I]t is useful to refer once again to the basic rationales determining the existence 
of process standards.  The Community Courts have forcefully stressed the 
dignitary purpose of those rules and thereby considerably improved individual 
protection in administrative procedures.  Surely, also from the perspective of the 
instrumental rationale, the high degree of procedural protection and participation 
25
 See generally Gary King, Robert O. Keohane & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry 99-114 (1994) (identifying 
falsifiability and specificity of hypotheses as one rule for constructing causal theories).
26
 See, e.g., The EU and Human Rights (Philip Alston ed. with Mara Bustelo & James Heenan, 1999).  
27
 See Hanns Peter Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in E.C. Law (1999). 
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is paralleled by an increased standard of rationality, accuracy, as well as 
transparency of the decision-making process. . . . Both the dignitary rationale and 
the instrumental rationale of process rules as essential components of this notion 
are to be combined in a reasonable manner.  The task of the Community Courts is 
delicate in this regard.  They bear the responsibility for maintaining the 
workability of the administration and the institutional balance provided for in the 
Treaty.28
Given the normative objective of analyses such as Nehl's, it is difficult to derive robust, 
forward-looking predictions for the nature of rights.   Commission procedure has guaranteed and 
will continue to guarantee the basic values of dignity, rationality, and workability, and if there 
arise circumstances in which Commission procedure falls short of these guiding principles, they 
should be corrected.  The question of what type of procedures and rights comport with dignity, 
rationality, and workability is addressed on a case-by-case basis, when and if litigants claim that 
the Commission's procedure is deficient.  A legal constitutionalist analysis, however, does 
generate predictions as to which institutions will press for rights in the administrative process:  
judges sitting on courts.  In Nehl's account, the Court of Justice is the institution that seeks to 
protect fairness, while the Commission, as a typical bureaucracy, is mainly interested in 
efficiently and expeditiously exercising its powers.  Lastly, according to a legal constitutionalist, 
the timing of rights should follow, or slightly lag behind, the attribution of powers to the 
Commission.  As the Commission acquires and exercises enforcement and rulemaking powers, 
litigants should go to the Court demanding fair treatment and the Court of Justice should require 
the Commission to respect procedural rights to the extent warranted by dignity, rationality, and 
efficiency. 
2.  Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism
On the political science side of the fence, scholars of European institutions have 
developed two, competing theories of the origins of institutions like the Council, Commission, 
and Court of Justice and their role in European governance:  intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism.29  Both types of scholarship  proceed from the same behavioral premises as 
domestic rational choice constitutionalists: actors' preferences are self-interested and they behave 
strategically to maximize their preferences when designing constitutional rules.  In explaining 
the creation of the common market and other areas of European governance,  material interests--
profits through cross-border trade, protection against discrimination in the workplace, consumer 
safety, and so on--and strategic behavior to further those interests are the essential explanatory 
factors.  The difference between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists rests in their 
assessment of which actors have been historically important in moving forward the common 
market project.  As the labels would suggest, intergovernmentalists argue that national 
governments, pressured by domestic lobbies and engaged in treaty-making and decisionmaking 
in the Council of Ministers, have controlled the pace and direction of European integration.  
Neo-functionalists, by contrast, argue that the supranational institutions of the Commission and 
the Court of Justice, in collaboration with individuals and lobbies who benefit from integration, 
have been the key players.
28
 Id. at 167-68.  
29
 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (1998) 
(intergovernmental theory explained by the leading exponent);  Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a 
Supranational Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63 (1998) 
(neo-functional theory explained by the leading exponents).  
Creating Rights
11
The scholarship has mostly explored the question of why the European Union has 
acquired powers in areas where sovereign states traditionally held exclusive authority.30  On the 
issue of the design of institutions like the Commission that exercise powers at the supranational 
level, including individual rights, political scientists have been relatively silent.  The theories 
themselves, however, contain a number of implications for the rights question and recently 
students of European governance have begun to turn their attention to the matter.
In an intergovernmentalist account, administrative procedure, like the substantive policy 
that the procedure is designed to implement, is the product of the interests of states.  What type 
of interest does a government have in procedure and rights?  States may wish to protect their 
nationals when they expect them to come before international tribunals or international 
bureaucracies. 31 A salient feature of public international law is the national interest in protecting 
the well-being of citizens when they leave the sovereign territory of the state.32  The same can be 
expected when governments cede sovereignty over certain policy matters, which can involve 
events occurring within the territorial confines of the state or citizens of the state, to an 
international tribunal or an international bureaucracy.  What type of procedure and rights would 
a state promote as best protecting its citizens?  Although international relations theories are 
largely unhelpful on this question, especially once they are asked to incorporate variation among 
democratic states, a good working hypothesis is the bundle of  rights and procedures available 
within the state.33  As with the other elements of international agreements, the most powerful 
states within the international regime should be the ones that are able, through bargaining, to 
upload their systems of rights onto international tribunals and bureaucracies.  
If the intergovernmentalist theory is accurate in the case of Europe, the rights that private 
parties enjoy before the Commission should be those that exist in the most powerful Member 
States.  The actors promoting rights should be Member States, in treaty negotiations or 
bargaining on the Council of Ministers, rather than the supranational institutions of the Court of 
Justice, the Commission, and the Parliament.  Lastly, on the question of timing, rights should be 
established as soon as Member States confer autonomous powers upon the Commission that 
could be exercised in such a way as to directly undermine the well-being of Member State 
nationals.  
In the neo-functionalist line of analysis, rights serve the interests of supranational actors, 
principally the Court of Justice and private parties that invoke the assistance of the Court in 
30
 The debate between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists started as a broader debate between realists and liberal 
institutionalists  in international relations theory.  See supra text accompanying note__.
31
 States may also have an interest in administrative procedure because it enables them to control the international organizations 
to which they delegate agenda-setting and enforcement powers.  Mark Pollack argues, following the McNollgast line of analysis 
reviewed in the previous section, that Member States (the principals) may use procedure to protect against policy drift when the 
Commission (the agent) is given the power to enforce European treaties and laws.  See Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of 
European Integration (2003).  Pollack demonstrates that the creation of committees (so-called comitology committees) to oversee 
Commission decisionmaking follows the predictions of the principal-agent model of administrative authority.  Pollack, however, 
focuses on procedures and rights that are available to Member States, not individuals, and indeed the McNollgast prediction of 
rights for all citizens is unconvincing in a system where each legislator disposes of the resources necessary to monitor 
administration.  The McNollgast analysis overlooks the fact that legislators can lose, as well as gain, control over administration 
by allowing individuals and associations with competing agendas to intervene in administration through procedural rights.  It 
would be irrational for a Member State to empower domestic interest groups to protect the original bargain contained in a 
European law through procedure when many domestic groups will almost certainly have interests that are opposed to the law--
and be themselves the source of policy drift--and when the state has an entire administration at its disposal to do the monitoring 
directly.  In the case of a state as opposed to a resources-poor Congressman, therefore, it is unlikely that the principal-agent 
problem would generate rights for citizens.
32
 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 521-55 (5th ed. 1998) (describing protections under international law 
for citizens of one state whose persons or property is stationed in the territory of another state).
33
 See generally Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 
International Organization 217 (2000) (reviewing realist theories of state preferences for human rights).  
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promoting their agendas.  Supranational bodies, according to neo-functionalists, seek to 
aggrandize their powers.  As Mark Pollack puts it, Europe's supranational institutions are 
"competence maximizing," meaning that they "seek to increase both their own competences and 
more generally the competences of the European Community."34  Rights, in the neo-functionalist 
line of analysis, are instrumental to the competence-maximizing agenda of the Court of Justice 
because they enable litigants to go directly to the courts and challenge government action as 
incompatible with higher, European law, thus bringing most public decisionmaking within the 
power of the Court of Justice.35
Neo-functionalists have largely focused on the Court's role in establishing European 
rights that individuals can invoke in their dealings with their national administrations, not the 
Commission.  Martin Shapiro, however, has argued that similar judicial politics are responsible 
for the development of rights in Commission proceedings.36  According to Shapiro, a mix of self-
interested litigants, judicial activism, public distrust of technocracy, and the inherent legal logic 
of procedural checks on administration has led, and will continue to lead, the Court to create an 
extensive set of procedural rights similar to those in American administrative law.37  Shapiro 
contends that the structural and legal conditions that resulted in the proceduralization of 
American rulemaking in the 1970's are today present in the EU.
The historical process as recounted by Shapiro can be broken down into a number parts.  
Litigants using every possible argument to avoid administrative action and espousing a larger 
anti-technocracy culture, challenge decisions before the Court on the grounds that the 
Commission failed to respect procedural requirements in the administrative process.  They do so 
using the textual hook of Article 253 of the EC Treaty, which provides that all measures adopted 
by the institutions "shall state the reasons on which they are based."38  The duties under Article 
253 would appear to be minimal but the provision is used by the Court to develop a 
jurisprudence of extensive procedural rights for the parties and, covertly, to engage in judicial 
review of the substance of the Commission's administrative determinations.  The Court does so 
out of a  penchant common to constitutional courts for judicial activism as well as the legal logic 
of procedure.  Once the Court requires the Commission to give reasons, it cannot accept just any 
set of reasons;  the Court demands reasons that respond to the objections of the parties and 
justify, in the eyes of the judges, the measure.39  In Shapiro's account, the imperatives of rights at 
the European level are slightly different than in the relation between the Court of Justice and 
national administrations: the Court is driven less by the desire to maximize competences and 
more by a reaction, common in most advanced democracies, to the vesting of extensive 
discretion in the hands of technocrats.  Nonetheless, the self-interest of private plaintiffs and the 
judicial activist, competence-maximizing tendencies of the Court are critical forces for rights in 
both settings.
34
 See Mark A. Pollack, Supranational Autonomy, in European Integration and Supranational Governance 217, 219 (Wayne 
Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998).
35
 See generally Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 
International Organization 41 (1993) (recounting the so-called “constitutionalization” of the EC Treaty, whereby international 
obligations were transformed into hard constitutional rights that could be invoked by individuals in court through the neo-
functionalist lens); Alec Stone Sweet & James Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and 
Integration, in European Integration and Supranational Governance 92, 105 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998) 
(elaborating neo-functional theory of constitutionalization of the EC Treaty); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe 
(1991) (recognizing and synthesizing the constitutionalization of the EC Treaty).   
36
 See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, in University of Chicago Legal Forum 179 (1992); Martin Shapiro, The 
Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, in The Institutionalization of Europe  94 (Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne 
Sandholtz & Neil Fligstein  eds., 2001).    
37
 Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, supra note __ at 98-99.  
38
 EC Treaty, art. 253.  
39
 Shapiro, The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space, supra note __ at 100.  
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Deriving predictions for rights before the Commission from the neo-functionalist account 
is easy.  They should be similar to the rights that exist in American administrative law.  The 
Court of Justice should be the actor promoting the rights, in the interest of law, democracy, and 
judicial power, and the Commission should resist, in an attempt to retain discretion and 
technocratic expertise.  Lastly, procedural rights should develop gradually, as litigants test the 
waters, the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects novel theories, but then is moved by 
virtue of the logic of judicial politics to accept the litigants' arguments.
C.  Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is an approach that was developed by political scientists and 
economists in the 1980's and 1990's to understand cross-national differences in political and 
economic outcomes 40   In the historical analysis at the heart of this Article (Part II), I 
demonstrate that the evidence supports this theory and more than it does the competing theories 
(Part III).  This school of thought defines institutions as the formal organizations of political and 
social life, and the written rules, together with the less formal, unwritten norms, associated with 
those organizations.41 Legislatures, courts, parliaments, constitutions, laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, administrative circulars, and standard bureaucratic operating procedures, all fall 
squarely within the definition of institution.  According to historical institutionalists, once 
institutions come into being, they show remarkable staying power and affect political outcomes 
in predictable ways (so-called “path dependence”).  In the sociological variant of historical 
institutionalism, this is because rules and conventions shape the preferences and identities of 
individuals.  In the rational choice variant, the same persistence of institutions is explained as a 
result of their role in solving collective action dilemmas and the difficulty, due to the very nature 
of collective action dilemmas in political life, of discarding one sub-optimal set of rules and 
organizations for another, better set.42
In this approach, institutions are created and altered in response to historical 
circumstances that can only be understood by going back and examining the events that were 
faced by the relevant political actors at the moment in time when change occurred.  Many 
historical institutionalists find that institutions undergo long periods of relative continuity 
interrupted by sudden change (historical junctures) followed by more continuity.  External 
shocks such as war or technological changes can provoke such junctures.   Historical 
institutionalists regard functionalist explanations with skepticism. The logic of path dependence 
and unintended consequences make it unlikely that historical actors created organizations and 
rules to serve the needs that they fulfill today.     
Historical institutionalism differs from legal and rational choice constitutionalism in a 
number of key respects.  Let me return to the organizing themes from the beginning of this part 
of the Article, human preferences and the process through which constitutional rules are created 
and changed.  First, in the historical institutionalist approach, when citizens design constitutional 
rules, they can be motivated by both value and interest, not one exclusive of the other.  That is 
because their mental maps are shaped by their previous engagement in institutions and therefore 
their capacity for strategic action to further self-interest is limited by the social understandings 
that have already developed within a historical community.  Second, constitutional rules are not 
designed purposively by members of the political community to the same extent as in the legal or 
40
 See generally Peter Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms, 44 Political Studies 936 
(1996); Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990).     
41
 Hall & Taylor, supra note__ at 938.  
42
 See Paul Pierson, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 251 (2000). 
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rational choice accounts.  Voters and public officials do seek to further certain types of moral 
visions and strategic interests when they create, adhere to, and recreate the rules.  However, the 
moral visions and strategic interests that the rules serve today may very well not be the reasons 
that produced them in the first place.   A positive explanation of constitutional rules, therefore, 
requires careful examination of the historical record, to discern when and for what reasons they 
emerged.  Third, and related to the second point,  rules undergo episodes of far-reaching 
transformation, after which change occurs at the margins, within the basic parameters set down 
during the earlier moment of transformation.
As I show in detail in the next part of this Article, the historical institutionalist 
understanding of human motivation and institutional change captures the dynamics of rights 
creation in European governance more closely than any of the other theories canvassed in this 
section. 43  Political actors pursue certain visions of good government that cannot be attributed to 
self-interest (contrary to the intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist accounts) yet their 
visions are particular to their constitutional experiences within their nation-states, not 
universalistic (contrary to legal constitutionalism).  The agents of European institutional change 
do not work from a tabula rasa.  The individuals who shape European institutions are educated 
and socialized within distinct national cultures and are strongly influenced by their national 
traditions of rights and public law.  Furthermore, while the European officials sitting on 
supranational bodies act strategically to improve their own powers when designing constitutional 
rules (contrary to legal constitutionalism), they do not behave according to a single model of 
judicial or bureaucratic power-grabbing (contrary to the neo-functionalist approach).  Rather, 
European judges and public officials respond to highly contextual, historically specific 
challenges to their authority.  Related to this last point, the pattern of rule change has followed 
the sequence of juncture and continuity observed by historical institutionalists in other settings.  
New rights in Commission decisionmaking have come into being, redefining what it is to be a 
European citizen, episodically, not incrementally (contrary to the legal constitutionalist and neo-
functionalist approaches).  Finally, the national, context-specific values which voters, litigants, 
and public officials seek to further by promoting certain rights are different from the values that 
the rights come to serve, over time, in their new European setting.  Thus, rights are created by 
purposive actors to further certain interests and values but not the same ones as they serve today.  
The table below summarizes the alternative theories and the competing predictions.
Table 1—Creating rights before the European Commission:  Theories and predictions
Legal 
constitutionalism
Intergovernmentalism Neo-
functionalism
Historical 
institutionalism
Human  
motivations 
and collective 
Individuals promote 
values of dignity, 
rationality, and 
Governments bargain to 
promote material well-being 
of their citizens in 
Using doctrinal 
hook of the duty to 
give reasons
European 
institutions respond 
to challenges to 
43
 Historical institutionalism has informed some of the more recent scholarship on the development of the European Union as a 
political entity.  See Alec Stone Sweet, Neil Fligstein & Wayne Sandholtz, The Institutionalization of European Space, in The 
Institutionalization of Europe 1 (Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz & Neil Fligstein eds., 2001).  It is often understood as 
complementary to the neo-functionalist approach because it provides a theoretical framework for understanding the rise of 
supranational organizations and rules.  See Paul Pierson, The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis, 
in European Integration and Supranational Governance 27, 48 (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet 1998).  In my analysis, 
however, historical institutionalism is used to emphasize the importance of national institutions for the creation of supranational 
ones.  Furthermore, neo-functionalist explanations continue to suggest a certain inevitability or teleology in the end result of the 
common market and other areas of European governance:  economic interests motivate market actors, who pressure political 
actors, who in turn establish efficient, European-wide rules.  However, historical institutionalists are cautious of this form of 
explanation.
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behavior workability. Commission proceedings. supranational 
court expands 
competence and 
furthers anti-
technocracy 
values and 
individual litigants 
pursue material 
interests. 
authority by 
adopting rights 
derived from 
national traditions.
Institutional 
agents
European Courts Member States (treaties and 
laws passed by Council of 
Ministers)
European Courts Institution facing 
historical challenge 
Timing Gradual, tracking the 
attribution of powers 
to Commission.
Sudden, at the time that 
Commission conferred 
powers.
Gradual, tracking 
the attribution of 
powers to 
Commission.
Sudden, shortly 
following the 
moment of 
challenge to 
authority.
Bundle of 
rights
_____ Rights existing in most 
powerful Member States.
Rights in U.S. 
administrative 
law.
Rights necessary to 
consolidate 
authority of 
institution, based on 
one or more 
Member State 
traditions.
II.  THREE GENERATIONS OF RIGHTS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
In this part, I discern three generations of rights before the Commission:  the right to a 
hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to civil society participation.   The explanation of 
the adoption and subsequent evolution of each right is organized chronologically.  I first describe 
the nature of government decisionmaking and individual rights before and after the critical 
historical event.  Since I insist on the importance of Europeans' old mental maps of legitimate 
government authority in designing new, European-wide constitutional rules, the before consists 
of the rules of government administration at the national level and the rules that applied to 
Commission decisionmaking.  Then, I analyze the event that prompted the adoption of the right.  
I demonstrate that European institutions responded to historical circumstances by adopting a 
template of legitimate administration developed elsewhere and did so for the strategic reason of  
preserving supranational, European authority.  After the careful analysis of the historical moment 
in which the right was adopted, I trace the incremental development of the right in shaping how 
the Commission exercises its authority.  Lastly, I compare where the right stands today with the 
national--or in the case of civil society, international--tradition from which it was drawn to reveal 
the dynamics of rights in the European system of global governance.
A. The First Generation:  The Right to a Hearing 
Compared to an ordinary executive branch, the Commission has few direct enforcement 
powers.44  Fines, injunctions, orders, and permits under European laws passed in Brussels are 
44
 See Francesca Bignami, Transnational Administration: International Data Transfers under the European Privacy Directive, 
forthcoming in Mich. Int'l L. J.  
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generally decided and issued by national administrations in each of the twenty-five Member 
States.   Nonetheless, the very fact that the Commission exercises direct powers over citizens of 
the Member States, bypassing national governments, is extraordinary in light of the international 
origins of the organization.  The Commission directly enforces European law in three areas:  
competition law (anti-trust),  anti-dumping law, and customs law.  In 1957, the Commission was 
given the power to impose fines and issue orders against firms that engaged in anti-competitive 
behavior.45  In 1969, it was authorized to impose duties on foreign goods and, by extension, the 
firms selling the goods, if they were being sold at an unfair price ("dumped") on the European 
market or were being subsidized by a foreign government.46  In 1979, in a narrow class of cases, 
the Commission was given the power to decide whether the customs duties that had been paid or 
were due on imported products under the European Customs Code had to be returned to the 
importer.47  What were the rights of  French, German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, and 
Luxembourger citizens when they first came face-to-face with international authority?  What are 
their rights today?  And how can we explain the difference in the rights that a European citizen 
yesterday could invoke when she learned that she was at risk of paying a hefty competition fine 
and those same rights today? 
1.  The right to oppose adverse Commission determinations then and now
a.  National traditions of administrative procedure
In all Western legal systems, individuals have the right to contest vigorously decisions of 
government administration that inflict hardship upon them.   Nonetheless,  the stage at which the 
individual may contest the determination, the forum before which she may vindicate her rights, 
the scope of the rights, and the range of hardships believed to warrant such procedural rights, 
differ considerably from one country to another.  For purposes of characterizing procedural 
rights, European systems of administrative law can be divided into those that fall into the droit 
administratif family and those that are part of the common law family. 48  Of the original six 
Member States, all were squarely droit administratif systems (France, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) or closely related to droit administratif systems (Germany). 49
45
 See EC Treaty, arts. 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86); Council Regulation No 17/62, First Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 
(ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204.  This has been repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. 
(L 1) 1.  The Commission has since come to exercise powers in the related areas of merger control and state aids.  See infra text 
accompanying note__.  
46
 See Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 of the Council of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or 
subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic Community, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1. The Regulation has 
been amended on numerous occasions.  The law currently in force is Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Communities, 1996 O.J. (L 56) 1.
47
 See Council Regulation (EEC) No 1430/79 of 2 July 1979 on the repayment or remission of import or export duties, 1979 O.J. 
(L 175) 1. This law has been repealed and repayment and remissions are currently dealt with under Articles 236 to 239 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1.
48
 The standard classification of countries into droit administratif and common law systems is based on the nature of the court in 
which individuals can seek redress against administrative action.  See John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An 
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985); L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell, French 
Administrative Law 1-8 (5th ed. 1998).  In droit administratif countries, the courts have jurisdiction only over challenges to acts 
of the administration and are staffed by specialized judges who can also be employed elsewhere within government 
administration.  In common law countries, the courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with powers over all types of disputes and 
whose judges are the same regardless of the type of dispute.  The characteristic of interest here--the extent and nature of 
procedural rights before administration--is different from that used to create the standard typology.  Nonetheless, the countries 
fall into the same clusters.   
49
 German administrative law is generally characterized as related to, but different from, the droit administratif family.  See 
Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective 1-20 (2001).  Administrative acts are reviewed in 
specialized courts but the judges on those courts are recruited and promoted according to the rules governing the entire judiciary.  
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Administrative decisions in droit administratif countries are generally made with few 
opportunities for individuals to make their views known.50  When the administrative process is 
completed, however, individuals have the right to apply to the courts for full review of the 
legality of the determination.  Individuals have the right to contest adverse administrative 
determinations at some point, but not necessarily before the administrative authority deciding on 
the act.  Fairness is guaranteed through access to strict "control" (contrôle) of the 
administration's decision in an independent forum.  By contrast, in the English common law 
tradition, many of the same requirements of impartiality and procedure that are imposed on 
courts are also imposed on government bureaucrats.  Government administration acts through 
trial-type procedures in which the citizen has the right to challenge the factual and legal premises 
of the determination before an unbiased decisionmaker.  Once the determination becomes final, 
however, access to the courts is restricted, the grounds of review are limited, and the types of 
remedies available are strictly defined.  The fairness of the administrative act in the common law 
turns on the ability to engage in a quasi-judicial process at the time of its adoption.
The basic difference in procedural rights can be traced to differences in experiences with 
the administrative state.  In France, government administration is highly centralized and 
professionalized and consequently the mode through which it exercises power and renders 
decisions is characteristic of a bureaucracy.  By contrast, in Great Britain, local government 
(where most of the decisions that impose direct burdens on individuals are taken) is largely 
autonomous of central government departments in London and is not highly professionalized.  In 
the 1800's, local government was mostly the task of the justices of the peace, responsible for 
administration of the poor laws, the highways, and liquor licenses.51  Even now, local 
government administration in England is handled largely by boards of elected local officials.  
Given these histories, it is no surprise that the droit administratif and common law ideals of fair 
government administration differ.  In the droit administratif tradition, it consists of 
professionalized decisionmaking, without extensive procedural rights for individual citizens, but 
with intense scrutiny after-the-fact by judges.  In the common law tradition, the ideal consists of 
neutral third-party dispute resolution within the administration, entailing extensive procedural 
rights for the parties seeking to avoid the adverse government decision, and limited review 
afterwards, before judges.   
b.  Administrative procedure of the European Commission
Procedural rights were first established in European competition proceedings, one of the 
few areas in which the Commission, as opposed to the Member States, is empowered to directly 
impose sanctions or other burdens upon individuals and firms.52   In the Treaty of Rome, anti-
Moreover, fines and other forms of administrative sanctions are reviewed by ordinary criminal courts  and law suits against 
government based on the Civil Code, i.e. sounding in contract, tort, or property, are brought in ordinary courts.  As for 
administrative procedure, German law also stands between the droit administratif and common law families.  The attention to 
individual rights in the Basic Law of 1948 has led to fairly extensive procedural rights whenever an individualized administrative 
act (Verwaltungsakt) is promulgated.  See id. at 74-80.  Nonetheless, the bureaucratic culture in German administration is strong 
and therefore the quasi-judicial procedures that characterizes British administration are less pervasive in the German case.  
50
 See Marco D'Alberti, Diritto amministrativo comparato 35 (1992) (comparing Anglosaxon proceduralism and French checking 
of administrative decisions by the Conseil d'Etat).
51
 See H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law 448 (8th ed. 2000).
52
 In this article, I do not cover the limits on the Commission’s investigative powers.  These include a privilege for attorney-client 
communications, Case 155/79, Australian Mining and Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 ECR 1575, para. 23 (covering 
communications made between an independent lawyer and a client for the sole purpose of defending the client in the competition 
proceeding at issue), a privilege against self-incrimination, Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 1989 ECR 3283 (allowing firms 
to refuse to answer questions that directly go to the question of guilt or innocence), and a duty to respect national search warrant 
requirements and only collect evidence related to the specific ends of the investigation, Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v. 
Commission, 1989 ECR 2859.  Rather, I focus on the procedures the Commission must follow and the rights it must respect 
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competitive agreements and abuses of monopoly power were prohibited and the Commission 
was entrusted with enforcement powers.53  Five years later, in 1962, the Council passed 
Regulation 17/62, designed to implement Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.54  The Regulation 
stipulated that:
Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 the 
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings 
concerned the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which the Commission 
has taken objection.55
In other words, the Commission was required to “hear” the parties whenever it took any action to 
enforce competition law:  decisions that an agreement or practice did not violate Articles 85 and 
86, so-called “negative clearance" (art. 2); findings of an infringement of Article 85 or 86 and 
orders for termination of the infringement (art. 3); decisions under Article 85(3) that an 
agreement was exempt from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements (art. 6); decisions on 
the retroactive application of European competition law to agreements existing before the 
passage of Regulation 17/62 (art. 7); the revocation or amendment of exemptions granted under 
Article 85(3) (art. 8); decisions to impose fines (art. 15); decisions to impose “periodic penalty 
payment” to compel compliance with Commission decisions (art. 16).
The next year, the Commission set down the details of the procedure, which, as shall be 
explained shortly, followed French and German law.56  The opportunity to be heard comprised 
the following sequence:
o The Commission would notify the parties, in writing, of the “objections raised against 
them.”  Art. 2.
o The parties would have opportunity to “make known in writing their views concerning 
the objections raised against them” and provide exculpatory evidence. Art. 3.
o The Commission would hold an oral hearing at which the parties could present their case, 
represented by counsel if they wished.  Art. 7.
o The Commission's final decision would  be limited to the objections on which the parties 
had had an opportunity to set forth their views.  Art. 4.  
Under Article 190, now 253, of the EC Treaty, the Commission was also under a duty to state the 
reasons for official acts, including competition enforcement decisions.57  Lastly, under Article 
173, now 230, of the EC Treaty the parties could go to the Court of Justice to challenge the 
decision on one of four grounds: lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse 
of powers.
The law left open many questions.  How detailed did the statement of objections need to 
be?  Would the parties have to rely on the Commission’s characterization of the facts, as set out 
in the statement of objections or would they have a right to review independently the evidence 
collected by the Commission?  If the parties had the right to review the evidence, did this include 
all of the information collected by the Commission or just the evidence supporting the 
when it exercises its decisionmaking powers under the Treaties.  The Commission’s powers to collect information from 
individuals and rights in that context are related but tangential to my inquiry.  
53
 EC Treaty, arts. 81 and 82 (ex arts. 85 and 86).  
54
 Council Regulation No. 17/62, First Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 (ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 
204.  This has been repealed and replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.  
55
 Id. at art. 19. 
56
 Regulation No. 99/63/EEC of the Commission of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council 
Regulation No. 17, 1963 O.J. (L 127) 2268.
57
 EC Treaty, ex art. 190 (now art. 253).  Article 190 provided that "acts adopted by the Council or the Commission shall state the 
reasons on which they are based . . . ."
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Commission’s determination?  Could the same civil servants who investigated the case also 
decide it, or did the decision have to be reached by a neutral third party?  In its final decision, did 
the Commission have to address all of the points raised by the parties, both those going to their 
alleged anticompetitive behavior and those suggesting less burdensome remedial measures, or 
could the Commission wait to respond, if and when the decision was challenged in the Court of 
Justice?
In the following three decades, the Court of Justice, joined by the Court of First Instance 
in 1988, answered most of these questions.  In a line of cases on the right to a hearing, the Court 
of Justice imposed an extensive set of procedural requirements on the Commission.  In the 
statement of objections, the Commission must notify the parties of all aspects of the planned 
decision, to allow the parties a full opportunity to answer the case against them and object to the 
proposed remedial measures.58  It must allow the parties to examine all of the information in its 
files.59  Summaries of the evidence or the production of evidence limited to information that the 
Commission considers relevant to the case will not suffice.  The Commission is not under a duty 
to separate prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions and therefore the same civil servants who 
investigate the case may also decide it.60  Under the separate but related duty to give reasons, the 
Court requires that the Commission give a complete enough statement of the facts and 
considerations underlying the final decision so that the parties and the Court can discern whether 
the Commission has adhered to the substantive requirements of European administrative law.61
However, the Commission is not obliged to answer all of the objections of the parties in the final 
decision.  If the parties choose to challenge the administrative determination in the European 
Courts, the Commission can advance more detailed reasons for the decision there.62
The Commission has also helped define the contours of the European right to a fair 
hearing.  Starting in the early 1980’s, the Commission issued  a series of policy statements and 
binding rules, setting down procedures for exercising the right to examine the evidence.  Thus, in 
1982, the Commission announced that it would attach copies of the evidence to the statement of 
objections issued to the parties at the beginning of a competition proceeding, or, if the evidence 
was unwieldy, allow the parties to inspect the files on Commission premises.63  A Commission 
rule from 1997 defines the classes of documents that are available to the parties and those that 
are protected from disclosure and sets down the procedure for enabling the parties to consult the 
documents.64
58
 See Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, 1974 ECR 1063; Cases 142 & 156/84, BAT and 
Reynolds v. Commission 1986 ECR 189, para. 13 (defining statement of objections as "a procedural and preparatory document, 
intended solely for the undertakings against which the procedure is initiated with a view to enabling them to exercise effectively 
their right to a fair hearing"); Cases C-89, C-116, C-117, C-125 to 129/85, Woodpulp II 1993 ECR I-1307, paras. 40-54 and 148-
154 (annulling those parts of Commission decision that were not clearly raised in the statement of objections).
59
 See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 ECR 1139; Case T-7/89, Hercules v. Commission 1991 
ECR II-1711, para. 53; Cases T-30/91, T-31/91, T-32/91, T-36/91, T-37/91, Soda Ash Cases, 1995 ECR II-1775, II-1821, II-
1825, II-1847, II-1901 (setting down "general principle of equality of arms" under which all parties are entitled to know contents 
of case file); Case T-36/91 ICI v Commission 1995 ECR II-1847.  See generally Koen Lenaerts & Jan Vanhamme, Procedural 
Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process, 1997 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 531, 545-49 (reviewing case 
law on the right of access to the file).  
60
 See Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-
42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, 
T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, 
T-103/95 and T-104/95, Cimenteries CBR and Others v Commission 2000 ECR II-491, paras. 712 to 718.
61 See Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, 1970 ECR 661, 690; Michelin, 1983 ECR 3500.
62
 See Case T-308/94, Cascades SA v. Commission, 1998 ECR II-925, paras. 220-23. 
63
 12th Report on Competition Policy (1982).
64
 See Commission Notice 97/C 23/03 on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file in cases 
pursuant to Arts. 85 and 86 EC, Arts. 65 and 66 ECSC and Council Reg. (EEC) No 4064/89, 1997 O.J. (C 23) 3.
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The Commission has also created the figure of the hearing officer.65  This is a civil 
servant in the Commission department responsible for competition (Directorate-General for 
Competition) who presides at the oral hearing.  Her primary function is to ensure that the hearing 
is fair by allowing the parties to present their statements, putting questions to the parties, entering 
new evidence into the record, and allowing witnesses to give testimony.  At the conclusion of the 
oral hearing, the Hearing Officer issues a report in which she summarizes the proceedings, draws 
conclusions from the hearing, and makes recommendations for new evidence-gathering if she 
believes it to be necessary.66
Lastly, when the Council enacted a European merger law, based on a proposal from the 
Commission, all of the procedural guarantees developed in the context of Article 85 and 86 (now 
81 and 82) enforcement actions were extended to merger proceedings.67  Firms, therefore, that 
seek to obtain clearance for a merger enjoy the same procedural rights as firms under 
investigation for engaging in anti-competitive practices or abusing a dominant position under 
Articles 85 and 86 (now 81 and 82).  
2.  The historical juncture: Accession of the United Kingdom
What explains the choice that has been made in favor of a detailed statement of 
objections, full disclosure of all the evidence, and a hearing presided by a civil servant 
independent of the investigating officers?  In this section I demonstrate that UK accession in 
1973 represented a critical test of the European system of legal authority because of the different 
common law understanding of lawful administrative action.  As explained earlier and analyzed in 
depth below, under English law, individuals enjoy rights in administrative proceedings similar to 
those to which they are entitled in the courts.68  The Commission's administrative procedure, 
based as it was on the droit administratif systems of the original six Member States, did not 
afford the same rights.  The incompatibility between the European mode of exercising 
enforcement powers and the British conception of good government posed a challenge to the 
Court of Justice’s and Commission's legal authority over British citizens, on British territory.  
Here I show that the Court of Justice and the Commission adopted the British mental map of fair 
administration and that they did so for the strategic reason of appeasing British judges and 
lawyers and thus extending their authority to the UK.
65
 See 2001/462/EC, ECSC: Commission Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain 
competition proceedings, 2001 O.J. (L 162) 21.  The position was first created in 1982 and then modified in 1990. See Notice on 
procedures for applying the competition articles of the EEC and ECSC Treaties (Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and 65 and 
66 of the ECSC Treaty), 1982 O.J. (C 251) 2;  Commission Decision of 8 September 1982: 13th Report on Competition Policy 
273 (1983) (setting down “terms of reference” of Hearing Officer); Commission Decision of 23 November 1990: 20th Report on 
Competition Policy 312 (1991) (modifying “terms of reference” of Hearing Officer); Harmut Johannes, The Role of the Hearing 
Officer, 1989 Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 000 (B Hawk ed., 1990).
66
 See 20001/462/ECSC: Commission Decision of 23 May 2001, supra note__, at art. 8.  
67
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 1990 O.J. 
(L 257) 13, at art. 8.  This has been replaced from May 1st, 2004 by Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.  See also the 
implementing regulation, Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1. 
68
 To refer to the country, I use the noun “UK.”  Since the legal system of the UK is comprised of separate courts for England and 
Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland on the other hand, and most of the cases come from England, I generally use the adjective 
“English” to modify “law” when I refer exclusively to the judge-made principles of the common law.  When I refer more broadly 
to the statutes and the legislative activities of Parliament, which generally apply throughout the UK, and the activities of 
government administration, which also generally apply throughout the UK, as well as the judge-made law of the courts, I used 
the adjective “British” to modify “law.” 
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a.  The common law challenge:  The principle of natural justice compared to the French droit 
de la défense and the German rechtlichen gehörs
As explained earlier, one of the most significant differences between the droit 
administratif systems of the founding Member States and English law is the extent to which 
administrative decisionmaking is proceduralized.  The picture that was drawn of the two 
principal European traditions, however, was impressionistic.  Especially in administrative law, 
generalization is perilous since administrative procedures and the stringency of judicial review 
can differ dramatically from one government department to the next, one field to another.  To 
show that the Commission's administrative procedure was first designed on the droit 
administratif model of the six original Member States and then was transformed to mimic the 
minority common law model,  I enter into the details of administrative law in the Member States, 
in particular, competition law, which would have been the natural reference point for the civil 
servants, lawyers, and judges designing Commission procedure.  I examine first the law of 
France, the place where the droit administratif model originated, then I review the features of 
German law that depart significantly from the droit administratif,  and finally I compare the two 
systems to the English common law.
In France, the right to make one's case before an administrative decision can be issued is 
known as the rights of the defense (droits de la défense).  The right dates back to 1944, when the 
French Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) recognized that individuals have the right, above and 
beyond any of the rights created by the legislator in an enabling statute, to refute the 
administration's version of the facts if the decision constitutes a sanction.69  In the case, Dame 
Veuve Trompier-Gravier, the prefect (préfet) of  the Seine region (département) had revoked a 
newspaper kiosk permit based on the defendant's alleged misconduct without giving the 
defendant the opportunity to refute the charges against her.70  The Conseil d'Etat found in favor 
of dame veuve Trompier-Gravier and annulled the prefect's decision based on a theory of general 
principles of law (principes généraux du droit), among which figured the rights of defense.  In 
French administrative and constitutional law, this judgment constituted an extraordinary turning 
point, for it was the first in a long line of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat created whole cloth, 
without a textual basis, general principles of law that French administration is required to obey.71
The Conseil d'Etat in Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier disregarded, for the first time, the 
fundamental tenet of French constitutional law under which the law (la loi) enacted by 
Parliament is the expression of the sovereign French people and judges are to apply the law, 
never make it.
Notwithstanding the significance of the rights of defense for French public law, it is 
critical to appreciate the limits of the right compared to the common law tradition.   It only 
applies to administrative sanctions.  And sanctions comprise only a subset of administrative 
determinations that impose hardship on individuals.  The determination must involve personal 
facts (caractère personnel) that go to the behavior of the individual concerned for it to be 
considered a sanction. 72  Sanctions are distinct from three broad classes of individualized 
decisions:  administrative acts that rest entirely within the discretion of the administration and 
where a hearing of the parties would have no impact;73 administrative acts that are non-
discretionary because they draw the necessary consequences from a previous administrative or 
69
 The Council of State is the highest French court responsible for reviewing decisions of government administration.  
70
 Dame Veuve Trompier-Gravier, 5 May 1944, Recueil Conseil d'Etat, p. 133.  
71
 See Marceau Long, Prosper Weil, Guy Braibant, Pierre Delvolvé & Bruno Genvois, Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence 
administrative 352-53 (14th ed. 2003).
72
 Commissaire du gouvernement (Guy Braibant), Conclusions from Conseil d'Etat, January 8, 1960, Min. Intérieur c. Rohmer.
73
 Jean-Marie Auby & Roland Drago, Traité des recours en matière administrative 427 (1992).
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judicial determination and where, again, a hearing of the parties would have no impact;74 and 
police measures (mésures de police), characterized as forward-looking decisions, adopted to 
protect public safety or health,  which concern the whole public and only incidentally affect the 
interests of a specific individual .75  In sum, the rights of defense are far from universally 
recognized in the daily decisionmaking of French administration, even in decisions that name 
particular individuals or are clearly directed at certain individuals or firms.76
In addition, the procedure required of the administration is extremely abbreviated 
compared to what would be expected in a judicial proceeding.  The party must be informed that 
the government is contemplating a sanction, she must be informed of all the charges against her 
(griefs), and she must be able to present her case in such a way as to be able to influence the 
administration's decision (présenter utilement sa défense).77  With the exception of disciplinary 
proceedings involving state employees, the duty to inform the party of the factual and legal basis 
of the contemplated decision does not include the communication of all the administration's 
evidence, rather it entails a summary description of the facts at issue in the case.  Furthermore, 
the manner in which an individual is entitled to present her case depends on the circumstances of 
the particular decision and does not entail, as a rule, an oral hearing.78
At the time that the European Commission was given powers in the competition area, 
France also had legislation prohibiting certain types of inter-firm agreements and abuses of 
dominant positions.79  The administrative enforcement mechanism comported with the 
bureaucratic rationality ideal and the limited nature of the rights of defense in French law. The 
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs was required to refer a suspected competition 
infringement to a special commission appointed by the government and known as the Technical 
Commission on Cartels and Dominant Positions (Commission Technique des Ententes et des 
Positions Dominantes).80  The Commission appointed a rapporteur to investigate the matter and 
draft a report and a separate advisory opinion that would then circulate to the members of the 
Commission, the parties, and any government ministries that might be concerned.81   The firms 
accused of the anti-competitive behavior had the right to submit written observations on the 
report, but were not permitted to see the evidence in the file.  Moreover, when the Commission 
met to consider and vote on the case, the parties did not have the right to appear in person and, 
even when they were permitted to appear, they generally were not allowed representation by a 
74
 Long et al., supra note__ at 356, point 8b).
75
 Auby & Drago, supra note _ at 427.  
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 My analysis is based on the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat.  A number of legislative texts provide greater protection for 
rights of the defense.  The most significant are the Presidential Decree of 28 November 1983 and the Law of 12 April 2000. 
Under Article 8 of the Decree and Article 24 of the Law, all administrative acts that must be accompanied by a statement of 
reasons under an earlier law (Law of 11 July 1979) must also allow for an adversary proceeding (une procédure contradictoire), 
which in French legal terminology is the equivalent of respect for the rights of the defense.  See Long et al., supra note__ at 355, 
point 7.  The acts covered are all those that are unfavorable (défavorable) to the interested party or that derogate from a standard 
legal rule (une décision dérogatoire).  Jean-Bernard Auby, Juris-Classeur Administratif,  Fascicule 107-20, at 14, point 110 
(1998).  The Decree and the Law have extended the right of defense in a number of ways, for instance, by requiring a hearing 
even in the case of police measures.  However, this legislation post-dates the developments in the Court of Justice and the 
Commission analyzed below and therefore cannot serve to explain rights in Commission proceedings.
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 Auby & Drago, supra note__ at 429.
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 This is another element of administrative procedure which was altered by the Decree of 1983.  In the administrative 
proceedings covered by the Decree, individuals have the right to submit written observations and to give an oral presentation of 
their case.   See Auby, supra note __ at 15, point 113. 
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 See Decree 53-704 of August 9, 1953, 1953 J.O. 7045  (anti-competitive agreements); Law 63-628 of July 2, 1963, 1963 J.O. 
5915 (abuse of dominant position).  See Eric E. Bergsten, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices in France, II Business 
Regulation in the Common Market Nations 1, 109-12  (Harlan Morse Blake ed., 1969).  
80
 See Bergsten, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices in France, supra note__ at 122-26; V.G. Venturini, Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices in France 88-100 (1971).    
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 The provisions of the government regulation setting down the procedure of the Commission and the Ministry, Decree No. 54-
97 of 27 January 1954, are reproduced in Venturini, supra note __ at 98n.41.  
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lawyer since, as one contemporary commentator put it, "the Commission has apparently found 
that lawyers are too technical and want to argue the law, which the Commission feels is not 
helpful before an economic advisory body."82    The Commission's opinion would then be issued 
to the parties and sent to the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs for a final decision on the
infringement and the appropriate remedial action.  The Commission's recommendation, although 
technically non-binding, was considered an administrative act, subject to outside scrutiny in the 
Conseil d'Etat.83  Hence, in France, the specifics of the administration of competition policy fell 
into line with the basic features of the droit administratif tradition:  there were few procedural 
rights before the deciding authorities but access to the Conseil d'Etat for scrutiny of the merits of 
the decision was guaranteed.
The only mental map of rights and administrative authority that departed significantly 
from the droit administratif model in the first decades of the European Commission was German 
law.  Although, broadly speaking, the German system is grouped with the droit administratif
countries, it possessed, and continues to possess, certain unique features.  In the realm of 
administrative procedure, it afforded greater protection for individuals.  The federal 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1976, which codifies long-standing principles of administrative 
law, requires that before an administrative authority issues an individual act (Verwaltungsakt) 
that interferes with rights the parties have a right to be heard (rechtlichen gehörs).  Interfering 
with rights captures a wider class of administrative action than the French concept of sanction.84
The administration is under a duty to inform the interested party (Beteiligten) of all the facts and 
evidence relevant to the decision and give the interested party an opportunity to controvert 
them.85  Individuals have the right to a written decision in which the essential factual and legal 
grounds of the decision are given.86 Unlike French law, individuals have a right of appeal 
against the act within the administration (Vorverfahren), as well as a right of appeal to the 
courts.87  However, as a rule, and contrary to the English common law, administrative authorities 
are not under a duty to allow the interested party to examine all of the evidence, independent of 
the relevance to the party's case, or to make oral representations.  Moreover, administrative 
authorities are not required to afford an independent, neutral adjudicator to take evidence and 
consider the government’s case against the individual, as in the common law tradition. 
In competition proceedings as well, German administrative procedure differed from the 
French procedure.  The parties before the German Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) had the 
standard right to notice of the charges and the evidence, the right to respond with a written 
statement, and the right to receive a reasoned decision. 88  In contrast to ordinary administrative 
procedure and the proceedings before the French Technical Commission, the parties also had a 
right to an oral hearing.89  However, again, they did not have a right of access to all of the 
evidence in government's file90 nor were the administrative officials responsible for the 
investigation independent from those who took the final decision.
82
 See Bergsten, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices in France, supra note__ at 124.  
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 Societé La Langouste, cited in Bergsten, The Law of Restrictive Trade Practices in France, supra note__ at 125.
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 See Georg Ress, Due Process in the Administrative Procedure in 3 Federation Internationale Pour Le Droit Europeen (FIDE), 
Due process in the administrative procedure, Rapports du 8eme Congres, 22-24 Juin 1978, 4.1, 4.10 (1978).
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 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [Federal Administrative Procedures Act or “VwVfG”], §§ 28, 29.
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54,56); 
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 See GWB, § 53 (now § 56).
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 See infra text accompanying note__ (discussing limited access to administration's evidence in German competition 
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Procedural duties in English administrative law, known as the principles of natural 
justice, are more extensive.  Natural justice is one of a number of requirements that English 
courts impose, as a matter of judge-made common law, on government administration.  The 
courts interpret parliamentary statutes delegating powers to the administration as containing 
certain conditions for the lawful exercise of powers.  The administration may not commit errors 
of fact and law, exercise discretion so that its decisions are unreasonable or based upon irrelevant 
considerations, or make decisions without respecting the procedures of natural justice.  Should 
the administration breach any one of these principles, the courts will hold administrative action 
to be ultra vires.91  These common law doctrines are so engrained that it is hard to envisage a 
parliamentary statute that would be interpreted by the courts to authorize the administration to 
act in breach.  Notwithstanding the British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, it 
would be extremely difficult for Parliament to write a statute that an English court would 
interpret as permitting errors of fact or law, authorizing unreasonable acts, allowing decisions 
based on irrelevant considerations, or permitting disrespect for natural justice.
Natural justice comprises two elements: officials are forbidden from deciding cases in 
which they may be biased (nemo judex in re sua or "no man a judge in his own cause")  and 
every person has a right to be fairly heard (audi alteram partem or "hear the other side").92  Both 
can be traced back to cases decided in the second half of the 1800's, in which decisions of local 
administrative authorities were quashed because they had disregarded the rules of natural 
justice.93 The rule against bias has no equivalent in French or German administrative law.  Bias 
can stem from a number of sources, including a pecuniary interest in the matter, a personal or 
family relationship to the parties, prejudging the outcome before hearing all of the evidence, and 
the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.94  Some of the most common 
sources of bias in government administration, however, are permitted by the courts.  For 
instance, if a minister decides a matter  pursuant to a delegation from Parliament, it will be 
considered lawful notwithstanding the fact that civil servants under his direction might have been 
responsible for investigating the case or that the minister might have prejudged the matter by 
announcing a department policy.95
The right to be fairly heard overlaps with the droits de la défense  and the rechtlichen 
gehörs but applies to a broader array of administrative action than the French right and entails 
more extensive duties than both the French and German rights.  Under English case law, 
administration must respect the right to be heard whenever it plans to take a decision that 
adversely affects the legal rights or interests of an individual.96  Although the characterization of 
what is a legal right or interest narrows the application of the right, it is nowhere as restrictive as 
the French limiting principle of a sanction.  Administrative decisions that are entirely forward-
looking, discretionary, or policy-driven, must nonetheless respect the right to be heard.  As a 
result, administrative decisions such as land-use planning, the allocation of funds to local 
administrative authorities, and the awarding of licenses to first-time applicants can only be made 
after the affected parties have an opportunity to make themselves heard.97  As for the content of 
the right, the courts have held that it includes the right to know the government's case, including 
91
 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, supra note__ at 37.
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 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, supra note __ at 445, 469.  
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 See, e.g., R. v. Rand (1866) LR 1 QB (rule against bias) (discussed in Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, supra note__ at 
448); Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180 (right to a fair hearing) (discussed in Wade & Forsyth, 
Administrative Law, supra note __ at 473).  
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 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law, supra note __ at 460-66.   
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the evidence and reports in the government's possession.98  The parties are also entitled, as a 
general matter, to present their case directly before the deciding authority, although sometimes 
written submissions are all that is required.99  Thus, English administrative procedure differs 
from its French and German counterparts in both the extent to which the parties have the 
opportunity to examine the government's evidence and the emphasis on oral hearings.
The principles of natural justice have not only been developed by common law courts, 
but have also been given effect by parliamentary statutes establishing the institutions of the 
British administrative state.100  In the early part of the 1900's, a number of special tribunals were 
created to administer the social legislation of the welfare state and  they have since multiplied in 
virtually all policy domains.  Tribunals exist for awarding social security benefits, allocating 
fishing licenses, deciding on child support, determining whether companies have infringed 
information privacy laws, and myriad other policy areas.101 Tribunals are charged with making 
decisions that in droit administratif systems would be made by government ministries.  Tribunals 
are analogous to courts in that they are independent of the ministry responsible for the policy 
area in which they adjudicate.102   Furthermore, their proceedings are adversarial:  the 
government presents the case against the defendant and the defendant has the opportunity to 
respond.  They are different from ordinary common law courts because they are specialized--
their jurisdiction is limited to one administrative scheme—and their procedure is abbreviated 
compared to a civil or criminal trial.  Appeals on questions of law decided by administrative 
tribunals can be taken to the ordinary courts.  
The other type of legislative scheme designed to give effect to the dictates of natural 
justice is the statutory inquiry.  Inquiries are established in areas where, ultimately, the decision 
is a discretionary one entrusted to a minister, but where it is believed that the minister should 
listen to what the public has to say on the matter.  A civil servant is tasked with conducting a fair
hearing of all of the interested parties and then making a recommendation to the minister. 103
This is the procedure that is followed before the government may acquire land, build roads or 
airports, alter certain types of health services, and make a number of other types of 
administrative decisions.  The case law and the parliamentary practice of establishing tribunals in 
the place of bureaucracies and statutory inquiries in the place of exclusive ministerial power 
demonstrate the extent to which the principle of natural justice permeates the fabric of British 
administration.  
At the time that the UK joined the European Community, the enforcement of British 
competition policy adhered to the principle of natural justice.  The institutional apparatus was 
split between the Restrictive Practices Court and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.   
The Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) was a full-fledged administrative tribunal, with 
jurisdiction over cartels and certain forms of vertical agreements in restriction of competition.104
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was also organized as an administrative 
tribunal but it only had the power to make recommendations on mergers and anti-competitive 
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practices to the administration.105  The government ministry, namely the Department of Trade 
and Industry, was responsible for deciding on the appropriate prohibitions.  In sum, cartel policy 
was the province of a classic administrative tribunal and fully in line with the principles of 
natural justice.  Monopolies and merger policy was administered through the combination of a 
commission independent of the government, before which individuals had a right to be heard, 
and discretionary ministerial decisionmaking, without procedural guarantees for individuals.  In 
both cartels and mergers, however, the contrast with the French Commission Technique and the 
German Bundeskartellamt is evident. 
The Commission procedure set down in 1962 and 1963 fell in line with the procedural 
guarantees of French and German competition law.  As in both French and German law,  the 
parties had the right to learn of the government's essential facts and arguments, respond in 
writing, and receive a reasoned final decision.  As in German law,  the parties also had the right 
to an oral hearing.  However, the Commission was not required to inform the parties of every 
aspect of the planned decision, reveal all of the evidence and reveal it directly to the parties, or  
provide for a neutral third party to officiate the administrative proceeding.  As in the French and 
German systems, it was believed that any injustice that could arise from such defects could be 
remedied when the administrative decision was appealed to the Court of Justice.  In 1973, this 
view was called into question. 
b.  National value:  The influence of the English right to a fair hearing
The English principle of natural justice influenced both the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice and the European Commission's self-imposed procedural reforms.  UK accession brought 
a marked shift in the Court's doctrine on procedural rights in competition law.106  In 1966, in the 
very first challenge to a Commission competition decision, the parties raised the question of the 
adequacy of their rights in the course of the Commission’s proceedings.  The parties claimed, 
and the Court dismissed, a right to examine Commission evidence, the very same right that the 
Court declared in 1979 to part of a fundamental  "right to be heard."  Consten and Grundig, firms 
that had been denied an exemption under Article 85(3) for their exclusive distributorship 
contract, argued that the Commission had violated their rights of defense.107  They argued that 
they should have had the right to receive and examine all of the evidence gathered in the 
Commission’s investigation. Consten and Grundig were especially keen to examine memoranda 
from the French and German authorities responding to questions posed by the Commission, 
which they believed had influenced the Commission’s decision.
Advocate General Roemer rejected their claims, followed by the Court, largely based on 
the finding that the Commission procedure comported with the procedure followed by national 
competition authorities and, in particular, the German one.108  The Advocate General recognized 
that there was a “right to be fully heard” (rechtlichen gehörs) but that, as far as the right to 
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examine the evidence was concerned, Consten and Grundig only had the right to a summary of 
the facts that the Commission used in support of the competition decision.  The Advocate 
General based his conclusion on the law governing the German Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt):  
A clear summary of their contents [documents that served as the basis for the 
decision], which allows those concerned to learn without difficulty of the essential 
lines of the opinion of the third parties concerned, is enough.  These are also the 
principles which govern the procedure before the Bundeskartellamt.  (Cf. Müller-
Henneberg and Schwartz, ‘Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und 
Europäisches Kartellrecht’, 2nd ed., p. 959.) 109
The Court followed the Advocate General.110
In 1970, when the Commission used for the first time its power to impose fines, the 
parties challenged the decision on similar procedural grounds and again they were rejected by the 
Advocate General and the Court, with one small exception.  In ACF Chemiefarma v. 
Commission, a number of quinine producers were found to have participated in a price-fixing 
cartel.  They argued that the Commission’s statement of objections was not sufficiently precise; 
that the Commission should have communicated all of the evidence in the file, or in the 
alternative, should have communicated the documents that served as evidence for the 
Commission’s allegations; and that the final decision was defective because it did not address 
arguments made by the parties on the nature of the pharmaceuticals market.111  The Commission, 
as it had in Consten and Grundig, relied on the absence of a duty to disclose the file in the cartel 
laws of the Member States in defending its procedure.112  The Advocate General rejected all of 
the quinine producers’ procedural challenges and, for the most part, the Court followed.113  Only 
on the question of whether the Commission had to disclose the records from staff visits to certain 
firms or whether it could simply summarize the results of the investigation, did the Court hedge.  
It said that the Commission should have communicated the records, but when the Court went on 
to examine the prejudice to ACF Chemiefarma, it found it to be minimal.  The failure to 
communicate the documents and allow for critical examination of the proof led to the conclusion 
that the Commission had failed to prove its case in one limited respect:  the life of the ten-year 
cartel, and hence the amount of the fine, was reduced by seven months.114
The next competition case, decided in 1972,  produced no surprises.  In ICI v. 
Commission, the member of a dyestuffs price-fixing cartel challenged the Commission’s fine.  
The complainant alleged a similar litany of procedural defects and, again, the Advocate General 
and the Court rejected them.115
By 1974, the tone of the Court had changed dramatically.  Transocean Marine Paint 
Association v. Commission was one of the first competition cases to be decided after the 
accession of the UK.116  Transocean, an association of marine paint manufacturers, operated a 
world-wide sales network for its members.  It had previously notified the Commission of the 
agreement, and had obtained an Article 86 (3) exemption.  When Transocean applied for renewal 
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of the exemption, the Commission sent Transocean a notice of objections in which the conditions 
being contemplated by the Commission in order to ensure that the agreement would not have 
anti-competitive effects were listed.  After giving Transocean the opportunity to make written 
and oral submissions, the Commission issued the final decision.  There, according to Transocean, 
was a condition that had not been notified to the parties:   Transocean’s members would have to 
disclose cross-holding patterns between their directors and other firms in the paint sector.  
Transocean challenged the decision on the grounds that it could not have anticipated the 
condition from the proceedings and hence never had the opportunity to make its views know.
The Advocate General assigned to the case was one of the new British members of the 
Court, Advocate General Warner.  He agreed with the Commission that the procedure was 
perfectly consistent with the letter of the applicable law.  Nonetheless, Advocate General Warner 
concluded that the “right to be heard” was part of Community law and that by imposing what 
amounted to an entirely new condition without hearing  the parties, the Commission breached the 
right and the new condition had to be annulled.117  The Advocate General based his conclusion 
on a long excursion into the laws of the Member States.   He first gave what amounted to a text 
book statement of the English rule:
There is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries that an 
administrative authority, before wielding a statutory power to the detriment of a 
particular person, must in general hear what the person has to say about the 
matter, even if the statute does not expressly require it. Audi alteram partem or, as 
it is sometimes expressed, ‘audiatur et altera pars’. 118
He then launched into an extensive discussion of the English "rule of natural justice" under 
which “although there are not positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, 
yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.”119  The Advocate 
General then canvassed the traditions of other Member States.  In his tally, England, Scotland, 
Denmark, Germany, and Ireland clearly embraced the principle, while France, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg were arguably evolving in that direction, and Italy and the Netherlands clearly 
rejected it.  His results did not support a declaration that the right was ubiquitous or even that it 
was a majority tradition.  Nonetheless, he concluded:
My Lords, that review, which I have sought to keep short, of the laws of the 
Member States, must, I think, on balance, lead to the conclusion that the right to 
be heard forms part of those rights which the ‘law’ referred to in Article 164 of 
the Treaty upholds, and of which, accordingly it is the duty of this Court to ensure 
the observance.120
The Court embraced the common law principle put forward by the Advocate General.  
For the first time, it found that there was a “general rule” that: “a person whose interests are 
perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to 
make his point of view known.”121  In the past, the Court had framed its review of the 
Commission’s procedures as a matter of policing respect for the rights of defense set down in the
competition laws.   In Transocean, by contrast, the Court announced a higher principle that that 
could be used to supplement the competition laws.  The Court concluded by annulling the 
condition and sending the case back to the Commission for further proceedings, in which the 
parties could make their views know.
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By the time the Court decided the next major competition case involving procedural 
issues, it was clear that the tide had turned towards a court-like administrative process.  
Hoffman-La Roche, a manufacturer of vitamins, was found by the Commission to have engaged 
in an abuse of a dominant position by forcing buyer firms to purchase all of their supplies from 
Hoffman-La Roche.122  Hoffman- La Roche objected to the Commission’s procedure on the same 
grounds as the parties in the pre-Transocean cases:  in the course of the administrative 
proceeding, the Commission had not allowed Hoffman to inspect certain documents which 
supported the findings of fact in the Commission’s final decision.  Hoffman argued that the 
Commission had breached the right to be heard.  This time, the Court agreed.  
The extent to which the new, English tradition had transformed the judge-made law of 
rights before the Commission is graphically illustrated by the difference between the opinion of 
the Advocate General and the judgment of the Court.  Advocate General Reischel recommended 
to the Court that it find against Hoffman-La Roche.  As his predecessor Advocate General 
Roemer had done in Consten and Grundig,  the Advocate General looked to the procedural 
guarantees in German competition law for guidance.  Like Roemer, he observed that, under 
German law, the parties to the administrative proceeding only had a right to a summary of the 
evidence, not the right to examine the evidence for themselves:
According to [the German Law Against Restrictions on Competition] in 
administrative proceedings the only applicable principle is that the persons 
concerned must have the opportunity to give their views on the objections laid 
against them and that a decision cannot be found on facts of which the parties 
concerned were unaware.  The way in which the Bundeskartellamt (the Federal 
Cartel Office) applies this principle is evidently to cumminicate [sic] only the 
essential content of the pleadings, and in particular to notify them only of the 
essential purport of the views of the other parties concerned.  There is no right to 
carry out a thorough inspection of documents . . . .123
The Advocate General found that  there was “no general legal principle” giving a right to 
inspect documents and therefore, recommended that the Court find against Hoffman La-
Roche.
The Advocate General showed himself to be behind the times.  With UK 
accession, the nature of Europe’s legal system had radically changed.  The common law’s 
principle of natural justice had replaced the German law of procedural rights as the 
yardstick against which European authority had to be measured.  Thus the Court declined 
to follow the Advocate General and departed from the cases decided before accession.  
The Court declared, for the first time, that the right to be heard was a “fundamental 
principle of Community law” and that the ability to examine the Commission’s evidence 
was part and parcel of the right: 
[I]n order to respect the principle of the right to be heard the undertakings 
concerned must have been afforded the opportunity during the administrative 
procedure to make known their views on the truth and relevance of the facts and 
circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the Commission to support 
its claim that there has been an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty.124
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The rejection of the earlier case law is striking.  Both the timing of the change in the Court’s 
doctrine, as well as the reasoning of the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, in which the Court 
categorized “the right to be heard” in much the same terms as Advocate General Warner in the 
earlier Transocean case, support the conclusion that European administrative law came under the 
spell of the English common law.  In the twenty-five years of competition cases that have since 
followed, the European Courts have worked out the ramifications of  the fundamental principle 
of the—now European-- “right to be heard.”  
The background of how the Commission came to adopt the figure of the hearing officer 
at the oral phase of competition proceedings also demonstrates the common law’s influence on 
individual rights before the Commission.  The historical record shows that the Commission drew 
upon the common law's rule against bias, the second element of natural justice.  As mentioned 
earlier, in 1982, the Commission announced that a civil servant, unconnected with the 
investigation, would preside at the oral hearing at which parties accused of anti-competitive 
behavior give testimony and refute the Commission’s evidence.125  According to a number of 
sources, this innovation occurred in response to a damning report from the House of Lords 
European Communities Select Committee.126  There, the House of Lords criticized the European 
Commission for combining the functions of judge and prosecutor, in breach of the second 
principle of natural justice.  The Select Committee said:
It is clearly essential that the rules and proceedings of the Commission should be 
seen to be just and fair as well as effective.  The evidence received by the 
Committee revealed that there exists widespread doubt whether the Commission’s 
procedures are just and fair to undertakings whose practices are under 
investigation. . . .  For most witnesses, including the Bar and Law Society, the 
grounds for believing that there was “room for improvement” were derived from 
the fact that the Commission combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor, 
and judge.  In general it was urged that the requirements of natural justice  should, 
as far as is possible, be observed in the adjudication by the Commission of all 
contentious or disputed cases and that there should be no departure from natural 
justice on grounds of administrative convenience.127
Since the existing treaty framework would not allow for the appointment of an independent  
figure, similar to a member of a British administrative tribunal, the Committee suggested that a 
civil servant, removed from the Commission’s investigation, be brought in at the hearing phase:
The Committee suggest that the creation of an additional post of Director in 
Directorate-General IV [the Commission competition department] should be 
considered.  The Director so appointed would enter the case at the stage of the 
preliminary meeting [the Committee also recommended introducing a preliminary 
meeting in which the parties would be able to clarify the factual basis and 
reasoning of the complaint] over which he would preside.  He would also preside 
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over the oral hearing, and would assume, within Directorate-General IV, 
responsibility for the subsequent conduct of the case.128
The Commission very shortly afterwards took on board the crux of the House of Lord’s 
recommendation by creating the figure of the hearing officer.  
The House of Lords exercised a similar influence over the Commission’s decision to 
disclose all of the evidence to the parties, regardless of whether or not the Commission 
considered the evidence relevant and hence relied on it to build its case.129  Although the 
Committee’s report was only published in February 1982, its inquiry began one year earlier.  The 
Committee put a number of questions to the European Commission on competition procedure, 
circulated the critical comments of British lawyers to the European Commission, and called upon 
a high- ranking civil servant responsible for competition (Mr. Pappalardo, Director, DG IV)  to 
testify before the Committee.  The British Lords on the Committee had this to say to the Italian 
Director about the Commission’s practice of only allowing companies to examine the evidence 
the Commission deemed relevant:
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton.  Without wishing to be more offensive than I can 
help, Mr. Pappalardo, the difficulty is that if the company concerned knows that 
the judge has in his file under the table a whole lot more documents but does not 
quite know what those other documents are, it is apt to leave the company in a 
dissatisfied position.  That is the trouble, is it not?
Chairman (Lord Scarman)
The Court said in the La Roche case that the Commission must produce the 
documents on which they rely.  What troubles the undertaking is that there are 
other documents on which the Commission has not chosen to rely and they want 
to know what they say?—I know [Mr. Pappalardo].  This is the problem.  There 
are various answers to that, not simply the dogmatic approach that since this is an 
administrative procedure we do not need to go that far. . . .  It is unthinkable for 
any official of DG IV to have a document which would be favourable to the 
company and to forget it in order to punish the company.
Chairman.  You might not understand the document.  You might not see that it 
was helpful to the undertaking?  . . . . I cannot exclude that. [Mr. Pappalardo]  
However, it seems to me somewhat theoretical.130
The House of Lords final report recommended that the Commission give access to the entire file 
and the Commission, shortly thereafter, did precisely that.
In making the recommendation, the House of Lords relied on a recent opinion of 
Advocate General Warner.  There the British Advocate General had criticized the Commission 
for not disclosing all of the information to the parties to a competition proceeding.  He recited yet 
another classic common law maxim:  
The Commission seems to me moreover to have overlooked that “justice must not 
only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done.”  Justice is not seen to be 
done if there is concealed from an undertaking, for no imperative reason, part of 
the text of a complaint made against it.131
This passage from the House of Lords’ report illustrates vividly how British lawyers, statesmen, 
and judges throughout the European system, on both national and supranational government 
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bodies, working with the British mental map of legitimate administration, joined together to 
challenge the droit administratif way of governing.  The critique from judges and lawyers 
socialized in the common law tradition spurred yet another transformation in European 
competition law in the direction of a quasi-judicial administrative process.  
c.  Supranational interest:  The interest of the Court of Justice and the Commission in 
extending European legal authority
Why did the Court and the Commission alter the rights available in administrative 
proceedings in accordance with the English principle of natural justice?  After all, the UK was a 
vastly outnumbered minority.  In 1973, it was only one of two common law Member States in a 
European Community of nine Member States, the rest of which were members of the droit 
administratif family or represented variations on the droit administratif system.  The same is true 
today.  The answer lies in the distinctive European system of legal authority.  Enforcement of 
European law relies upon national administrations, police, and, most importantly in the rights 
context, courts.   The Commission can issue decisions and the Court of Justice can hand down 
judgments, but unless national courts are willing to enforce European law against  individuals,  
the decisions of the European institutions exist on paper only.  When the UK acceded and British 
lawyers, judges, and statesmen launched the natural justice attack, the Court and the Commission 
came under immense pressure to accommodate them.  The consequence of failing to do so was 
English courts unwilling to enforce Commission competition decisions because the time-honored 
rights of their citizens had been breached.  The Court and the Commission reformed competition 
proceedings and adopted the right to be heard with the objective of bringing the UK into the 
European system of legal authority. 
There is a stark and an infinitely more subtle and realistic way of rendering the European 
dynamic of legal authority.  First, the stark account.132  To execute any decision against an 
individual or firm, the Commission and the Court of Justice rely on national administrations and 
national courts.  A firm that does not comply with a Commission competition decision and the 
Court of Justice judgment upholding that decision can only be brought into line—and a bank 
account attached or an individual detained for contempt of court--through the decision of a 
national government officer, upheld in national court. If the government officer and the judge are 
unwilling to enforce the Commission’s decision, it becomes an obligation in the international law 
sphere rather than an authoritative command in the positivist sense.133  Especially at the 
beginnings of European integration, the Commission and the Court were intensely  aware of the 
limits of their enforcement authority and this awareness contributed to the making of European 
law.134  A Commission decision or Court of Justice judgment could not blatantly disregard 
national cultural traditions of the lawful exercise of public power.  The judges on the Court of 
Justice were particularly attune to the need to accommodate their British brethern, given the 
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sensibilities of judges to rights claims and the imperatives of protecting individual freedoms in 
the face of oppressive government action.
The subtle version of the cooperation dynamic builds on the stark one.  In making 
decisions and rendering judgments, European judges and administrators take seriously objections 
from their counterparts at the national level, schooled in their distinct traditions of public law.135
A national jurist’s claim that European authority has been exercised unfairly must be examined 
with extreme care.  To put it slightly differently, one of the most important interpretive sources 
for determining the scope and limits of the power conferred on the Commission by the EC Treaty 
are national legal traditions.  As the Court has repeatedly stated, “the Court draws inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”136  But, different from what 
the Court says, there sometimes does not exist a common tradition.  Hence, when it comes to 
determining the limits of European public power, in the absence of a common tradition, it is the 
tradition that will object loudest to the particular exercise of public power that prevails.  This 
solicitude for national understandings of legitimate, rights-abiding public authority is related to 
the absence of European enforcement powers and the corresponding strategic need for 
cooperation from national courts and administrations, but it runs far deeper.  It now can be said 
to define the new, European constitutional tradition.137
My explanation for the powerful influence of a minority rights tradition is largely based 
on speculation.  However, there is significant evidence that the Court of Justice was aware of the 
consequences of disregarding national mental maps of fair and rights-abiding government 
administration.  In the first years of the European Community, individuals indeed did go to their 
national courts to protest Commission decisions and national courts were willing to review the 
decisions, to ensure that their citizens were not subject to arbitrary and unlawful exercises of 
public power.  The case in point is the challenge brought in the Italian courts by a number of 
Italian steel producers to a fine issued by the High Authority, the predecessor to the Commission 
and the executive branch for the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
Treaty (ECSC Treaty). 
In 1965, the Italian Constitutional Court was asked by a trial court in Turin to consider 
the constitutionality of a decision issued by the High Authority. 138  The challenge was based on 
exactly the same type of argument that, had the Court of Justice not incorporated the right to be 
heard eight years later, might have been made by British litigants:  the High Authority’s decision 
and the review available in the Court of Justice did not satisfy national constitutional principles 
135
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systems.
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of lawful administrative action.  The facts are as follows.  Under the ECSC Treaty, the High 
Authority had the power to regulate the production of steel in the Member States, including the 
power to impose certain taxes related to the importation and use of scrap iron for steel 
production.139  In 1961, the High Authority requested that producers forward original invoices 
documenting their electricity consumption, or certified copies of the invoices, as one means of 
monitoring and verifying the amounts of scrap iron being consumed by individual steel plants.   
Ten Italian companies replied that they could not comply for various reasons and that the request 
was unlawful.  The High Authority then issued an order pursuant to its information-gathering 
powers under the Treaty.140  The steel companies brought a challenge in the European Court of 
Justice and the Court upheld the order.141
Four days later, the High Authority issued new decisions to the parties, imposing fairly 
significant fines for the failure to comply with the first order (0.5% of the companies’ annual 
turnover) and fining the companies additional amounts for the each day’s delay in failing to 
produce the documents, counted from the date of notification of the second set of decisions 
(2.5% of the daily turnover for nine of the companies and 5% for the tenth company).142  This 
time, the parties challenged the High Authority’s order in both Italian court and the European 
Court of Justice.  For its part, the Court of Justice upheld the fine, with one exception.  It found 
that given that the applicants had to obtain the invoices from third parties, i.e. the electricity 
company, there were good reasons for the delay in turning over the documents.  Therefore the 
Court suspended the daily penalties for a period of seven months.143
The High Authority's decision did not fare so well on the Italian front.  Four separate 
cases were filed in local courts: one in Milan, one in Naples, one in Rome, and one in Turin.  
Exercising their rights under Italian law, the steel companies challenged the decisions of the 
High Authority on the grounds that the order breached a basic interest (interesse soggettivo) by 
taking their property without respect for the Italian Constitution's guarantees of lawful 
administrative action.144  The litigants challenged the constitutional validity of the ECSC Treaty, 
in particular, the failure of the Treaty and the European Court of Justice to afford the plaintiffs 
the same protections against arbitrary and oppressive government action as afforded under the 
Italian Constitution.  Only the Milan court held, without reservations, in favor of the High 
Authority.145  The Naples court first examined whether the Court of Justice was structurally 
similar to an ordinary Italian court—as opposed to an Italian administrative court which has less 
independence from the executive branch—because under the Italian Constitution, citizens are 
guaranteed an ordinary judicial forum to challenge administrative acts that breach basic interests 
such as property.  The Court of Justice passed muster.  Hence, the Naples court found that the 
139
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ECSC Treaty was constitutionally permissible and consequently only the European Court of 
Justice, not national courts, had jurisdiction over the decision of the High Authority.
The Rome court held that, in the case of the steel companies, the judicial protection from 
unlawful administrative action that they had been afforded comported with the requirements of 
the Italian Constitution.  In doing so, however, the court found that there was no way of 
excluding the possibility that the constitutional rights of Italian citizens would be undermined in 
the future through inadequate judicial protection.  It said:
[there are] more delicate questions resulting from the inability to impugn before 
the European Court the decisions of the High Authority on the grounds of conflict 
between Community norms . . . and norms of our Constitution which assure 
inalienable guarantees for the rights of individuals.146
The Turin court went the furthest of all.  Unlike the Naples court, the Turin court found 
that the Court of Justice was indeed a special, administrative court, without the full array of 
powers of an ordinary court of law, and hence judicial review in the Court of Justice breached 
the guarantee of access to an ordinary court contained in the Constitution.   Moreover, the Turin 
court found that the grounds of review set down under the ECSC Treaty were limited, in 
violation of the Constitution’s requirement that there be full legal protection of the rights and 
interests (diritti soggettivi and interessi legittimi) affected by administrative decisions.147  Lastly, 
the Turin court linked the case to the broader conflict between the Italian Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice on the question of whether European law was supreme to 
Italian law.  The Turin court repeated the Italian Constitutional Court’s earlier holding that the 
Italian Constitution was supreme to the treaties and that a constitutional amendment would be 
required to establish the supremacy of European law.  Therefore, the Turin court referred two 
questions to the Constitutional Court:  were the Articles limiting the grounds of review before 
the European Court of Justice of High Authority decisions (art. 33) and giving the Court of 
Justice exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the validity of European acts (arts. 41 and 92) valid under 
the Italian Constitution?
The Constitutional Court decided the question in favor of the High Authority and against 
the steel companies.  But it did so by systematically comparing the administrative law guarantees 
at the European level to those afforded under Italian constitutional law and concluded that the 
two were roughly equivalent.148  It did not give the High Authority and European Court of 
Justice carte blanche.  For students of European law, it should be noted that this decision came 
down after the Court of Justice’s judgment in Costa v. ENEL, in which the Court of Justice held 
that, contrary to an earlier pronouncement of the Italian Constitutional Court, European law was 
supreme to Italian law.149  Obviously, the Italian Constitutional Court was still not persuaded.
According to the Constitutional Court, the independence and impartiality of the Court of 
Justice passed Italian constitutional muster:
That Court [Court of Justice] is established and functions according to the rules 
corresponding to the basic principles of our own legal system . . . .  It is 
unanimously recognised that the Court of Justice is endowed with a judicial 
146
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character; and it may be observed that its members must fulfil their respective 
functions with independence and impartiality.150
Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that, under the ECSC Treaty, San Michele would be 
allowed to impugn the High Authority’s decisions in the Court of Justice on the same grounds as 
afforded under Italian law. 
The [High Authority’s decision] is subject to attack before the Community Court 
by virtue of Article 36, para. 2, by way of appeal with full jurisdiction (recours de 
pleine jurisdiction); some maintain even that, once formulated, such an appeal 
under Article 3, para. 3 [article guaranteeing review of monetary sanctions issued 
by High Authority] may be used to attack acts contemplated in Article 33, para. 2 
[individual decisions of Authority].  The latter, by their nature, could not be 
subjected to any wider control under the internal order.
The Italian Court therefore concluded that the arrangement for review of administrative acts in 
the ECSC Treaty complied with the Italian fundamental right to judicial protection, guaranteed 
under Article 2 of the Constitution.  It said that the relevant provisions of the Treaty created a 
judicial order “[i]n accordance with the rules corresponding to the fundamental features of our 
judicial system, even if they do not repeat literally the whole of the rules.”151
What is the relevance of this old Italian case for the right to a fair hearing? At the time 
that the UK acceded and Transocean Marine Paint was decided, the case was not so old.  
Transocean Marine Paint was decided only nine years later and many of the same judges were 
still sitting on the Court.  The Italian case served as a warning that, after accession, British 
lawyers and judges might challenge the authority of the Commission and the Court of Justice if 
the Court failed to accommodate those features of the British public law tradition that set it apart 
from continental systems.  The procedural guarantees of the principle of natural justice were 
precisely such features. 
Some will object that because of the British constitutional doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy and because Parliament had incorporated the treaties through the European 
Communities Act of 1972, an English court would not assume jurisdiction over the Commission 
decision, as the Italian courts had done.  But would the English court have interpreted 
Parliament’s exercise of sovereignty in the European Communities Act as one in which it 
rejected centuries of common law on the rules of natural justice?  The answer, especially in the 
early years after accession, was not clear.  It is certainly not fanciful to argue that this question 
was on the minds of the members of the Court of Justice and that, to head off resistance from 
English courts, they adopted the right to be heard and a highly proceduralized blueprint of 
Commission decisionmaking.152
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3.  The evolution of the right to a hearing 
Once the Court established the right to be heard in competition proceedings, it rapidly 
migrated to other areas of direct Commission enforcement of European law.  The common law 
understanding of fair administration colonized other areas of Commission action through the 
logic of judicial decisionmaking.  The Court of Justice extended the right to a hearing to other 
policy fields based upon the precedential value of the earlier cases in deciding the later ones and 
the similarities that existed, as a matter of fact and logic, between individuals in competition 
proceedings and other types of European proceedings.153   The first place where this occurred 
was anti-dumping law.  
As a policy related to the customs union, international trade is an area in which the 
Commission has had direct enforcement powers since the early years of the European 
Community.  When importers of a product are alleged to have benefited from government 
subsidies at home or to be selling the product on the European market at a price below the 
“normal value” of the product (“dumping”), the Commission is responsible for enforcement.  
The Commission, not national administrative bodies, is charged with determining that there has 
been subsidization or dumping and calculating the appropriate duty.  The duty is intended to 
offset the unfair price advantage of the imported good.  
When the first European law was passed in 1968, it provided for a fairly extensive 
procedure.154
o The Commission would publish a notice of the investigation in the Official Journal, as 
well as individually advise the representatives of the exporting government and the 
exporters and importers known to be concerned.
o The parties would be allowed to examine “all information that is relevant to the defence 
of their interests . . . and that is used by the Commission in the anti-dumping 
investigation.”155
o The parties would be allowed to refute the allegations of government subsidies or sale at 
less than the normal value in writing.  If they so-requested and if they “showed a 
sufficient interest,” the parties would be allowed to present their views orally.156
Furthermore, on the request of the parties, the Commission would organize a meeting of 
the foreign and domestic interests, to enable them to exchange their views.
In 1979, however, the Court of Justice suggested that the procedure did not 
adequately guarantee the right to a hearing because the parties did not have an adequate 
opportunity to review the information collected by the Commission.157  The case 
involved a challenge to an administrative decision imposing an anti-dumping duty on ball 
153
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bearings and tapered roller bearings from Japan.158  The Commission recommended to 
the Council of Ministers (the European institution with the final decisionmaking authority 
in dumping and subsidies proceedings) that a duty of 15% be imposed, without disclosing 
to the ball-bearing producers what cost figures had served as the basis for calculating the 
duty.  Advocate General Warner, ever-ready to vindicate the principles of natural justice, 
relied on the competition law that he had been instrumental in creating to find that the 
right to be heard applied to anti-dumping investigations:
It is a fundamental principle of Community law that, before any individual 
measure or decision is taken of such a nature as directly to affect the interests of a 
particular person, that person has a right to be heard by the responsible authority; 
and it is part and parcel of that principle that, in order to enable him effectively to 
exercise that right, the person concerned is entitled to be informed of the facts and
considerations on the basis of which the authority is minded to act.  That 
principle, which is enshrined in many a Judgment of this Court, and which applies 
regardless of whether there is a specific legislative text requiring its application, 
was re-asserted by the Court only yesterday in Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & 
Co. AG v. Commission.159
He easily concluded that the Commission had decided the anti-dumping duty in breach of the 
producers’ right to be heard.  
The Court never reached the procedural question, since it found for the producers and 
against the Commission and Council on the alternative grounds that they had acted contrary to 
powers conferred under the European anti-dumping law.160  However, the Advocate General’s 
declaration attracted considerable attention in the academic commentary as well as policymaking 
circles.161 A few months after the judgment was handed down, European anti-dumping law was 
amended in two fundamental respects.162  First, firms on both the foreign and domestic sides 
were allowed to inspect all of the information gathered in the course of the investigation and in 
the Commission’s files.  Second, the firms that exported and imported the product under 
investigation were given the right to request that the Commission disclose its “essential facts and 
considerations.”  The common wisdom in international trade circles is that the revisions were 
made to respond to the criticism of Advocate General Warner in NTN Tokyo Bearing.163
Then, in 1985 and again in 1991, the Court annulled two sets of anti-dumping duties 
because they had been imposed in breach of the parties’ right to be heard.  In the first, Timex, the 
main European manufacturer of wrist-watches and the initiator of the anti-dumping proceeding, 
had not been allowed to examine information collected on watches from Hong Kong.  The 
Commission reasoned that the action was against watches from the Soviet Union, not Hong 
Kong, and European anti-dumping law only provided for the disclosure of evidence provided by 
the parties to the investigation.  The Court held against the Commission and the Council, 
reasoning that to protect the procedural rights of Timex, it was necessary to interpret the 
governing law broadly.164
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In the second case, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v. Council & Commission, the influence of the 
right to a hearing in competition proceedings was unmistakable.165  In Al-Jubail Fertilizer, the 
manufacturer of fertilizer from Saudi Arabia claimed that the Commission had failed to 
communicate a number of facts relevant to the imposition of the duty, including the information 
on European costs of production and prices of fertilizer, which had served as the basis for 
concluding that there had been injury to the domestic industry.166  Advocate General Darmon 
first quoted at length from the opinion of Advocate General Warner in NTN Tokyo Bearing.167
He then noted the analogies between the position of the parties in a competition proceeding and 
in an anti-dumping proceeding:
From the viewpoint of an undertaking, the loss of the Community market as a 
result of the imposition of a high anti-dumping duty—as in this case—has 
financial consequences which are comparable to those which follow the 
imposition of a fine for an infringement of Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome.168
Finally, in concluding that the Commission had to respect procedural rights in anti-dumping 
proceedings similar to those guaranteed in the competition area, the Advocate General said that 
the right to be heard announced in the lead competition case naturally applied in the case at hand:
[A] principle as general as the one defined by the Court in its judgment in 
Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, namely that the Commission may not base its 
decisions on facts, circumstances or documents on which the party concerned has 
been unable to make its views known, would seem to apply to dumping 
proceedings as well.169
The Court squarely followed the Advocate General’s opinion.  It declared that the right to 
a fair hearing was a “fundamental principle” of European law and that it applied to  anti-dumping 
proceedings because of the adverse impact that an anti-dumping duty could have on the interests 
of the parties:
[I]t is necessary . . . to take account in particular of the requirements stemming 
from the right to a fair hearing, a principle whose fundamental character has been 
stressed on numerous occasions in the case-law of the Court (see in particular the 
judgement of 17 October 1989 in Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v. Commission 
[1989] ECR 3137 [competition case]).  Those requirements must be observed not 
only in the course of proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, 
but also in investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping 
regulations which, despite their general scope, may directly and individually 
affect the undertakings concerned and entail adverse consequences for them.170
A number of cases have since been decided in which the Court of Justice, now joined by the 
Court of First Instance, have defined the scope of the right.171
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The last policy field in which the Commission must abide routinely by the right to a 
hearing, as a result of the judicial logic of reasoning by analogy and reliance on earlier 
judgments, is customs.  Since 1968, the European Community has had a single set of tariff rates 
for goods imported into the Community from third countries.  The duties are calculated and 
collected, pursuant to an elaborate set of European rules, by national customs services in each of 
the Member States.  Generally national administrations, not the Commission, handle the 
collection of custom duties.  Since 1979, however, in a narrowly defined class of cases, the 
Commission has had the power to make individualized determinations affecting specific firms.172
These are cases in which the importer applies for the repayment (the duty has already been paid) 
or the remission (the duty is owed but has not yet been paid) of a customs duty due under the 
European Customs Code.  The importer’s claim can be based on any one of a number of 
circumstances set out in the Customs Code, for instance negligence on the part of the 
Commission in administering customs policy.173  Remission or repayment may also be made 
under the general fairness clause of the implementing regulation.174  The proceeding is initiated 
by the importer by filing an application with the responsible national customs services.175  The 
customs services is responsible for determining whether to grant remission, but, in the case of 
doubt, may refer the question to the Commission, which has the last word.
Until recently, individual importers did not enjoy the right to a hearing before the 
Commission in remissions proceedings.  The procedure afforded under national law before the 
customs services of the Member States was deemed enough.  Even when the national customs 
services sent the file to the Commission for consideration, no provision was made for the trader 
to make his views known. Then, in Case T-346/94 France-aviation v Commission, the Court of 
First Instance held that that a trader who requests repayment of customs duties has the right to be 
heard during the proceeding.176 As a consequence of that judgment, the Commission amended its 
customs rules in 1996.  Under the new provision, when a national customs service sends a file to 
the Commission, it is required to include a statement by the trader certifying that the trader has 
read the case file and stating either that she has nothing to add or listing the additional 
information that she considers should be included.177  But still no provision permitted individual 
importers to have any direct contact with the Commission in the course of the repayment or 
remissions proceedings.
The Court of First Instance changed the state of affairs in two subsequent cases involving 
remissions applications for customs duties owed on high-quality beef imported from Argentina 
(known, appropriately, as Hilton beef ).  There, the Court of First Instance held that if the 
Commission was contemplating reversing a favorable determination by the national customs 
service, it was under a duty to give the importers access to the Commission’s file and an 
opportunity to respond, in writing, to the Commission’s allegations, including the right to submit 
evidence.178  Again, the Commission amended its customs rules to reflect the Court’s holding.179
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In two pending cases, the Court has been asked by importer firms to extend the right to a hearing 
even further:  the issue under consideration is whether parties to remissions proceedings also 
have the right to make oral representations to the Commission.180
The Court has sporadically recognized the right to a hearing in other types of 
Commission proceedings which, according to the test developed by the Court and reminiscent of 
the earlier formula of Advocate General Warner in Transocean Marine Paint Association, “are 
initiated against a person and are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that 
person.”181  These are policy areas in which enforcement is almost exclusively in the hands of 
national authorities and the Commission intervenes rarely, under exceptional circumstances.  In 
one case, the exclusion of a Swedish fishing company from a Community fishery zone because 
of allegations of illegal fishing activities was enough to trigger a hearing right.182 In another, it 
was the reduction of European financial assistance to a Portuguese firm that triggered the 
right.183  In these cases, however, the scope of the hearing right is far less extensive than in the 
core areas of competition, anti-dumping, and now, customs administration.184  The litigants have 
the right to a brief description of the facts and reasoning supporting the contemplated decision, to 
make their arguments and advance their evidence in a written submission, and to receive a brief 
and by no means exhaustive reply in the Commission's statement of reasons.
Notwithstanding the Court’s central role in establishing adversarial, trial-type procedures 
in Commission decisionmaking, it has recognized a critical limit to the right to a fair hearing.  
The Commission decision must “adversely affect” the party vindicating the right.  This 
requirement has led the Court to reject the right in two types of cases.  When the Commission’s 
decision is characterized as a benefit-conferring, as opposed to a sanction or burden-imposing 
one, then the right is not guaranteed.  In Windpark Groothusen, the Commission denied an 
application for Community aid under a programme promoting energy technologies.185  The 
Commission based the decision exclusively on the information submitted in the initial 
application, without allowing the applicant to submit observations before the final funding 
decision was made.  The Court of First Instance, upheld by the Court of Justice, found that there 
was no right because “the applicant . . . had merely been placed on a reserve list of possible 
beneficiaries of Community financial support.”186
The other type of case in which the Court does not recognize that a party is adversely 
affected is where a third-party individual stands to benefit or lose from the Commission’s 
enforcement action.  In other words, the individual is a member of the wider public in whose 
interest the Commission is supposed to act when it applies European law, not the specific 
individual or firm against whom the Commission is taking action.  For instance, the Court denied 
that a consumer group had the right to a fair hearing in an anti-dumping case brought against 
audio-cassettes imported from Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea.  The Commission, therefore, was 
179
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allowed to deny the consumer group access to the information in its files on the alleged 
dumping.187
The Court has employed a variation of this logic in state aids cases.  In state aid 
proceedings, the Commission takes action against Member States alleged to unfairly assist their 
national firms through direct subsidies or favorable treatment in one form or another.  
Competitors of the national champions often bring the state subsidies to the Commission's 
attention.  The Court has repeatedly held that the Member State under investigation has a right to 
a hearing.188  By contrast, the procedural rights of the state enterprise and competitor firms are 
significantly more limited.189
The most recent chapter in this history is the European Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
2000, which, under the Constitutional Treaty of 2004, would be given binding legal force.  
Article 41 codifies the extensive case law of the Court of Justice on individual rights in European 
administration, including the right to a hearing chronicled above.190  The relevant paragraphs 
read as follows:
Article II-41 Right to good administration
1.  Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly 
and within a reasonable time by the Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union.
2.  This right includes:
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which 
would affect him or her adversely is taken;
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the 
legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
. . . .
Thus, Article 41 enshrines the long and steady trajectory of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence 
that started with Transocean Marine Paint Association in 1974 and continues to this day.
4.  European value:  The European and British rights compared
How does the European right to a hearing today, after thirty years of Court of Justice 
judgments and Commission policymaking, compare to the British tradition from which it was 
drawn?  Since generalization in administrative law is dangerous, it is best to compare the 
procedures in the same substantive policy area.  The one field where such one-to-one comparison 
is possible is competition.  The results are startling: by the early 1980's, the European right had 
overtaken the British one.  The entitlements of the right to a hearing, taken as combination of the 
duty to give notice of the government's case, disclose the evidence, and allow the parties 
opportunity to refute the opposing case, were more extensive before the European Commission 
than before the British authorities.
As the reader will recall, early in the history of British competition policy, jurisdiction 
was split between two administrative authorities, the Restrictive Practices Court, responsible for 
187
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cartels and certain types of vertical restraints of trade and the Mergers and Monopolies 
Commission (MMC), responsible for investigating monopolies and mergers and a variety of 
market practices considered to be anti-competitive.  By the mid-1970's, the MMC had become 
the most active of the two authorities.191  Yet the procedure there fell short of the Commission’s 
proceedings in certain respects.  The parties did not have the right to examine all of the evidence 
gathered by the MMC.192 Furthermore, the letter sent out to the parties at the beginning of the 
MMC’s investigation, informing them of all of the facts and arguments against them, was not 
believed to be as comprehensive as the Commission’s statement of objections. 193
Although not strictly related to the principle of natural justice, there was a last, notable 
difference between British and European competition proceedings which significantly limited the 
rights of the parties under investigation.  The British system allowed for vastly more discretion in 
the hands of the Secretary of State of Trade and Industry, i.e. the Minister, than was enjoyed by 
the College of Commissioners in the European context.194  The MMC issued a comprehensive 
report on the anti-competitive practices or merger in which it made findings on injury to the 
public interest and made recommendations on the appropriate remedies.  The Minister, however, 
had complete discretion to reject the finding of injury or the proposed remedial measures and this 
discretion was often used.195  The application of largely political considerations at the final stage 
of the proceedings signified that even though the parties were heard, early on, in a quasi-judicial 
proceeding, the final outcome could well be based upon factors of which they had had no notice 
and on which they had no opportunity to respond.196
In 1998 and again in 2002, British competition law was completely overhauled.  Part of 
the reforms were designed to de-politicize British competition law, taking away the Minister’s 
powers to depart from the report of the Commission (now called the Competition Commission), 
and replacing review by the Minister with a powerful appeals tribunal within the Competition 
Commission.197  There lies the irony.  In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, rights and procedures in 
European Commission competition proceedings were transformed to respond to the common 
lawyer criticism of an overly bureaucratic process without adequate opportunities for individuals 
test administrative decisions and protect their rights.  Now, the British system has been changed 
to render it more judicial in nature, expressed modeled on European competition proceedings. 198
Even though this reconfiguration of British administrative authority does not come under the 
doctrinal heading of natural justice, effectively, the right to be heard and the rule against bias are 
more vigorously protected in a system with a powerful appeals tribunal and without ministerial 
discretion.  Here we see the influence of new European mental maps of rights on old national 
traditions, the effect of which has been to bring the British system closer to the ideal of natural 
justice.
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B.  The Second Generation:  The Right to Transparency
The next wave of rights to transform the structure of Commission decisionmaking and 
the relationship between the Commission and European citizens came in 1993.  The Commission 
has the far-reaching policymaking prerogatives of an executive branch in a parliamentary system 
of government.  The EC Treaty gives the Commission the exclusive right to introduce laws into 
the assemblies with the power to vote and enact laws, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament.199  The Commission is also responsible for implementing European laws by 
promulgating implementing regulations, monitoring implementation by the Member States 
(which, as mentioned earlier, generally are responsible for day-to-day enforcement), and suing 
Member States in the Court of Justice if their implementation is inadequate.200  What rights did 
European citizens have in 1957 when the Commission exercised authority through broadly 
applicable policy measures?201  Today? And how do we explain the transformation?  In this 
section of the Article,  I give the first part of the answer to this set of questions by examining the 
rise of the right to transparency.  
1.  The right to examine Commission documents then and now
a.  National traditions of open government and the right of access to documents
In Europe, there exists considerable variation among government administrations in how 
open or closed they are to the public.202  Most are believed to fall on the closed side of the 
spectrum.  This is the case for administrations in both the civil law and common law traditions.  
Over the centuries, government officials in countries like France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and 
the UK have been allowed to draft legislation, promulgate administrative rules, and make 
administrative decisions in relative secrecy, without the prospect of widespread public scrutiny 
through reporting requirements, the right of access to documents, and other transparency devices.  
The exception is government administration in the smaller countries of northern Europe:  
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland.
Let me briefly enter into the specifics of  Sweden, the legal system that is recognized as 
the lead contributor to the northern paradigm.  A number of features of that system separate it 
from the majority tradition: powerful parliamentary committees, an ombudsman elected by 
parliament with investigative and prosecutorial powers over government officials, 
constitutionally guaranteed independence for the administration from the prime minister and the 
cabinet, and the constitutional right of access to government documents.  Although the classic 
north-south dichotomy is not as stark as it used to be because of a number of contemporary, 
European-wide trends in government administration, the difference still exists.  
199 This is different from lawmaking in the U.S., where bills tend to originate in Congress, but similar to European parliamentary 
systems, in which the same political party or set of parties sitting in the government cabinet controls both the executive branch 
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Whether a country has general access to documents legislation largely tracks the 
categorization of a system as open or closed.  In the Nordic systems and the Netherlands, 
individuals have the right to request documents related to a broad array of government acts, 
without a need to demonstrate any particular connection to the government proceeding.  
Especially in Sweden and Finland,  the right has deep, historical roots and is part of the 
constitutional identity of the nation, or at least of the public lawyers of the nation.203  The 
declaration on transparency in the Swedish Treaty of Accession gives a flavor of the symbolic 
nature of the right:
Transparency in the management of public affairs and, in particular, access of the 
public to administrative documents as well as the protection that the Constitution 
guarantees for the media, are and remain fundamental principles that are part of 
the constitutional, political, and cultural heritage of Sweden.204
It is important not to exaggerate the scope of the right.  The legislation in all of these 
countries contains significant exceptions.  Everywhere, public officials may refuse disclosure to 
prevent harm to the public interest or to other individuals, albeit according to different, national 
understandings of what constitutes harm.  Moreover, in Sweden and Finland, preparatory 
material such as drafts, outlines, and reports generally do not fall within the ambit of the right.205
Drafts, memorandums, and minutes of meetings in government ministries leading to the adoption 
of legislative proposals are also excluded from the scope of administrative documents.  By 
contrast, in Denmark, information produced in connection with administrative proceedings, 
regardless of whether it is contained in the final act, is also subject to disclosure.206  As in 
Sweden and Finland, however, documents that are highly political in nature, like drafts of bills 
and minutes of cabinet meetings, are excluded.207
The Netherlands has probably the most liberal system of all.  Individuals may request 
documents related to any general policy decision or individual determination made by any part of 
the administration, including the documents related to the initial preparation and drafting of the 
decision and including material related to government bills.208  The principal exception to the 
disclosure of internal documents is the one for documents containing personal opinions of public 
officials.  Even on that score, however, in the interests of “good administration" and democratic 
government, the administration can transmit the information, but is required to do so in an 
anonymous form, so as to prevent identification of the individual who gave the opinion.209  It 
203
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should also be noted that the Swedish and Finnish laws require officials to keep registers listing 
government documents open for public consultation, although the registers do not contain the 
full text of documents.210
Among those Member States on the closed side of the spectrum, one group of countries 
have recently adopted cross- cutting access to documents legislation but are still newcomers to 
the habit and law of open government.  The UK adopted a law in 2000, Ireland in 1997, Belgium 
in 1994, Portugal in 1993, and Spain in 1992.211  A second set of Member States has adopted 
general legislation which significantly restricts the right by requiring individuals to show a 
special interest in the document because the document is related to an administrative proceeding 
affecting their rights and duties.   Italy212 and Greece213 fall in this category.  Lastly, Germany 
does not provide for a general right of access, rather the right is contained in numerous, sector-
specific laws in areas such as the environment and municipal planning. 214
b.  The right of access to Commission documents
Until 1992, European citizens who wished to know how the Commission exercised its 
powers enjoyed the same rights, or more accurately, lack of rights, as their counterparts in 
Member States belonging to the closed government tradition.  They had the right to know of 
official acts passed by European institutions pursuant to their powers under the treaties, in the 
case of individual decisions through the communication of the decision in writing to the 
concerned party, and in the case of generally applicable measures, through publication in the 
Official Journal.215  It is difficult to imagine how matters could have been otherwise:  all of the 
Member States were committed to the basic rule of law principle that, as governments of law and 
not men, the law should be put down in writing and should be known to citizens.  But European 
citizens did not have the right to be informed of what went on behind the closed doors of the 
Commission’s offices.  As a matter of practice, the Commission was more open than many 
national administrations.216  Nonetheless, as a matter of rights,  European citizens could not 
demand to learn of individual decisions that were not of specific concern to them, to review the 
expert reports and technical data that served as the basis for administrative and legislative acts, or 
to view the correspondence among Commission departments and between the Commission and 
outside parties on the administration of the law.  
In 1993, there began a process of transformation of European law.  On December 6, 
1993, the Commission and the Council entered into an agreement, called a Code of Conduct, 
pledging to adopt access to document rights for their respective organizations and agreeing to 
common conditions and principles.  Thereafter, the Council and Commission separately 
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promulgated internal rules of procedure implementing the terms of the Code of Conduct.217  The 
rules were worded extremely broadly.  The documents covered by the rules were defined as any 
written text held by the Council or Commission and the exceptions to disclosure were sketched 
in the briefest of terms, covering areas such as public security, privacy, business secrets, and the 
Community’s financial interests.218 Four years later, the Amsterdam Treaty created a right of 
access to documents:
Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission documents . . . .219
In 1999, the Commission agreed to extend the right of access to material generated in the 
European rulemaking process, including meeting agendas, drafts, and final decisions, and 
to create a public register of all such documents.220  Finally, in 2001, the Council, 
Commission, and European Parliament passed a law giving effect to the right of access in 
the Amsterdam Treaty.221
The Public Access to Documents Law, which has been followed by more precise 
provisions in each of the institution’s rules of procedures,222 elaborates considerably on 
the terms under which Europeans can exercise their right of access.  The most significant 
innovation is the requirement that each institution establish a register of documents and 
that, whenever possible, access be provided through direct electronic access to the 
documents listed in the register.223  The law also creates a new category of sensitive 
documents, designed to cover material generated in the fields of foreign affairs, security, 
and police cooperation, which would enable the institutional author of the document to 
veto disclosure.224   As for the exceptions to disclosure of ordinary, non-sensitive 
documents, they are specified in far greater detail compared to the 1993 rules of 
procedure and require the institutions to engage in more balancing, weighing the 
applicant’s public interest in disclosure against the commercial interest or institutional 
interest in secrecy.225
2.  The historical juncture:  The Maastricht Treaty crisis
What explains the radical change in the right of European citizens to know how the 
Commission exercises its powers?  In this section, I demonstrate that the crisis provoked by the 
Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty led to the salience of the northern model of open 
217
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government in the eyes of European Heads of State, who consequently made a number of 
hortatory commitments to transparency.  Once the crisis had subsided, momentum for 
transparency continued because of the presence of government officials from the North within 
the institutional system—reinforced considerably by the accession of Sweden and Finland in 
1995—and because of the advocacy of the European Parliament.
a.  Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty:  Northern values and the interest of European 
Heads of State
The idea of a European right of access to government documents was not new. The first 
directly elected  European Parliament called for “legislation on openness of government of 
Community affairs” in 1984.226  This was followed, in 1988, by a parliamentary resolution 
declaring the “right to information” to be a fundamental freedom and requesting the Commission 
to propose access to information legislation.227  Again, in 1989, when the Parliament urged the 
Member States to adopt a binding declaration of rights, it included the right of access to 
information in its proposed Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedom.228
In the Intergovernmental Conference leading up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, the Dutch government sought to insert a provision, modeled on the Dutch Constitution, 
that would have required the European institutions to pass legislation on access to information.229
The idea did not find strong support among the other Member States, and as a compromise 
measure, the Commission proposed that the text be included as a toothless, non-binding protocol 
to the Treaty.  Thus, attached to the Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on February 
7, 1992, was a Declaration, by the Heads of State, on the right of access to information:
The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process 
strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions  and the public’s confidence 
in the administration.  The Conference accordingly recommends that the 
Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures 
designed to improve public access to the information available to the 
institutions.230
Nowhere was there mention of an individual right and, aside from the usual diplomatic 
language, the only concrete action envisaged was a Commission report, which, given the 
text of the protocol, might very well have been limited to a call for the publication of 
more official documents and better access to existing data bases. 
The Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the national referendum of June 
2, 1992, was the catalyst that set the right to transparency into motion.231   The Danish 
referendum, along with the Euro-skepticism it triggered in a number of other countries, 
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was a tremendous blow to the twelve governments that had signed the Treaty.232  Over 
one year had been consumed in the negotiations on the Treaty and the result was an 
ambitious  project of monetary and political union that went well beyond the customs 
union and common market of the original Treaty of Rome.233  The Maastricht Treaty was 
a step beyond the functional, market-oriented vision of Jean Monnet’s European 
Community.  It included European citizenship, a common currency, and cooperation on 
foreign policy, immigration, and police matters.  The signatories had a great stake in 
ratification and the Danes and the gloomy mood that set in after their referendum stood in 
their way.
Transparency emerged as a powerful concept through which the governments 
could reclaim legitimacy for the European project, largely because it was the open 
government country of Denmark that had rejected the Treaty.  After the “No” vote, the 
Danish government submitted a memorandum outlining the changes that would be 
necessary if the Maastricht Treaty was to survive a second referendum.  At the top of the 
list were openness and transparency.234   The response was a steady wave of 
commitments to transparency by European Heads of State at European Council meetings 
in the fall of 1992. 235  The Commission dutifully produced a series of policy documents 
in spring of 1993.236  And in summer and fall of 1993 the last Member States ratified the 
Treaty: the Danish electorate approved Maastricht in a second referendum on May 18, 
1993;  the UK House of Commons voted in favor of the Treaty on May 20, 1993 and the 
UK House of Lords approved the Treaty on July 20, 1993; and the German Constitutional 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty, thereby allowing Germany to ratify it, on 
October 12, 1993.
b.  The aftermath of Maastricht
After the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by all Member States in the fall of 1993, 
transparency could very well have faded from the political agenda and could have become a 
hortatory duty without any real bite for the day-to-day operation of the institutions.  In this 
section, I show that the advocacy of Europeans with cultural allegiances and expectations shaped 
by their experiences as citizens of the Netherlands, Denmark, and later Sweden and Finland, 
combined with the interest of the Parliament in obtaining information for itself, ensured that the 
impetus for transparency was sustained.  The rights exercised by European citizens day-in-and-
day-out in obtaining information about how European government is run flow directly from the 
legal instruments to which these European actors made a decisive and critical contribution.  
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i.  National value:  The influence of the northern tradition of open government
The evidence of the significance of the northern mental map of rights and democracy 
comes in the form of surnames.  Who, in the institutions, were transparency advocates?  The 
parliamentarians who have chosen to make transparency their mission by authoring committee 
reports and sponsoring resolutions have mainly come from the North: Jens-Peter Bonde 
(Denmark), Maj-Lis Loow (Sweden),  Hanja Maij-Weggen (Netherlands), Heidi Hautala 
(Finland).237  When the Parliament, Commission, and Council entered into tripartite negotiations 
over the final text of the Public Access to Documents Law of 2001, five out of the seven 
parliamentarians were from the North:  two Swedes, two Finns, and one Dutchwoman.238  This is 
not to say that there are no exceptions.  A few British parliamentarians have also been active on 
the issue and, over the years, parliamentarians from a couple of other Member States have shown 
sporadic interest.239  Nonetheless the northern provenance of most of the transparency advocates 
is striking, especially given that, in the Parliament’s system of weighted representation, there are 
relatively few parliamentarians from the small Member States to the North.
Likewise, within the Council of Ministers, the representatives of northern Member States 
have consistently come down on the side of transparency, against representatives of Member 
States in the center and south of Europe.   The voting record of the Council working party on 
access to documents is illustrative on this score.  When an application is filed with the Council 
and it possibly comes within one of the exceptions to the right of access, it is sent to a working 
party of Member State representatives.  In 2000, the working party was divided on whether to 
grant access in 24 instances.  Denmark voted to grant access in 88% of those cases, Sweden in 
83%, Finland in 53%, the Netherlands in 29%, the UK in 20%, Ireland in 17%, Greece and 
Germany each voted to granted access in only one case (4%), and the remaining Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, France, and Sweden) voted to deny access in all 24 
cases.240
The citizens and Member States of northern Europe also made their mark in the judicial 
branch (Court of Justice and Court of First Instance).  Member States intervened on the behalf of  
plaintiffs in seven out of the 28 cases brought between 1993, when the first rules of procedure 
entered into force, and summer 2002.241  They were all northern Member States:  Sweden in four 
cases,242 the Netherlands in three,243 Denmark in two,244 and Finland in one.245  Member States 
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also intervened in support of the defendant institutions (the Council and Commission, 
alternatively).  They were countries with traditions of closed government:  France in four 
cases246 and the UK in four.247
The Netherlands also independently sued the Council over the first Council access to 
documents rules.  The Netherlands, supported by the European Parliament (which because of the 
rules of standing existing at that time was only allowed to sue in the Court of Justice to protect 
its own legislative prerogatives and could not bring suit independently) sued the Council on the 
grounds that access to documents should be set down in a legislative measure rather than internal 
rules of procedure.248  The consequence of adopting the access to documents measure as internal 
rules of procedure had been to allow the Council to act by a simple majority, thereby enabling 
the Member States in favor of continued secrecy to easily outvote Member States like the 
Netherlands in favor of transparency, and to allow the Council to cut out the Parliament entirely 
from the decisionmaking process.  Both the Netherlands and Parliament considered that the 
exceptions to the access to documents principle were far too broad and hence vitiated the right to 
transparency.249  They lost, foreshadowing the argument of the next section, where I demonstrate 
that Parliament, not the Council or the Court of Justice, was the main institutional proponent of 
transparency because it could act notwithstanding the majority, closed government tradition and 
it had a strategic, institutional interest in doing so.
The nationalities of the plaintiffs are also revealing.250  Eight were from the UK, eight 
from the Netherlands, four from Germany, two from Finland, one from each of Denmark, 
Sweden, France, Greece, and Italy, and two were public interest groups with diverse 
membership.251  Plaintiff nationalities roughly correspond with expectations, albeit less strikingly 
than in the case of government intervenors.  In terms of their numbers relative to population, 
citizens of northern, open-tradition countries are disproportionately represented.  British citizens 
are an interesting anomaly:  they vindicate access to information rights even though they have 
never had access to documents legislation at home, their national administration is widely known 
for resisting open government measures, and their government was one out of only two Member 
States that intervened in support of defendant European institutions.  Part, but certainly not all, of 
the high case count can be attributed to a single dispute between the Commission and two British 
nationals over certain VAT documents which generated three separate cases.252
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ii.  Supranational interest: The interest of the European Parliament in information on 
policymaking in the Commission and the Council 
In the ordinary politics following the Maastricht ratification crisis, the European 
Parliament proved to be the most significant institutional proponent of transparency. Parliament's 
central role is less evident than the institutional association analyzed in the previous section 
between the Court of Justice and the Commission and fair hearing rights and connection 
explored in the next section between the Commission and the right to civil society participation.  
That is because a variety of European institutions have adopted legal instruments, issued reports, 
and decided cases requiring that the Commission and Council give access to documents.  In this 
section I present the evidence for ascribing the Parliament such a central role.  I then go on to 
show that parliamentarians, both from northern and southern Member States, were committed to 
transparency, more so than to other rights associated with democratic government, because 
transparency overlapped with Parliament’s campaign to obtain greater powers within the 
European institutional complex by acquiring more information on the legislative and 
administrative affairs of the Commission and Council.  
There are a number of episodes in the development of transparency after the Maastricht 
debacle that demonstrate the centrality of Parliament.   In the aftermath of the high-level 
European Council meetings of fall 1992 and the final national ratifications of the Maastricht 
Treaty in summer and fall of 1993, the Parliament, Commission, and Council negotiated an inter-
institutional agreement on transparency. 253  It is widely held among policymakers and scholars 
alike that the inter-institutional agreement of October 1993 served as the basis for the 
Commission’s and the Council’s first rules on access to documents.  Yet the Council originally 
was determined to discuss subsidiarity only and it was intense pressure from the Parliament that 
put transparency and democracy on the bargaining table as well.254  In the agreement, the 
Council undertook to make some of its debates public, publish voting records, and improve 
access to documents.  The Commission and the Parliament also committed themselves to a 
number of transparency measures.255
Parliament also played a key role in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) leading to 
the Amsterdam Treaty and Article 255 on access to documents.256   The Danish parliamentarian 
Jens-Peter Bonde issued a number of working documents on the behalf of the parliamentary 
Committee on Institutional Affairs recommending the inclusion of transparency provisions in the 
Treaty.257  In all of the European Parliament’s contributions to the 1996-1997 IGC, it insisted 
that commitments to transparency be made in specific treaty articles.258  A simple comparison of 
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Parliament's three major demands--demands not made by the two other important IGC actors 
besides the Member States, the Commission and the Amsterdam Reflection Group-- with the 
final outcomes of the treaty negotiations demonstrates Parliament’s influence.259  The Parliament 
proposed that the principle of openness be written into the Treaty, that a rule of access to 
documents be included in the Treaty, and that the legislative meetings of the Council of 
Ministers be opened to public scrutiny, both through open meetings and through access to the 
minutes, votes and reservations recorded at those meetings.260  While Parliament's requests were 
not incorporated word-for-word, the Amsterdam Treaty included all three dimensions.261
After Amsterdam, the very first significant legislative innovation in the transparency area 
was adopted at the behest of Parliament.  New legislation setting down the structure and 
operation of European administration was adopted in summer of 1999.  The original proposal 
submitted by the Commission did not make any mention of the public’s right of access to the 
documents generated in the administrative process.262 Following an amendment proposed by 
Parliament, the law provided that a public register of documents would be created and that the 
access to documents rules set down in the Commission’s rules of procedure would also apply to 
the administrative process.263
The Public Access to Documents Law, adopted to give effect to the commitment of the 
Amsterdam Treaty to transparency, was also strongly influenced by Parliament.  In the aftermath 
of Amsterdam, Parliament tasked its Committee on Institutional Affairs with coming forward 
with recommendations for the implementation of Article 255, which were adopted by the entire 
Parliament in the plenary session of January 12, 1999.264  Nevertheless, when the Commission 
eventually came forward with its proposal for legislation, parliamentarians found it disappointing 
in a number of critical respects. 265 The Commission proposal would have excluded from the 
coverage of the law all internal documents that were not contained in official acts, in order to 
protect the so-called “space to think" of the institutions.266  The list of exceptions to the right of 
access was far more extensive than those in the earlier access to documents rules of the Council 
and the Commission.  It contained some dangerously broad categories such as the protection of 
“the effective functioning of the institutions” and “the stability of the Community’s legal 
order.”267   Furthermore, when the documents of third parties were involved, the proposal 
required that they give their consent before the documents could be released.268  All 
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communications with the Member States or with non-Community institutions were at risk of 
falling into this loophole.269  Another shortcoming of the Commission’s proposal was the failure 
to use the device of the public register to make documents directly available to the public, 
electronically, without the need to file a request.270 Lastly, Parliament was concerned that the 
Council would use the public interest exception to exclude most documents related to common 
foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation.271
In response, the responsible parliamentary committee produced a highly critical report 
and proposed a number of amendments.272  Parliament approved the amendments to the 
Commission’s text, after which followed a series of trilogues  between Parliament’s 
representatives, the Swedish Presidency of the Council, and the Commission.273  (Trilogues are 
tripartite negotiations among the deciding institutions on the final text and are functionally 
equivalent to conference committees of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
in the U.S.)  In the final compromise version, Parliament succeeded in reducing considerably the 
list of exceptions.  Moreover, all European institutions were required to establish electronic 
registers of documents.  For legislative documents, direct, electronic access to the document is 
mandatory and for other documents such access should be provided where possible.  In 
conclusion, had the Amsterdam Treaty not required that the legislation be adopted by co-
decision, the law would have almost certainly represented a step backwards for transparency.  
(Co-decision gives Parliament decisionmaking powers equal to those of the Council and thus 
requires the Commission to anticipate the Parliament's position in the original proposal and to
allow Parliament to vote on the final text.)  Parliament ensured that the Council and Commission 
did not back-peddle on their existing rules of procedure and, in some respects, improved the 
access to documents scheme.274
Why did Parliament campaign so hard for transparency, above and beyond other 
principles associated with good European governance, and more assiduously than other 
institutional actors?  Since the European Parliament was first directly elected in 1979, it has 
pushed for access to information on the Commission and the Council for Parliament.  Without 
information, the meager powers it originally possessed under the Treaty of Rome would have 
been virtually non-existent.  After Maastricht, the growing currency of the northern value of 
transparency led the Parliament to couple the strategic, institutional need for information with the 
campaign for open government. 
The relationship between the normative ideal of transparency for all European citizens 
and the need of Parliament for information to exercise its legislative prerogatives was complex: 
the institutional interest furthered the ideal and the ideal was used to promote the institutional 
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interest.  On the one hand, the right of transparency for all piggy-backed upon the improvements 
that Parliament obtained for its own purposes.  Before Maastricht, Parliament had successfully 
forced a number of institutional changes that required the Commission and Council to forward 
documents and give updates on their proceedings on a timely basis.  Once the northern right to 
transparency became a defining element of the European concept of good government, as a 
matter of normative discourse, Parliament’s past successes in obtaining documents, as well as its 
subsequent crusades to obtain yet more information had to be extended to all European citizens.   
In other words, once transparency became a European value, Parliament could not ask for 
information for itself and itself alone.  On the other hand, Parliament promoted transparency 
because the right served Parliament’s strategic, institutional need for information from the 
Commission and the Council.   In other words, once the northern mental map of open 
government had been transferred to Europe, Parliament had a concrete, institutional interest in 
advancing a rhetoric and law of transparency.  
To demonstrate the logic of supranational institutional interest and national value, it is 
again necessary to do some of the history.  Parliament’s campaign for information can be divided 
into three categories:  the budget, legislation, and administration.  In the past, the European 
Parliament’s most important, and some would say, only, powers were in the area of the budget.   
In two treaties dating to the 1970’s, the Parliament acquired the right to propose amendments to 
the European Community’s annual budget and to reject the budget  if dissatisfied with the 
outcome after final voting in the Council.275  Parliament also obtained the right  to review or 
“discharge” the European Community’s accounts, after the expiration of the fiscal year, to ensure 
that the money appropriated under the budget had been spent lawfully.276  Since Parliament was 
first directly elected in 1979, it has consistently called for more documents, reports, and statistics 
on the programs to be financed by each of the line items in the budget, as well as more 
information on how the monies appropriated were spent.  
Dissatisfaction with the scant information provided by the Commission has been 
expressed repeatedly, in many forms.  The comments accompanying the Parliament’s annual 
discharge reports are one place where it can be found. 277 More information on the intended use 
of budget appropriations, as well as the implementation of the different programs, is a staple of 
the recommendations and criticisms put forward by Parliament.  Just to give a flavor of the 
critique, I present here portions from the Parliament's report on the discharge of the budget from 
the 1982 financial year.  Parliament explained the decision to defer the discharge--perceived at 
the time as an extraordinary expression of disapproval, similar in terms of opprobrium to a 
parliamentary no-confidence vote--based  on the failure of the Commission to transmit complete 
and comprehensible information on the disbursement of Community funds.  Parliament stated 
that it: "Strongly deplores the fact that the present Commission has taken a step backwards, as 
compared with the preceding college, by refusing to make certain basic document available to 
275
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Parliament."278 And it said that it: "Requests the Commission to consider ways of providing 
more and clearer statistical and explanatory information on the execution of the budget." 279  The 
discharges of subsequent years are replete with comments in the same vein.280
In the 1980’s and the 1990’s, Parliament also pushed the Commission for more 
information in connection with its legislative powers.  Until 1986, the Parliament only had the 
power to give non-binding opinions on European legislation through what was known as the 
consultation procedure.281  The real decision-making power rested with the Commission, which 
had the power to propose legislation, and the Council, which had the power to adopt legislation.   
In the Single European Act of 1986, the co-operation procedure was introduced in certain policy 
areas.  Co-operation required that Parliament review proposals at two, separate stages in the 
legislative procedure, once after the Commission issued the initial proposal, and a second time, 
after the Council had voted on the proposal.  On the second reading, Parliament could propose 
amendments, which the Council could reject, but only by a unanimous vote.  Parliament’s 
legislative powers were improved in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.  Maastricht introduced co-
decision, which preserves the two readings structure of cooperation, but requires the Council to 
adopt Parliament’s amendments if the legislation is to pass.  As the label suggests, in co-
decision, Parliament and Council are co-legislators:  the approval of both is necessary for a piece 
of legislation to be enacted.  In the treaties negotiated subsequent to Maastricht, co-decision has 
been extended to a wide number of areas, so that today, outside of the foreign policy and 
criminal law areas, it is the prevalent mode of enacting European laws.  
In all three procedures, information on the Commission’s policy agenda, the 
Commission’s specific legislative proposal, and the trajectory of the proposal once it enters 
Council—where more often than not it undergoes numerous and substantial amendments—is 
critical.  Without advance warning of the different proposals in the Commission pipeline, and 
without access to the information supporting the Commission’s proposals, parliamentary 
committees are handicapped in researching the issues and writing their reports and the 
Parliament as a whole cannot take informed votes.  In the consultation procedure, if the 
proceedings in the Council are secret, the Commission’s proposal can be transformed by the 
Council and enacted into law without any warning to the Parliament.  Parliament’s power of 
278
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consultation is rendered meaningless, since the Commission proposal on which Parliament gives 
its opinion may bear no relation to the law ultimately passed by the Council.  Information on 
Council proceedings is also important in co-operation and co-decision; advance warning of the 
likely outcome of the Council vote is necessary for Parliament to react fully and propose its own, 
well-considered amendments in the second reading.  
The failure to disclose declarations made by Member States when approving European 
laws in the Council can also undermine the Parliament’s legislative prerogatives.  These 
declarations are similar to reservations in international treaties and can modify the text of the 
agreement, either by allowing derogations for certain Member States or by altering the 
interpretation of the legislation for certain Member States.   If declarations are not published, 
then, in effect, the Member States on the Council can alter legislation without the knowledge or 
input of the Parliament, even on matters on which Parliament had full co-decision powers.282
To safeguard its institutional prerogatives as legislator, the Parliament has negotiated an 
inter-institutional agreement with each new Commission since 1990.283  (A new Commission 
takes office every five years.)  In all, timely and complete information on the Commission’s 
policy initiatives and the state of play of negotiations in the Council have figured prominently.  
Parliament has also separately urged the Council to notify Parliament of any planned changes to 
the proposal in the course of negotiations there.284  It has suggested an inter-institutional 
agreement with the Council, patterned on the agreements with the Commission, but without any 
success to date.285  As far back as 1981, in connection with the power to approve the annual 
budget, which it shared with the Council, Parliament voiced frustration with the secrecy of the 
Council and requested information on the state of play of negotiations among the Member States 
sitting on the Council:
[Parliament c]onsiders that the procedure of budgetary collaboration between 
Council and Parliament during the annual budgetary process should be improved 
by a series of practical measures: for example, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives and the Budgetary Committee of Council should supply the 
rapporteur and the members of the Committee on Budgets with the working 
documents and minutes of their meetings.286
Information has also been at the heart of Parliament’s attempt to establish legislative 
oversight of European administration.  The implementation of European legislation by the 
Commission, through implementing regulations or individualized decisions, very often requires 
the approval of committees of national regulators.  So-called comitology committees are 
designed to serve as a surrogate for the Council and enable the Council to monitor, and 
sometimes veto or modify, Commission implementing regulations and decisions.  The 
Parliament has staged a long battle to eliminate comitology committees in European 
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administration and entrust the Commission, acting alone, with implementation.287  Because 
comitology committees empower the Council, the Parliament views them with great suspicion.  
In Parliament’s eyes, comitology committees constitute a device through which the Council can 
undermine legislative commitments, obtaining results that would otherwise be impossible 
because of opposition from the Parliament.  Parliament, however, has been unsuccessful in 
eliminating comitology committees.  In compensation, it has sought to establish supervisory 
powers over European administration equal to those of the Council.   
Parliament has asserted control over administrative decisionmaking since the mid-1980’s 
through a series of resolutions, inter-institutional agreements, and now, legislation.  The duty of 
the Commission to transmit information on administrative proceedings to the Parliament is 
common to all of these instruments.288  Today, after over twenty years of institutional wrangling, 
the Commission is required to forward Parliament the proposals for administrative action 
submitted to the committees, the agendas of committee meetings, the names and organizational 
affiliations of committee members, and the votes and minutes from committee meetings.  
Furthermore,  Parliament today has the right to vote on implementing measures adopted by 
comitology committees, although a "no" vote only has moral force and does not bind the 
Commission.  
Parliament’s need for information on the work of the Commission and the Council has 
contributed to its advocacy of the right to transparency through the two mechanisms that I briefly 
sketched earlier in this section and that I explore in detail here.  First, the value of open 
government for all citizens, not only parliamentarians, has driven Parliament to include the 
public in what previously was a quest for information restricted to itself.  After the right to 
transparency became a salient conceptual paradigm, it caused Parliament to redefine the 
campaign for information in such a manner as to include all citizens.  The value redefined the 
strategic institutional interest.  
The piggybacking of the right to transparency onto Parliament’s information initiatives is 
evident in the administrative area. The first law guaranteeing parliamentary oversight of the 
administrative process (comitology committees) both codified the gains that Parliament had 
made in the previous decade through inter-institutional agreements, and included a right of 
access for the public-at-large.289  As mentioned above, the provision was pushed by Parliament, 
287
 See generally Corbett, The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Integration, supra note__ at 133, 256 (parliamentary 
resolution of 1981 recommending that committees be purely advisory in nature); Kieran St. Clair Bradley, The European 
Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?, 1997 Eur. L. J. 230; Ellen Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community 
Health and Safety Regulation:  Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies 120 (1999).
288
 See Resolution closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament on the proposal from the Commission of the 
European Communities to the Council for a Regulation laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred to the Commission, 1986 O.J. (C 297) 94, 95 (point 1); Plumb-Delors Agreement of 1988, cited in Vos, Institutional 
Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Regulation, supra note__ at 126 (agreeing to  forward all proposals for 
implementing measures to the Parliament at the same time as they are submitted to comitology committees); Code of conduct on 
the implementation of structural polices by the Commission, 1993 O.J. (C 255) 19, 19-20 [“Klepsch-Millan Agreement”] 
(agreeing to forward the Parliament all plans, generally elaborated by the Member States and then transmitted to the Commission, 
for the use of regional development funds, all proposals for Community initiatives, and the results of any reviews of the 
implementation of development projects on the ground); Modus vivendi of 20 December 1994 between the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, 1996 O.J. (C 102) 1 (undertaking to forward all proposals for implementing measures, to 
allow Parliament the opportunity to vote on proposals, and in the event of a negative vote, to adopt the measure only after “taking 
due account of the European Parliament’s point of view"); Resolution on the draft general budget of the European Communities 
for the financial year 1997—Section III—Commission, 1996 O.J. (C 347) 125, 125, para. 72 (agreeing to forward the Parliament 
a wider array of documents--the agendas of committee meetings and the results of votes taken in comitology committees—and to 
allow parliamentarians to attend comitology meetings if there is no objection from the national regulators on the committee); 
Comitology Decision, supra note__ at arts. 7.3, 8 (codifying information and control powers established in earlier instruments).
289
 Comitology Decision, supra note__.
Creating Rights
59
not the Commission or the Council.  Parliament’s transparency amendments were watered down 
in the end but, had it gotten its way, the law would have read:
Having regard to the rules and principles of transparency and access to documents 
flowing from Articles 1 of the EU Treaty, 207 and 255 of the EC Treaty and 
Declarations 35 and 41 attached to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty,
. . . 
Except for reasons of confidentiality, all documents shall be made public and 
accessible by electronic transmission.290
In other words, the new right to transparency led Parliament to advocate more information about 
the administrative process not just for itself, but for all European citizens.
The second reason for Parliament’s advocacy was the moral resource that the right 
brought to the institutional interest in information.  The right for all citizens was also a means of 
improving Parliament’s access to information on the European institutions and hence 
Parliament’s powers.  As mentioned above, in the 1980’s, Parliament called for a right of access 
to information in three separate resolutions.  Although the resolution made no difference, given 
that the northern value had not yet been placed on the European agenda by the Danes and 
Parliament was still fairly powerless, Parliament expressly coupled information as a fundamental 
right for all European citizens, with information as a necessary complement to its powers in the 
legislative and administrative processes.  Parliament said that it:
1.  Takes the view that right to information is one of the fundamental freedoms of 
the people of Europe and that it should be recognized as such by the European 
Community;
 . . . . 
4.  Requests that the minutes of Council meetings which concern the discussion of 
and decision-making of a regulation or directive should be published, including 
the statements which alter the purpose of the directive or give another 
interpretation to the published document;
. . . .
6.  Wishes to see open access to information concerning the activities of the 
management and the advisory committee [comitology committees involved in 
European administration], with a view to obtaining precise information on the 
scope of the decisions taken;
7.  Proposes that a mediator be appointed within Parliament to monitor 
compliance with the obligation incumbent on the Community bodies to provide 
information.291
In other words, Parliament linked the battles narrated above to the fundamental freedom of the 
right to information.  The right to information was ideologically attractive because it could also 
serve as an umbrella for the campaign to further Parliament’s legislative prerogatives.
Parliament’s initiatives after the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 also revealed the 
instrumental quality of the right for Parliament.  As mentioned above, Parliament tasked a 
committee (Committee on Institutional Affairs) with producing a report on the legislation that 
would be needed to implement Article 255 on access to documents.292  The opinion of a related 
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committee (Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights) on the report is telling.  After 
discussing the means of guaranteeing transparency for European citizens, the Committee moved 
on to transparency measures for parliamentarians:
A rapporteur [the parliamentarian tasked by the appropriate committee with 
preparing a report on a proposed European law] should have increased rights of 
access when drawing up his report.  Access to all documents used during the 
preparation of a Commission proposal might be considered in this context.
The competent parliamentary committee should be granted rights of access during 
the commitology procedure [European administrative process described above].
Parliament as a whole might be granted rights of access in the case of major 
interinstitutional issues and problems connected with institutional law.293
The opinion of a second related committee (Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs) 
was even more pointed in calling for a right to transparency for both the public and Parliament.  
In the foreign and security policy area (so-called Second Pillar) and in the police and 
immigration areas (so-called Third Pillar and parts of the First Pillar), Parliament’s legislative 
prerogatives are extremely limited.294  Parliament has not, in contrast with areas where it has 
cooperation or co-decision powers, been able to cajole and threaten the Council and Commission 
with deadlock in order to obtain information and influence.  In the opinion, the Committee used 
the right of access to documents to make the case for greater parliamentary information and 
influence in police and immigration matters: 
The current campaign for access to documents of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council is crucial in fostering a culture of transparency within the Union.   
. . . .
It goes without saying that the European Parliament should be informed and 
therefore consulted before any legislative decision.  Public access to documents 
must also relate not only to the official institutions and bodies of the Union but 
also to all formal or informal working parties in which the Union is directly or 
indirectly involved. 295
The conflation of the general right of access to documents with Parliament’s powers to require 
information and be consulted is evident.296
3.  The evolution of the right to transparency
Since European citizens obtained concrete procedures through which they can exercise 
their transparency rights in the Public Access to Documents Law, the only significant 
development has been the Constitutional Treaty.  The Treaty gives the transparency measures 
that have been established over the past decade the status of higher, constitutional law.  In the 
first part, the duties incumbent upon the European institutions are set down.297  The second part 
of the Constitutional Treaty, which incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted in 
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2000, recognizes the individual right of access to documents.298  Lastly, Article 305 sets down  
the structural, institutional conditions of transparency, which are largely repetitive of the rights 
set out in the first part of the Constitutional Treaty.299
The principal change wrought by the Constitutional Treaty is the symbolic, constitutional 
status conferred upon the principles of openness, transparency, open meetings, and access to
documents.  As a practical matter, the new articles do not add much.  They recognize the 
legislative practice of requiring all institutions, committees, and agencies, in addition to the 
Commission, Parliament, and Council, to respect access to document rights.300   They also 
constitutionalize the rules of procedure of Parliament and the Council under which debates on 
the adoption of legislation are open to the public and under which parliamentary reports and the 
votes and statements from high-level Council meetings are made public.301   Lastly, the 
Constitutional Treaty specifically requires Parliament and the Council to publish documents 
related to their deliberations on legislative matters, but the scope of the requirement turns on the 
access to documents rules of the respective institutions and hence access to such documents 
would not need to be significantly broader than it stands at present.302
4.  European value:  European and northern transparency compared
To conclude, let me take stock of the European right to transparency today.  The 
European right combines different elements from the northern traditions of open government but 
it has also taken on dimensions not found in any of those traditions.  Europeans have a right of 
access to preparatory documents, if not outweighed by the public interest in confidentiality 
before the legal act is adopted and almost without exception after the measure is adopted.  In 
this, the European right approximates the Danish and Dutch laws on right of access.  The 
institutions are under a duty to maintain registers of all documents that can be easily consulted, 
approximating the Swedish and Finnish systems.  Yet where possible the institutions are also 
under a duty to give individuals direct access to documents, electronically, rather than requiring 
them to undertake the lengthy, bureaucratic process of an access to documents  request.  This 
goes beyond Swedish and Finnish law.  
The most notable, and different element of the European right is that it extends to 
government activities of a highly political nature. The reader will recall that in all of the northern 
systems, documents relating to the contribution of government cabinets and ministers to draft 
legislation are excluded from the right of access.  Likewise, parliaments are not covered by 
access to documents legislation.  This is not true in the EU.  Some of the drafts, minutes, votes, 
and declarations produced and recorded in the meetings of the Council, in which representatives 
298
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of national governments negotiate the text of European laws, are subject to the right of access.303
Citizens can also consult documents from comitology committees (part of the European 
administrative process) which, in some cases, reproduce the intergovernmental politics of the 
Council.304  Although I have not focused on transparency in the European Parliament, the right 
of access to documents applies there too, and applies to draft reports and agendas of committee 
meetings.305  Furthermore, in the EU, the right to transparency includes open, public meetings of 
legislative bodies:  Council meetings giving final approval to European laws, parliamentary 
committees, and the plenary sessions of the European Parliament.306  The negotiations and 
political deals that, even in the northern traditions of open government are freely conducted 
behind closed doors, without any hint of a right or duty of transparency, are coming under 
pressure, albeit still limited, from the European right to transparency.   
The added dimensions of transparency are causally related to the Parliament's strategic 
interest in information and the unique European institutional landscape in which the Parliament 
operates.  As this section has documented, since Parliament was first directly elected it has called 
consistently for greater openness in the Council and the Commission to further its own powers.  
The need for information extended to information about what the Commission and Council were 
contemplating  doing, not simply what they had already decided, and hence European 
transparency includes preparatory documents unlike Swedish and Finnish transparency.  
Parliament's campaign also extended to the highly political, intergovernmental bargaining in the 
Council and therefore the European right, in contrast to the northern systems where it originated, 
applies there too.
C.  The Third Generation:  The Right to Civil Society Participation
The last generation of rights before the Commission and the second set, after 
transparency, to revamp Commission authority in the area of broadly applicable policies began in 
1999.  The civil society phase is different from the two previous ones in a number of important 
respects.  First, the right did not originate in domestic public law, rather it was drawn from the 
international arena where civil society had become the dominant paradigm for legitimizing 
international organizations.  Nevertheless, the right has assumed a distinctly European 
significance.  The international provenance of the right meant that it was poorly defined 
compared to the right to a hearing and transparency, which had been worked out in the 
institutionally and historically rich political space of the nation-state.  The amorphous nature of 
the international value of civil society meant that European political entrepreneurs, constrained 
by old, European maps of legitimate relations between public bodies and private citizens, quickly 
infused the new right with the familiar, European practice of corporatism. 
Secondly, unlike the right to a hearing and transparency, this historical moment of rights 
creation is still in progress.  A number of important elements remain to be decided: Will 
European citizens and their organizations be able to vindicate the right in the European Courts? 
What type of policy measures will it cover?  And will the right apply, and in what shape will it 
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apply, to European institutions besides the European Commission?   In what follows, I employ 
the same organizing scheme as in the previous two sections:  the right before and after the 
critical event, the historical juncture (event, value, and supranational interest), the development 
of the right in the aftermath of the juncture, and the comparison between the European right and 
the right in the place of origin.  The reader should bear in mind, however, that the right to civil 
society participation is still unsettled.  I analyze certain facets of the right as belonging to the 
aftermath of the historical juncture not for purposes of complete descriptive accuracy but to 
relate this episode of rights creation to the previous ones and to draw broader lessons for a theory 
of rights in the EU and other, emerging global polities.
1.  The right to be consulted on legislation and implementing regulations then and now 
a.  National traditions of public participation in lawmaking and rulemaking
The procedure through which legislation and implementing regulations are drafted in the 
Member States displays both similarities and differences.307  It is similar in that, generally 
speaking, the government and the administration enjoy considerable discretion in drafting 
legislation and rules and are not under a legal duty to interact with members of the public.  
Before submitting bills to parliament for a vote or laying implementing regulations before 
parliament, sometimes for a vote and other times simply for purposes of information, the 
executive is not required to make its draft public and consult with interested citizens and 
organizations.  National procedure is also similar in that, in most Member States, there are 
carefully defined exceptions to executive discretion in areas such as the environment and land-
use planning, according to which officials are required to publicize drafts and consult the public.  
The procedure is different in that notwithstanding the government's considerable discretion, 
some systems require drafts to be reviewed by a specialized, independent body within the 
administration (Council of State) and other systems rely heavily on advisory bodies composed of 
interest organizations.
Let me elaborate a bit on this element of domestic public law.  First  I consider 
lawmaking.  All of the Member States are parliamentary democracies, meaning that the 
executive is elected by the members of the legislative assembly and therefore enjoys the 
confidence of the legislative assembly.308  The government cabinet and the administration are 
given extensive power to initiate legislation and adopt implementing regulations because they are 
considered to be the expression of the popularly elected legislative assembly.  In drafting 
legislation, most national administrations are not under a duty to adhere to any special 
procedures.309  They are not required, under their constitutions or ordinary legislation, to 
publicize their drafts and consult the public.310
307
 I use the term "implementing regulation" to cover any legal measure promulgated by government administration that is 
designed to affect a broad class of individuals and that is issued pursuant to a delegation contained in a law passed by the 
legislative assembly (or, in the case of France's presidential system, pursuant to the President's autonomous powers under the 
Constitution).  Implementing regulations are known as règlement in France, Rechtsverordnungen in Germany, decreto legislativo
in Italy, and statutory instrument in the UK.  The functional American equivalent is a rule or regulation.  The American reader 
should bear in mind that the categorical difference between lawmaking and rulemaking in American public law is much less 
pronounced elsewhere.  That is because in parliamentary systems, unlike the American separation of powers system, the 
government cabinet answers to Parliament when it drafts both laws and rules (at least in constitutional theory although the 
practice can be very different).  
308
 See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 117-27 (1999).
309
 In this, there is no difference between European systems of lawmaking and the legislative process in the U.S.
310
 The British government sometimes engages in consultation, but as a purely discretionary matter of good administrative 
practice and not because of a legal duty.   One of the modernization initiatives of the Blair government has been to require 
government departments to consult with the public when they draft legislation or major pieces of delegated legislation, i.e. 
Creating Rights
64
There are two important exceptions to government discretion in lawmaking, on which 
there exists variation among the Member States.  In countries influenced by the French 
administrative law tradition (droit administratif), the government is often required to submit 
draft legislation to a specialized  section of the administration.  The Council of State, as the body 
is known in France, Italy, Belgium, and Greece, checks the bill for technical drafting errors, 
respect for constitutional principles, consistency with other legislation, and so on.  Second, in 
some instances, the government is required to submit bills to advisory bodies composed of 
organizations representing the relevant interests, a practice which is often referred to as 
corporatism because it bears a certain resemblance to the powerful corporations of tradesmen 
and artisans that governed the city states of early modern Europe.311  This is typical of certain 
policy areas, for example welfare, industrial policy, and consumer protection.  Such advisory 
boards are far more common in places such as Germany and Scandinavia, where interests are 
highly organized and there is a long tradition of corporatist relations between government and 
intermediate organizations.312   In virtually all Member States, however, including those whose 
administrations are not viewed as particularly open to outside interests, advisory boards 
composed of peak associations exist in certain fields.313
Now I turn to the procedure for adopting implementing regulations.  In most of the 
Member States, the same government discretion and exceptions to that discretion apply in the 
case of significant implementing regulations.314  There is an additional set of exceptions 
however.  In most European systems, administrators are required to publicize their intentions and 
consult with the public-at-large on their choices in carefully defined classes of rulemaking.  
These are generally decisions believed to have concrete effects on discrete, geographically 
defined, groups of citizens.  In addition, they are generally decisions that are made by local and 
regional administrators, not central government.  Land-use planning is one example.315
Government building projects and public investment decisions that have the potential of hurting 
the environment are another example.316   Rules which are considered insignificant, usually 
because they address matters of internal administrative organization, deal with a limited class of 
cases, or have limited temporal effects are subject to fewer procedural requirements than draft 
statutory instruments.  See Cabinet Office, Code of Practice on Written Consultation (Nov. 2000), available at 
http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/Consultation/Code.htm.  As a general rule, government departments must allow 
twelve weeks for comment, synthesize and summarize those comments for public consumption, and then explain the policy 
choices ultimately made.  However, these are just Cabinet Office guidelines, namely they do not create binding legal duties and 
they vest a significant amount of discretion concerning when and how to consult with administrators.
311
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legislation and implementing regulations.317  They very often are promulgated by individual 
ministers, not by prime ministers sitting in the cabinet of ministers, and they are not subject to 
review by the Council of State or advisory bodies.  
b.  Public participation in Commission lawmaking and rulemaking
Until the late 1990's, the European Commission's procedure for drafting legislation and 
implementing regulations was very similar to that of its national counterparts.  The Commission 
was not formally required to publish drafts or consult the public.  As a matter of law, the 
Commission's proposal could remain entirely confidential until the moment that it was sent to the 
other institutions for adoption, principally the Council, and, starting in the late 1980's, the 
European Parliament.  As in the Member States, there was an exception for organized interests 
represented on corporatist advisory bodies. 
There were two different forums for the participation of private associations in European 
governance.   In 1957, the founding Member States established alongside the other original 
institutions, an advisory body called the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) that was 
modeled after their own corporatist traditions.318  The ESC was constituted of producer interests-
- employers, workers, farmers, tradesmen, and professionals--and the organizations sent to 
Brussels to represent such interests were appointed by their governments and were generally 
highly structured, peak associations with national constituencies.  Later, consumer organizations 
were added to the ESC.  Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission was required to consult the 
ESC on legislative proposals:  at the same time that a proposal was sent to the Council for a 
decision and the Parliament for an opinion, it was also sent to the ESC for an opinion.  
Notwithstanding the role that was carved out for the ESC in the European legislative process, it 
quickly came to be known as one of the most powerless institutions in Brussels.   
The second forum for corporatist interest representation was the issue-specific advisory 
committee, created by law in a particular policy area to assist the Commission when drafting 
laws and rules. 319  The interest representation that occurred through advisory committees 
differed from the ESC in a number of ways.  The Commission, not the Member States chose the 
organizations that sat on the committees; the organizations were generally pan-European, not 
national, federations;  their advice was sought earlier in the policymaking process, as the 
Commission was drafting the proposal and not after the proposal had been completed; their 
advice was sought on both laws and implementing regulations, not only laws; and, lastly, the 
enabling laws establishing the committees generally left consultation to the Commission's 
discretion. 
The practice of public participation in Commission decisionmaking was, in fact, quite 
different from the closed nature of the procedure in the law on the books.  The Commission 
would often solicit input from producer groups, firms, and associations not represented on the 
advisory bodies in order to build political momentum for proposals.  It largely did so on an 
317
 See generally Ziamou, Rulemaking, Participation and the Limits of Public Law in the US and Europe, supra note__ at 15-21 
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informal basis although it sometimes would also publish forward-looking policy documents, 
known as Green and White Papers and available to the public-at-large, in which it would outline 
a number of issues on which it was contemplating drafting legislation and ask for the public's 
response.  But the law permitted the civil servants in the Commission to draft in splendid 
isolation from the European citizenry and the Official Journal is full of directives and regulations 
that started in precisely that fashion.
Then, in December 2002, the Commission adopted a non-binding policy document, called 
a Communication, in which it outlined the procedure that all divisions within the Commission 
would follow for consulting individuals and their associations, billed "civil society," in drafting 
policy proposals.320  The procedure is as follows.  The Commission describes the issues open for 
discussion, the public is invited to submit written comments, and the civil society responses are 
published.321   This process is to take place largely through the Commission's website.  The 
Commission then summarizes the comments and explains how the final proposal was or was not
altered by the civil society responses: 
The Commission will provide adequate feedback to responding parties and to the 
public at large.  To this end, explanatory memoranda accompanying legislative 
proposals by the Commission or Commission communications following a 
consultation process will include the results of these consultations and an 
explanation as to how these were conducted and how the results were taken into 
account in the proposal.322
Parallel to the consultation of the public-at-large, the Commission also solicits the opinions of 
certain "target groups" which are believed to have a special interest in the proposal because they 
will be directly impacted or will be involved in the implementation of the policy, or because they 
pursue organizational aims related to the proposal. 323
In the Communication on Consultation, the Commission qualifies the procedure in a 
number of essential respects.  On the one hand, the Commission minimizes the importance of the 
procedure by asserting that the final decision on the content of the legislative proposal is a 
political one for it alone to make.324  Moreover, the Commission states that the standards set 
down in the Communication are meant to guide administrative practice but do not constitute 
legally binding duties enforceable in court:
[A] situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could be 
challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of consultation of 
interested parties.  Such an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible with 
the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the expectations of the citizens 
that the European Institutions should deliver on substance rather than 
concentrating on procedures.325
Lastly, the Commission confines the procedure to "major policy initiatives," namely proposals 
for European laws, and excludes the "minor" changes to the European legal framework contained 
in implementing regulations and other types of official instruments.326  On the other hand, the 
Commission makes it clear that the procedure set down in the Communication on Consultation 
320
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constitutes a floor and that it might choose to consult on more specific matters that would fall 
within the ambit of administrative rulemaking.327
The commitments undertaken in the Communication on Consultation have had a
significant impact on the procedure for drafting policy initiatives and legislative proposals.  
Since the Communication was published, there has been a steady flow of consultations in a 
variety of fields and on a number of different types of policy instruments.  I list some of them 
here to give a sense of the change in the Commission's working methods.  The Directorate-
General responsible for customs has published and solicited comments on a draft proposal for a 
new Customs Code.328  Earlier in the policy chain, the Commission requested comments on a 
Green Paper outlining a number of issues related to the quality and general accessibility of 
services in areas of the European market undergoing liberalization.  After reviewing and 
summarizing the comments, the Commission set down its general approach but concluded that it 
was not the time to go forward with new legislation in the area.329  Downstream in the policy 
process, the Commission conducted a public consultation on the implementation of the European 
broadcasting law, to determine whether there were problems with the existing framework and 
subsequently issued a series of official interpretations of the law, as guidance for the Member 
States.330  These are but a few examples.  In 2003, the first year after the Communication came 
into force, there were a total of 21 public consultations.331  It appears that what was, at best, a 
sporadic exercise, limited to mammoth policy initiatives in the past, is becoming routine 
throughout the Commission.332
2.  The historical juncture:  The fall of the Santer Commission
What explains the Commission's decision to engage in the systematic consultation of the 
public in drafting legislative proposals?   Why did it depart from its past practice, as well as the 
standard mode of administration in the Member States?  This turn of events creates a real puzzle, 
more so than the right to be heard and transparency, because civil society consultation was 
entirely self-imposed, not compelled in part by the judiciary (as with the right to be heard) or by 
European legislators (as with transparency).  The historical experience with government 
bureaucracies has been that their interest lies in unfettered discretion and that rights and 
procedures are imposed from the outside.  However, a closer examination of the background 
demonstrates that, starting in 1999, consultation was in the Commission's interest.  In this 
327
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section, I show that the Commission suffered a spectacular loss of moral authority with the 
resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999.  At the same time, a discourse on legitimacy 
through the participation of civil society had developed in the international arena.  What, just ten 
years ago, the Commission described as input from "special interest groups"333 could now be 
framed as the consultation of "civil society."  The Commission adopted the duty to consult civil 
society to improve its legitimacy in the eyes of the European public.
a.  The fall of the Santer Commission
The Commission has been criticized for fiscal mismanagement and cronyism ever since it 
underwent major expansion in the 1970's and 1980's.  As long as the Commission and the 
Council were the only strong organizations within the European institutional complex, the 
charges of inefficiency and corruption never amounted to much.  That changed in the 1990's with 
the reforms made in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the rise of the European 
Parliament as a powerful actor.  Not only did it obtain co-equal legislative powers, as detailed 
earlier in this Article, but it was given a variety of legal means through which to hold the 
Commission accountable, similar to an ordinary, national parliament.334  When, in 1998, it came 
to light that Edith Cresson, the French Commissioner responsible for Research and 
Development, had given out an expert contract to her dentist, the Parliament took the scandal as 
an occasion to demonstrate its new role as the legislative body to which the Commission had to 
answer.335  It voted to set up a Committee of Wisemen to investigate the Commission's financial 
and employment practices in January 1999.336  The report that was issued two months later, on 
March 15, 1999, was a tough indictment of the Commission and concluded with a fatal 
statement:  "It is difficult to find a member of the Commission with any sense of responsibility."  
The Commission, headed by President Jacques Santer, was at risk of being the first Commission 
in history to be censured by the Parliament and rather than face such a motion, it resigned.337
When the new Commission headed by President Romano Prodi took office on September 
17, 1999, it faced a real crisis.  The Commission's reputation was at an all-time low.  On the 
agenda was enlargement to the East, after the Luxembourg Crisis and the single market agenda 
of 1986, the single biggest transformation of the European Union since its founding.  The Prodi 
Commission was called upon to manage a complicated task, full of political minefields, at the 
same time as it suffered from low esteem from the Parliament and European public opinion more 
broadly.  The response was to undertake a massive, Commission-wide exercise on good 
governance.  Numerous divisions and special task forces within the Commission, as well as 
outside think tanks and scholars, were called to reflect on how to render the Commission more 
legitimate.338  The result was the Commission White Paper on European Governance, published 
333
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in 2001.339   The principal innovation of the White Paper was the civil society concept.340
Through the "involvement" and "consultation" of civil society, the Commission's policies would 
be more democratic and of better quality. The Communication on Consultation setting down the 
specifics of the consultation procedure followed one year later. 
b.  International value:  The influence of the idea of legitimacy through governance with civil 
society 
Global politics of the last decade have been marked by the emergence of widespread 
skepticism of international agreements and organizations.  The benefits of multilateral 
organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD have been challenged 
by a wide variety of social and environmental justice NGOs.  To some extent, international 
organizations are the scapegoats for the effects of the market-driven processes of the 
globalization of capital.  Nonetheless, they and their policies have been critiqued for contributing 
to the inequalities and loss of local control associated with globalization.  In the view of the 
skeptics, international economic organizations have not kept their promise of development and 
prosperity and instead have facilitated global capital's exploitation of the Third World, labor, and 
the environment.
Disparagement of international economic organizations was accompanied by the demand 
that NGOs have a voice their decisions.  The call for participation was made on the grounds of 
democracy, legitimacy, and effectiveness; only if international decisionmakers were responsive 
to NGOs would their polices be fair and equitable.  This demand extended to a wide array of 
international decisionmaking:  treaty negotiations, inter-state dispute resolution, foreign lending 
decisions, and the allocation and distribution of foreign aid at the local level. 
The call for greater NGO participation was tied to the reconceptualization of NGOs as 
civil society.  NGOs have long been part of the international system.341  The International Labor 
Organization created in 1919 provided that representatives of workers and employers would sit 
and vote alongside government representatives on its decisionmaking bodies.342  Later, the 
founders of the United Nations created a permanent, institutional role for non-governmental 
actors by providing in the Charter that the government representatives on the Economic and 
Social Council were under a duty to consult NGOs.343   In the mid-1990's, however, these old 
developing a set of recommendations for best practice in consultation); European Commission, European Governance:  
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the White Paper 63 (2002).  
339
 See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final, July 25, 2001 [hereinafter "White 
Paper"].
340
 The White Paper contained two other major themes:  confining the Commission to the technical, administrative realm while 
leaving political decisions to the Council and the Parliament; and improving transparency.   Both the technocratic 
characterization of the Commission and transparency, however, were well-established arguments for European integration and 
the Commission.  See generally Christian Joerges, "Economic order"--"technical realization"--"the hour of the executive":  some 
legal historical observations on the Commission White Paper on European governance, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01, at 
16  (discussing neo-functionalist roots of technocracy argument in White Paper).
341
 See generally Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 183 
(1997) (analyzing the history of NGO participation in international law). 
342
 The ILO is composed of an annual General Conference, a Governing Body which meets three times a year, and a Secretariat.  
Representatives of workers and employers sit on both the General Conference and the Governing Body.  See Steve Charnovitz, 
The International Labour Organization in its Second Century, 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1, 25 (2000).
343
 See UN Charter, art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for the consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.  Such arrangements may be made with 
Creating Rights
70
actors took on a new identity as civil society.  The official rhetoric of the UN system, the World 
Bank, and a variety of other international organizations shifted from "NGO" to "civil society" 
and “civil society organizations.” 344
The change in language was not simply a matter of form.  It was related to a vast body of 
academic and policymaking literature in which civil society, by which is generally meant social 
and environmental justice NGOs and not market actors or their associations, was put forward as 
the key to legitimate global governance.  An analysis of the normative claim in favor of civil 
society participation in international organizations is beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it 
to say that the organizations of global civil society are believed to foster transnational 
solidarities, pluralism in the international system of governance, republican commitments to 
collective self-government, and communitarian values.345  Most dramatically, some claim that 
the organizations of civil society represent the global people. 346  The transformation that the 
practice and rhetoric of international organizations underwent in the 1990's is nicely captured in 
a statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development:
I am happy to see that nowadays there is practically no international organization, 
not only in the United Nations system but also outside it, that is not actively 
seeking ways of integrating the civil society.  What was new in December 1995 is 
becoming a common concern of international organizations now.347
The Commission was influenced by this reconceptualization of organizations outside of 
the state in adopting its procedure for drafting lawmaking proposals.  The evidence for this claim 
can be found in the origins of civil society talk within the Commission.  The Commission is 
composed of over thirty Directorate-Generals but only three--the Directorate-Generals 
responsible for international trade, development (international aid), and employment and social 
affairs--began to conceive of their relations with private associations as relations with "civil 
society" in the late 1990's.  Departments such as DG Agriculture, DG Internal Market, and DG 
Competition did not develop a civil society discourse even though they routinely deal with 
intermediate associations of farmers, workers, firms, and consumers.  In other words, 
departments with regular contacts with other international organizations were far more likely 
than departments that largely dealt with internal matters to develop a discourse on civil 
society.348   And it was their discourse that was then taken on by the Commission as a whole.  In 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United 
Nations concerned.").  See generally United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), The NGLS Handbook of UN 
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the White Paper that first proposed consultation for the entire Commission, the Commission 
singled out the experiences of the trade and development departments:  "This [involving civil 
society] already happens in fields such as trade and development, and has recently been proposed 
for fisheries."
The experience of DG Trade, responsible for international trade, most clearly 
demonstrates the influence of the civil society concept from the international sphere. In October 
1998, the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment collapsed because of 
opposition from anti-globalization organizations.349  The response of the Trade Commissioner, 
Sir Leon Brittan, was to organize a series of public meetings, open to all "civil society 
organizations," starting in November 1998.350  At the meetings, a number of general and sectoral 
issues on the agenda of the upcoming Seattle WTO Ministerial were discussed (transparency, 
development, the environment, investments, intellectual property, goods, trade). The European 
delegation at Seattle included representatives of labor, business, the environment, farmers, 
development organizations, and so on.  After the Seattle protests of December 1999 and the 
collapse of WTO negotiations, DG Trade instituted a more formal version of the meetings held 
the previous year.  Consultation, known initially as  the “Trade Policy Dialogue with EU Civil 
Society” and now simply as the “Civil Society Dialogue” includes period public meetings on 
trade issues as well as regular Internet chats with the Trade Commissioner.  
The use of civil society language by the Commission departments responsible for 
international aid also supports the claim of international influence.  In the foreign aid domain, the 
Commission has a long history of implementing development policy through NGOs.351 Since 
1975, the Commission has also consulted NGOs on broader policy questions through the Liaison 
Committee of NGOs, now known as CONCORD (European NGO Confederation for Relief and 
Development).  The relationship was and continues to be weighted toward the clientelistic, 
implementation side, in which the Commission is the donor agency and the NGOs are the 
funding recipients, although there have been recent efforts to ensure more NGO participation at 
the initial stages of policymaking.352   By the mid-1990’s, the very same NGO actors came to be 
known as civil society.353
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c.  Supranational interest: The interest of the Commission in reclaiming political standing 
within the European institutional complex
Civil society consultation served the interest of the Prodi Commission in reestablishing 
credibility because it brought the Commission closer to the ideal of good global governance.354
The strategic use of the concept was manifest in the policy documents setting down the 
procedures for civil society consultation.  A brief excursion into theories on the role of language 
in political conflict is necessary to fully understand the deployment of the civil society concept in 
the White Paper and, later, the Communication on Consultation.  The mechanism by which 
words and ideas are used by actors like the Commission in struggles to define political authority 
has been analyzed by political theorists such as Quentin Skinner, James Tully, and Charles 
Taylor, drawing on J.L. Austin's concept of speech act.355  A statement made in the context over 
the struggle to define, exercise, extend, or modify political authority should be understood as 
action.356  It is not epiphenomenon.  What was the individual doing by using certain words?  
Speech act analysis builds on the crucial insight that language is used strategically by the 
participants in a political debate and because this is so, it cannot be assumed that words are being 
used in accordance with prevailing linguistic conventions:  a political actor might use an old 
word unconventionally or, albeit rare, might even coin a new word rather than work within the 
limits of the existing linguistic conventions.  Furthermore, in the speech act theory of language, 
authors use words to affirm or change the existing structure of authoritative decisionmaking.  
They can do so openly, by working within linguistic conventions to criticize or praise  the 
powers that be, but they can also do so covertly, by using old words in new ways, and hence 
recharacterize existing political relations.   
A couple of examples will help make the point.  Feminists like Betty Friedan have 
applied the old language of "exploitation" to the new setting of middle-class housewives in the 
suburbs, thereby mounting a formidable challenge to existing structures of patriarchy.357  In the 
literature on social movements, this practice is identified as framing.  Thus Margaret Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink argue that the international movement against female genital mutilation was 
able to place the issue on the agenda of national governments and international organizations 
only after it applied the language of "castration" to female genital mutilation, a radical 
innovation given the previous use of the word "circumcision" to describe the very same 
practice.358
How, then, did the Commission use strategically the language of "civil society" in the 
debate over the constitution of European public authority and reclaim a central role itself in the 
institutional balance of powers?   First, what were previously understood as "special interest 
is evidence of this shift:  the former refers to “non-governmental organizations,” the latter to non-state actors, which are defined 
as comprising the private sector, economic and social partners, and civil society, i.e. what in former times would have been called 
NGOs.  See Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé signed in Mauritus on 4 November 1995, arts. 38; 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, arts. 6, 32.
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groups,"359 "voluntary associations,"360 the "social partners," 361and "lobbies"362 were redefined 
as "civil society organizations."  The  word "civil society" was used to transfer the positive 
connotations developed in the rhetoric of the international sphere to a set of social actors and 
government practices that were very familiar in European politics yet were looked upon with 
suspicion by citizens of a number of Member States and by some of the civil society actors 
themselves. 363  In the Communication on Consultation, drawing upon the definition in the earlier 
White Paper, the Commission gave the following definition of civil society organizations:
Problems can arise because there is no commonly accepted--let alone legal-- definition of 
the term 'civil society organisation'.  It can nevertheless be used as shorthand to refer to a 
range of organisations which include: the labour-market players (i.e. trade unions and 
employers federations--the 'social partners'); organisations representing social and 
economic players, which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term (for 
instance, consumer organisations); NGOS (non-governmental organisations) which bring 
people together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights 
organisations, charitable organisations, educational and training organisations,etc.; CBO's 
(community-based organisations), i.e. organisations set up within society at grassroots 
level which pursue member-oriented objectives, e.g. youth organisations, family 
associations and all organisations through which citizens participate in local and 
municipal life; and religious communities.
So 'civil society organisations' are the principal structures of society outside of 
government and public administration, including economic operators not generally 
considered to be 'third sector' or NGOs.  The term has the benefit of being inclusive and 
demonstrates that the concept of these organisations is deeply rooted in the democratic 
traditions of the Member States of the Union.364
With this definition, the Commission recharacterized in a positive light a set of long-
standing interest organizations and government practices that were the subject of debate and 
contention in Europe.  The Germans might deny a role for the World Federation of Advertisers 
in European governance because it is considered a lobby, the British might do the same for the 
European Trade Union Conference because it is labor, and the French might oppose the 
involvement of the Vatican's charitable organization known as Caritas because it would represent 
the introduction of religion into public life.  None of them, however, would say that "civil 
society" should be excluded.   In essence, the Commission sidestepped the thorny issues of 
whether and what interest groups can be considered legitimate actors in government 
decisionmaking.
In the White Paper and then the Communication on Consultation, the Commission 
adopted the prevailing theory of civil society as good for democracy and global governance 
because private associations contest power holders in government, foster republican participation 
in government, and promote communitarian values.  First, the White Paper:
359
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Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of citizens 
and delivering services that meet people's needs. . . .  The organisations which 
make up civil society mobilise people and support, for instance, those suffering 
from exclusion or discrimination.365
Another passage in the White Paper reads: 
Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to change 
policy orientations and society.  This offers a real potential to broaden the debate 
on Europe's role.  It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving 
the Union's objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, 
criticism and protest.366
The Communication on Consultation repeated the point:
The specific role of civil society organisations in modern democracies is closely linked to 
the fundamental right of citizens to form associations in order to pursue a common 
purpose as highlighted in Article 12 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Belonging to an association is another way for citizens to participate actively, in addition 
to involvement in political parties or through elections.367
The last move made by the Commission was to ally itself with civil society by setting 
down a set of rules for consulting civil society in the policymaking process.  In the White Paper, 
the Commission promised that it would take the steps necessary for "[i]nvolving civil society."368
It committed to "[m]ore effective and transparent consultation"369 and "a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue."370  And I explained earlier, in the follow up Communication on 
Consultation, the Commission put forward full-blown standards for the routine, structured 
participation of civil society in drafting policy initiatives.  
To conclude, what was the Commission doing by saying it would consult "civil society"?  
The Commission was saying that it was closer to the good government ideal of today and should 
continue to govern. 371  Given the overtly political nature of the White Paper, there really is no 
need for much interpretation of what the Commission was doing.  The Commission was explicit:
Better consultation and involvement, a more open use of expert advice and a fresh 
approach to medium-term planning will allow it to consider much more critically 
the demands from the Institutions and from interest groups for new political 
initiatives.  It [the Commission] will be better placed to act in the general 
European interest.372
And hence, to finish the thought, the Commission should retain its position at the epicenter of 
European integration: 
Both the proposals in the White Paper and the prospect of further enlargement lead 
in one direction: a reinvigoration of the Community method.  This means ensuring 
that the Commission proposes and executes policy; the Council and the European 
365
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Parliament takes decisions; and national and regional actors are involved in the EU 
policy process.373
Before moving on, I would like to stress one point.  The fact that the civil society idea was 
adopted by the Commission for the strategic reason of reclaiming political standing after the 
resignation of the Santer Commission does not bear upon the normative analysis of civil society 
participation.  To put it in the bluntest way possible, civil society is not superstructure.374  In 
seeking to defend the Community method and reclaim authority, the Commission had to work 
within certain parameters of democratic discourse.   The Commission could not say obey me 
because I represent divine authority on earth.  Nor could it say obey me because I represent a 
European nation bound together by a common blood and a common language.  Rather, it had to 
say obey me because I am democratic.  Civil society, as one variation of "I am democratic," is 
not an infinitely malleable concept.  The revival of civil society in the 1990's was accompanied 
by a set of judgments as to what qualifies as civil society--not corporations in their profit-seeking 
guise--and what values civil society serves-- pluralism, protest, republican citizenship, and 
community--and the Commission, in consulting civil society, was, and continues to be, 
constrained by this set of judgments.  Because "consultation of civil society" cannot be stretched 
to accommodate, for instance, European regulatory policy dictated by a single profit-seeking 
corporation, it is an idea with autonomous force that must be evaluated on its own merits. 
3.  The evolution of the right to civil society participation
In fall of 1999, at the same time that the Prodi Commission began the good governance 
exercise that culminated in the White Paper, it was influential in setting into motion a chain of 
events that produced one of the major innovations of the recent Constitutional Treaty, an article
on the right of civil society to participate in European governance.  The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of 2000 was an important precedent for the Constitutional Treaty in both the structure of 
the drafting process and the substance of the commitments made therein.375  Drafting of the non-
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights began in fall of 1999 and it was approved by the 
European Council at Nice in December 2000.376  The Charter was the idea of the German 
presidency of the European Council.377  It was not intended to introduce new rights, rather it was 
conceived as vehicle for rendering the existing rights of European citizens in their relations with 
European institutions (as opposed to their national governments) more visible and thus improve 
the legitimacy of the EU. 
In line with this purpose, the European Council designed an inclusive and open drafting 
process.  The drafting body (“Convention”) include a number of actors that had, in the past been 
excluded from the high politics of European treaty negotiations:  representatives of the European 
373
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Parliament and national parliaments were given membership on the Convention, alongside the 
Member States and the Commission, and representatives of the Court of Justice and Council of 
Europe378 were given observer status.379  Furthermore, the European Council instructed the 
Convention to conduct its affairs as openly as possible.  Thus the Convention was required to 
hold all of its hearings in public, make the documents submitted at the hearings accessible on a 
website, and seek the opinions of the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
Regions, and the Ombudsman.  The Convention was also encouraged to invite “other bodies, 
social groups or experts” to give their views.  
The European Council conclusions establishing the Convention did not carve out a 
specific role for  NGOs or other private associations.380  Nonetheless, a number of public 
hearings of NGO representatives were held and a Convention website was created where citizens 
and organizations could submit their views.381  The Commission, as a member of the 
Convention, strongly supported including civil society organizations in the deliberative process 
and was one of the main reasons that civil society came to be so heavily involved.
The Constitutional Convention, which did include a formal role for civil society, was 
modeled on the earlier experience with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  And it was because 
of the suggestion of civil society representatives heard at that Convention that the Constitutional 
Treaty now contains a far-reaching right to civil society consultation.  In December 2001, the 
Laeken European Council decided to create the Convention responsible for drawing up the 
Constitutional Treaty.  The Convention was composed of 102 members and 102 alternates, 
chosen by national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the 
Commission.382  Alongside the Convention was a Forum for civil society organizations.  The 
Forum consisted of a website, open to all voluntary organizations, on which drafts of the 
Constitutional Treaty were published and on which comments and proposed amendments from 
members of the public could be posted.383  The function of the Forum was purely advisory.  The 
Praesdium, led by a Chairman (Giscard d'Estaing), two Vice-Chairmen (Giuliano d'Amato and 
Jean Luc Dehaene) and composed of nine members drawn from the Convention, set the agenda 
and drafted proposals for the Convention and the Forum to consider.  
The early months were devoted to soliciting views from the members of the Convention, 
what d'Estaing called the "listening stage."384  In this context, a meeting of civil society 
organizations was held in Brussels on June 24-25, 2002.385  There, Joseph Bresch, the President 
of the Economic and Social Committee, put forward the suggestion that the Constitutional Treaty 
provide for the principle of participatory democracy and include civil society.386  A skeleton 
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outline of the Constitutional Treaty was then circulated and posted on the Convention's website 
in the fall of 2002.387  The drafters anticipated a provision on "participatory democracy" which 
would guarantee that: "the Institutions are to ensure a high level of openness, permitting citizens' 
organizations of all kinds to play a full part in the Union's affairs."388  Anyone, including 
individuals, voluntary associations, and interest organizations could submit comments on the 
draft, which were also posted on the Convention's website.  They did, and many called for 
including a duty on the part of the European institutions to consult civil society in policy 
planning and decisionmaking.389  The fuller draft released on April 2, 2003 included an article on 
participatory democracy very similar to the final version, in which civil society organizations 
were given the right of participation in the decisionmaking of the European institutions.390  Thus, 
the decision to attribute constitutional status to civil society participation was linked to the 
structure of the Convention and its Forum for civil society organizations, which in turn was tied 
to the experience with citizen groups in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Prodi 
Commission’s decision to support civil society organizations in the bid to improve its democratic 
credentials and re-establish institutional stature after the fall of the Santer Commission.  
The provision dedicated to relations between European institutions and civil society says:
Article 46:  The principle of participatory democracy
1.  The Union Institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views on all 
areas of Union action.
2.  The Union Institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society.
3.  The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to 
ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent.
. . . .
The comments that accompanied the first appearance of Article 46 in the draft of April 2, 2003 
were explicit in drawing the connection between participatory democracy and civil society:  "The 
purpose of this Article is to provide a framework and content for the dialogue which is largely 
already in place between the institutions and civil society."391
While the Articles of the Constitutional Treaty on the right to good administration and the 
right to transparency simply constitutionalize existing law, Article 46 both elevates civil society 
consultation to the rank of higher law and extends the right to a host of new areas.  Insofar as the 
Commission is concerned, Article 46 converts what was previously an administrative practice set 
down in a non-binding policy document into a constitutionally guaranteed procedure.  With 
respect to other European institutions, the provision creates an entirely novel set of rights and 
duties.  The duty to engage in “dialogue” and the duty to give citizens and their associations an 
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opportunity to make their views known, were good government principles originally developed 
by the Commission, for the Commission, but in the Constitutional Treaty they have been 
extended to all European institutions.  Article 46 transforms a procedure designed for and by a 
single European institution--the Commission--into a general principle of democracy applicable to 
all. 
The turning point for European rights that started in 1999 with the resignation of the 
Santer Commission has still not come to a close.  A number of basic questions continue to 
surround the right to civil participation and will probably not be resolved until the Constitutional 
Treaty is ratified (or not), the first legal challenges are brought to European measures on the 
ground that the principle of participatory democracy was violated, and the first legislative 
measures are taken to give effect to the principle.  Among the most significant questions that 
remain open are:  Will the right be legally binding and enforceable in the European Courts or 
will it be interpreted as a programmatic article, that is, a right that European public officials are 
bound to respect and uphold in their activities but that is not an area for the intervention of 
judges?392  What types of Commission measures are subject to the duty to consult, just European 
laws or also implementing regulations, and if implementing regulations, all of them or only the 
most significant ones?  Lastly, how will the right of civil society participation be construed in the 
different institutional setting of adjudication by the European Courts, intergovernmental 
bargaining in the Council of Ministers and European Council, and technical administration and 
information-gathering in the European agencies?   The coming years promise to be eventful ones 
for the right to civil society participation.  
4.   European value:  Civil society in European and global governance compared
The Commission drew from the international realm when it set into motion the civil 
society phase of European governance.  None of the Member States had a developed discourse 
on the importance of civil society for good government or a procedure, applicable to all 
lawmaking, in which citizens and associations were systematically invited to comment on the 
early drafts of legislation.  Yet the civil society ideal in the international realm was nebulous and 
ill-defined.  Unlike the right to a hearing and transparency, public law principles that had been 
elaborated in the thick institutional space of the nation-state, the idea of legitimacy through civil 
society left the Commission with significant latitude in designing the organizational change that 
would constitute governing with civil society.  The latitude, however, was illusory because of the 
ever-present constraints of European mental maps, in this case the mental map of corporatist 
relations between public bodies and private interest organizations. 
The European right to civil society participation differs in two critical respects from the 
international right.  First, the understanding of civil society is different.  Civil society in the 
international realm is generally used to refer to NGOs that seek social or environmental justice, 
not associations of firms or workers whose agendas are informed by their market activities. 393
Moreover, the term encompasses an extremely fluid set of private associations.  An association 
qualifies as civil society just by virtue of being an organization that is one-step removed from the 
392
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institutions of government.  As long as the group has a name, an e-mail address, and a core of 
activists, it counts as civil society.  Civil society in Europe means NGOs.   But it also embraces 
producer groups such as farmers, employer associations, sectoral industry groups, labor unions, 
and professional associations.  Furthermore, civil society in the Commission documents and the 
Constitutional Treaty signifies a structured reality of organizations that represent distinct 
functional interests, religious traditions (churches), and political values.  It refers to a self-
contained universe of labor unions, employer organizations, consumer federations, umbrella 
environmental organizations, anti-discrimination groups, political liberties associations, and 
churches.  Lastly, to count as a civil society organization in Europe, an association is expected to 
have a membership base, a physical address with offices, and a bit of history. 
The different, European understanding of civil society is directly tied to the Commission's 
strategic use of the international discourse in the old institutional setting of European corporatist 
interest group representation that I described at the beginning of this section.  All of the 
Commission documents borrow their definition of civil society from the corporatist European 
institution par excellence, the Economic and Social Committee, which had developed earlier a 
definition of civil society that, not surprisingly, reflected its own model of interest 
representation.394  The new, central data base of Commission organizations with civil society 
representation is simply a compilation of already existing advisory bodies composed of 
organized interests, many of which can trace their roots to the 1960's.395  I do not wish to suggest 
that civil society is only a label and that nothing has changed in the relationship between 
European institutions and the public.  Certainly, the civil society concept brought with it a 
commitment to consult a wider array of  non-state organizations with a broader set of concerns 
than the old peak associations of labor, business, the professions, and farmers.  Yet these new 
associational actors must still fit a distinctly European mold.  They are defined as organizations 
with a long-standing role in national politics, i.e. churches, or are expected to reach out to a 
significant number of Europeans through membership or other activities and show some 
organizational stability before the Commission will take their claims seriously.
The second major difference between the European right to civil society participation and 
the international right is the breadth of the organizational change that has occurred in order to 
include civil society in public decisionmaking.  The consultation procedure adopted by the 
Commission is more comprehensive than the institutional practices of any of the major 
international economic organizations (World Bank, IMF, NAFTA, WTO). While, for instance, 
the World Bank has developed venues for civil society participation, they do not stretch across-
the-board to all policy areas, do not entail the same, weighty sequence of publication, public 
comments, and official explanation, and do not have binding, legal status.396  The participation 
that can be expected once (and if) the Constitutional Treaty is ratified and Article 46 takes effect, 
will surpass wildly anything that exists in the international realm.  As with the previous episodes 
of rights creation, the Commission did not simply borrow mental maps of liberal democracy, 
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rather it was driven to construct a more extensive rights scheme than existed in the place of 
origin.  
III.  THE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE 
My analysis of the historical record shows that the historical institutionalist 
understanding of human preferences and collective processes of constitutional change can help 
explain the development of rights before the European Commission.  European actors were 
motivated by values, what I also call mental maps of good government:  the common law right to 
a fair hearing, the northern right to transparency, and the international right to civil society 
participation.  Earlier, in Part I, I foresaw that these would be social understandings that actors 
had developed through their experiences as citizens of their different nation-states.  The first and 
second generations of rights were clearly driven by individuals with allegiances to their national 
constitutional symbols and practices but the third generation was more complex.  The 
Commission adopted a normative discourse of good government that had been developed outside 
Europe, yet precisely because the institutions and social understandings in the international realm 
were so ill-defined, the old European mental maps quickly took over.  As anticipated in Part I, 
European actors were not only motivated by values but also by their strategic interest in 
preserving and consolidating authority: the interest of the Court of Justice and the Commission in 
the enforcement of their decisions; of Heads of State in securing ratification of a hard-fought set 
of political deals contained in the Maastricht Treaty; of the Parliament in improving its 
legislative powers; and of the Commission in preserving its institutional role as the engine of 
European integration.  
The collective processes that led to the transformation of rights also fit a familiar mold.  
New procedural rights emerged sporadically, in response to historical, highly contextualized 
challenges to the powers of specific European institutions:  the accession of a common law 
country, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and the resignation of the Santer 
Commission.  After rights were added to the European toolkit, they showed real staying power 
and conceptual constancy.  Lastly, the national and international values that spurred 
constitutional change are different from the European ones that the rules serve today:  the 
European right to a hearing affords parties more procedural guarantees than the British 
counterpart;  the European right to transparency covers a wider array of government activities 
and affords citizens additional means for obtaining government information as compared to the 
northern right; and the European right to civil society participation covers a more structured 
organizational reality, through a more extensive and well-defined procedure, than does the 
international right. 
In Part I, I  presented three alternative theories of rights and constitutional change in the 
EU and derived specific hypotheses for the case of procedural rights in Commission 
decisionmaking.397  Legal constitutionalism, intergovernmentalism, and neo-functionalism 
generate predictions on a number of dimensions of rights in Commission proceedings:  the 
bundle of rights that individuals enjoy, the time when different types rights are acknowledged by 
the Commission, and the European institution responsible for advocating and imposing the rights 
on the Commission.  Now that I have presented the history, I return to the competing theories 
and examine how they fare when matched against the pattern of institutional change that has 
occurred over time.  If they were successful in predicting rights, notwithstanding their very 
different assumptions about human motivations and collective decisionmaking processes, then I 
397
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would have to conclude that historical institutionalism fails to capture the essential elements of 
constitutional change that can be used to explain rights before the Commission and elsewhere.398
As it turns out, although the competing theories are able to account for certain features of 
procedural rights, they each fall short of providing a comprehensive and accurate set of 
predictions. 
A.  Legal Constitutionalism 
As we saw earlier, legal constitutionalists work from the premise that constitutional 
designers are motivated by higher principles of democracy, fairness, and justice and that the rules 
and rights that are adopted by conventions and courts further those principles.  Hanns Peter 
Nehl's work best exemplifies this approach in the context of the European Commission.  Give 
the normative underpinnings of this form of scholarship the forward-looking element of the 
theory combines the positive "will"  with the normative "should."  Therefore it is difficult to 
discern the concrete mix of rights Nehl believes a constitution designer will (and should) protect 
at a given historical moment because they best guarantee the basic values that Nehl discerns as 
fundamental to modern administration, namely individual dignity, administrative rationality, and 
workability.  His analysis, however, does produce expectations as to which institutions will press 
for rights in the administrative process and when they will do so.  First,  given that their 
professional and institutional mission is inextricably woven with higher principles of justice, 
judges should be the most receptive to claims that European administration is unfair and 
illegitimate.  Bureaucrats, by contrast can be expected to focus on getting the work of 
administration done.  In other words, procedural rights should be driven by the judgments of the 
European Courts.  Second, such rights should emerge as soon as the Commission begins 
exercising different types of power and private parties go to the courts to complain that it was 
exercised unfairly.  
In the case of the right to a hearing and other types of rights in individualized 
Commission proceedings, Nehl's expectations as to the institutional proponent of the right are 
mostly borne out by the historical record.  The Court of Justice set down the right to a hearing in 
competition proceedings and then extended the right to other areas of Commission 
administration where private parties could show that they were similarly burdened.   Yet the late 
arrival of the right--eight years after the first competition case was decided--and the 
Commission's entrepreneurship in undertaking organizational change are difficult to explain.  
The events that pose real difficulties for legal constitutionalism are the rise of the right to 
transparency and civil society participation.  Many years before they became standard elements 
of European rights discourse, individual litigants had made functionally similar claims before the 
Court of Justice and had been rejected.  For instance, Nehl narrates a case from 1984 in which a 
trader vindicated, unsuccessfully, the right of access to documents.399  In Tradax Graanhandel 
BV v. Commission, a Dutch importer of maize challenged a duty ("levy") assessed as part of the 
European price support scheme for agricultural commodities, but rather than challenging the 
implementing regulation setting down the duty, the Dutch importer requested the information 
that had been used to make the calculations that resulted in the duty.  The Commission turned 
down the Dutch importer's request and, when Tradax went to the Court of Justice, both the 
Advocate General and the Court dismissed the claim. 
Tradax argued that general principle of good administration required the Commission to 
provide the documents--as evidenced by the access to documents laws common to a number of 
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Member States--and that the right to a hearing, through which parties obtained documents in 
competition proceedings, should also apply to a business affected by an implementing 
regulation.400   Neither the Advocate General nor the Court were persuaded.  The reasoning of 
the Advocate General illustrates the institutional limits of judges and fairness doctrines in 
reforming administration:  
Nor does it seem to me that there is any general or absolute principle of 
Community law, as is suggested, which requires information to be disclosed by 
the institutions of the Community to persons affected by Community acts in the 
absence of express provision and in the absence of litigation.  The provisions of 
the laws of Member States which have been cited requiring disclosure of 
information in the possession of governments, in the interests of more open 
government, may support an argument that there should be specific or general 
measures laying down some rules.  It does not seem to me to establish a general 
principle of "unwritten law" which aids the applicants in this case.  Moreover, the 
fact that in competition and staff cases the Court has recognized that, before a 
decision is taken affecting an individual he has a right to be heard and to know the 
case against him, does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion that after a levy is 
fixed for all traders (since it is not contended that there is a right to the 
information before the levy is fixed) the information must be given to individual 
traders.401
Moreover, unlike the English right to a hearing, there was no threat to the legal authority of the 
Commission or the Court.  Both the Advocate General and the Court were satisfied that Tradax's
rights were adequately protected by the right to challenge to the implementing regulation in 
court, at which point Tradax and the court would be able to review the documents underpinning 
the levy.402  They obviously believed that a Dutch court would see the matter in the same light.
A Dutch litigant, acting according to a mental map formed through education and 
experiences in the Dutch public law system of open government, was unable to persuade the 
Court to adopt an access to documents rule.403  It was only after Maastricht, the declarations of 
European Heads of State in fall of 1992, and the enactment of the first Commission access to 
document rules in 1993 and 1994, that the Court began enforcing a right of access to documents 
to the benefit of traders in situations almost identical to that of Tradax.404
The same unsuccessful testing of legal theories before the Court of Justice has occurred 
in the sphere of civil society participation.  The primary doctrinal candidate for obtaining, 
through the Court of Justice, the functional equivalent of the right to participation is the duty to 
give reasons under Article 190, now 253, of the EC Treaty.405  A requirement that the 
Commission respond to the objections of interested parties in the statement of reasons supporting 
a regulation or law would approximate the explanatory memorandum that the Commission now 
issues in civil society consultations.  Yet the Court has always rejected the claim that the 
400
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Commission is obliged to engage in an exchange of views with the European public, now known 
as civil society, before adopting regulations and proposing laws.406
As far as the anticipated timing of rights in concerned, unsurprisingly, legal 
constitutionalist theory also disappoints.  The Commission has always had the power to adopt 
rules and propose laws and it has done so since the 1960's.  Yet, notwithstanding the objections 
from individual litigants chronicled above, until recently the Commission exercised such powers 
free of any duty to disclose documents or engage in an exchange of views with civil society 
organizations and members of the public.  Only in 1993 and then in 2002 did such rights and 
obligations come into being.  In sum, it appears that even though judges are moved by 
complaints of oppressive, government action to do justice and make administration fairer, they 
face limits based on their pre-existing mental maps of rights, both in what they will recognize as 
oppressive and unjust and in what they believe that they can do to remedy injustice as a court of 
law as opposed to a democratically elected legislature.  
B.  Intergovernmentalism
According to intergovernmentalists, the preferences of Member States and bargaining 
among them are responsible for the rules through which European institutions govern.  Most 
intergovernmentalists base their model of European integration upon the same self-interested 
individual preferences and strategic behavior at the foundation of domestic rational choice 
theories of constitutional design.  Given the market-creating ends of the original European 
Community, intergovernmentalists focus on domestic economic lobbies, whose views are filtered 
through their governments, and then serve as the grounds for national preferences in treaty 
negotiations and bargaining on European laws in the Council of Ministers.407  As we saw in Part 
I, if pressed to anticipate national preferences for individual rights, an intergovernmentalist 
would say that states seek to protect the material well-being of their own citizens from arbitrary 
government action and that the definition of what constitutes arbitrary should follow national 
patterns of individual rights and public duties.  This type of preference verges on altruistic value, 
as opposed to selfish interest.  However, because rational choice theorists that attempt to 
accommodate value-driven preferences rank them as insignificant compared to material interests, 
we would not expect states to exhibit much variation in the intensity of their preferences for 
rights. 408  And therefore, an intergovernmentalist would not predict that weaker states would 
used the possibility of linkage across policy areas to secure their rights for their citizens by 
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making significant concessions on other issues.409  Hence the specific rights that should emerge 
from negotiations should be the ones existing in the most powerful Member States.
From the beginnings of European integration to the present day, France and Germany 
have been and continue to be the two most powerful Member States, notwithstanding the many 
waves of accession and the membership of another large country, namely the UK.410  An 
intergovernmentalist, therefore, would expect European citizens to enjoy the rights that French 
and German citizens are guaranteed under their domestic constitutions and laws.  Moreover, an 
intergovernmentalist would anticipate that rights are promoted by Member States and are 
contained in treaties and laws negotiated among Member States.  Lastly, the timing of rights 
should follow the same historical sequence as the conferral of  powers upon the Commission, 
since states would only want to protect their citizens from arbitrary government action once they 
perceived that the Commission had the power to impose it.
The intergovernmental explanation is persuasive in the early days of the Commission.  As 
the reader will recall, the first area in which the Commission exercised direct enforcement 
powers was competition law.  The right to be notified of the Commission's evidence and 
arguments and reply in writing and orally, at a hearing, were set down in a Council regulation.  
The Commission was also required to give a statement of the reasons supporting the final 
competition decision under Article 190 of the Treaty of Rome.  This conformed to French 
competition procedure (notice, a right to reply in writing, and a reasoned opinion of the 
Technical Commission on Cartels and Dominant Positions) and German competition procedure 
(the same plus the right to an oral hearing). The institutional advocates of rights also followed 
expectations: the basic framework was set down, in part, by the states that negotiated the Treaty 
of Rome and the Council Regulation.  And the timing is historically correct: as soon as the 
Commission was given direct enforcement powers (Council Regulation of 1962) it was also 
required to respect basic rights (Council Regulation of 1962 and Commission Regulation of 
1963).  
By the time the Court of Justice recognized the right to a hearing in 1974, however, the 
intergovernmental model of European institutional change ceased to hold true.  The right was not 
drawn from France or Germany or even the legal tradition of a majority of the Member States, 
but from a state (the UK) with little power, given her recent entry into the European Community 
after years of having been denied admission by De Gaulle.  Furthermore, the right was 
established by supranational institutions, the Court of Justice and, to a lesser extent, the 
Commission, and emerged at a time when there had been no change in the Commission’s 
powers.
The same initial consistency with intergovernmentalism followed by departure from the 
model is true also of transparency and civil society participation.  Before 1993, individuals did 
not have a right to documents, as in the majority, closed government tradition, which included 
France and Germany.  After 1993, the intergovernmental predictions falter, for the right came 
from Member States that were powerless as a matter of their economies and populations 
(Denmark and the Netherlands), were established partly by a supranational institution (the 
European Parliament), and were introduced well after the Commission had come to exercise 
significant rulemaking and lawmaking powers independent of the Member States represented on 
the Council.411
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Likewise, before 2002, public participation in rulemaking and lawmaking had followed 
the majority corporatist model of consulting advisory bodies on which select interest 
organizations were represented.  The Economic and Social Committee was established in the 
Treaty of Rome and advisory committees were set down in a number of European laws that 
dated to the 1960's and 1970's.  Thus, both forms of interest representation were promoted by the 
Member States and at the time that the Commission was first given rulemaking and lawmaking 
powers.   After 2002, while the definition of the interested public retained the original corporatist 
bent,  procedure for consulting interests, as well as the types of private associations that were 
consulted, became much more inclusive.  Moreover, the institutional proponent of the right was 
supranational Commission.  Lastly, the right to civil society participation did not appear at a time 
when the Member States transferred new powers to the Commission. 
In summary, the European experience shows that states initially do control the rights that 
their citizens enjoy before international organizations but, sooner or later, they lose control to 
those organizations.  Intergovernmental theory offers an important corrective to my analysis of 
the European Commission because it accounts for the procedural baseline that existed before 
each of the historical challenges that prompted organization change and new rights.  
Nevertheless, because this theory does not provide any intellectual tools for understanding the 
dynamics of European institutional change outside of intergovernmental bargaining, it remains 
fundamentally incomplete.
C.  Neo-Functionalism
As the reader will recall from Part I, neo-functionalist explanations of Europe, like 
intergovernmentalist ones, are based on self-interested motives and constitutional processes, but 
they identify supranational European institutions rather than inter-state bargaining as the critical 
forum in which such motives operate.  Martin Shapiro has come the closest to articulating a neo-
functionalist view of constitutional innovation in the Commission.  As I explained earlier, 
Shapiro employs a rational choice model of human behavior, in which litigants with the money 
to hire lawyers and the interest in avoiding administrative action, challenge Commission 
decisions on novel legal theories and judges are driven by competence-expanding, activist 
tendencies to rule in their favor.  His account also includes anti-technocracy, pro-democracy 
values and the internal logic of the legal doctrine of the duty to give reasons.  Nevertheless, these 
value-driven premises are complementary to the rational choice ones:  all elements of the neo-
functional model point in the direction of an ever-expanding bag of procedural rights.
According to Shapiro, procedural rights before the Commission should gradually come to 
approximate those under American administrative law.  The institutional advocate of rights 
should be the Court of Justice, since judges are interested in expanding their powers, as well as 
remaining faithful to the doctrinal demands of the duty to give reasons and the political demands 
of protecting litigants (and democracy) against overweening bureaucrats.  Lastly, the timing of 
the rights should track, with a slight lag, the exercise of different types of government powers by 
the Commission:  the Commission issues decisions and rules, litigants oppose the measures and 
test the waters with new legal theories, the Court of Justice considers and initially rejects the 
theories, but is moved eventually, in response to self-interest, pro-democracy values, and 
doctrinal logic, to accept the litigants' arguments.
their citizens.  Before 1986, Member States might have believed that they could control Commission activities in the rulemaking 
and lawmaking areas through unanimity voting on comitology committees and the Council, or that, in the isolated areas where 
such checks did not exist, in the nooks and crannies of the management of agricultural prices and customs duties, the decisions 
were simply too technical to be able to adversely--and arbitrarily--harm the economic well-being of their citizens.
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Even though Shapiro's model of constitutional change is very different from Nehl's, his 
predictions on institutions and timing are virtually identical and as I explained, neither finds 
support in the historical record of transparency or civil society participation.  The history of 
litigation before the European Courts contains many instances in which plaintiffs advanced 
theories that would give them access to documents and an exchange of views with the 
Commission in advance of the enactment of a rule or law, and the Courts consistently refused to 
entertain their claims.  In establishing the right to transparency and the right to civil society 
participation, the Court of Justice was a marginal actor and the incremental logic of judge-made 
law did not apply.
In addition to the predictions on institutions and timing, Shapiro anticipates that the 
Commission will be required to respect procedures analogous to American ones, by which he 
means principally notice and comment rulemaking.  The judicial interpretation given to the 
Administrative Procedure Act in the late 1960's and 1970's requires federal agencies to publish 
rulemaking proposals, including the policy considerations and scientific information underlying 
proposals, accept comments from the public, and give detailed explanations of their policy 
choices in the final rule.412  As the reader will recall, Shapiro argues that the duty to give reasons 
will eventually be interpreted in such a way as to give individuals a very similar set of rights.  
But that has not happened.  Even in the core administrative area of individual enforcement 
decisions under competition, anti-dumping, and customs law, the Commission's statement of 
reasons is far from the exhaustive rebuttal of all of the objections of the parties  required under 
American law.413
The difference between the European and American practices lies in the origins of the 
duty to give reasons.  It was contained in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and was imposed on 
European institutions to give effect to the rule of law principle common to the founding Member 
States that all government acts must be based on law.414  The European institutions promulgating 
the act had to give the reasons for it:  the legal provision on which it was based and the grounds 
for holding that the government act furthered the purposes of the legal provision.415  The duty to 
give reasons was not conceived as a device for guaranteeing pluralist participation in 
administrative proceedings, as the analogous provisions of American law have been interpreted 
by American courts.416  In the droit administratif systems of the original Member States, if the 
parties believed that the administration had not taken into account an important consideration 
and hence had acted contrary to the dictates of the enabling law, they could go to court.417
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When the right to a hearing came to be recognized as part of European law, it had no impact on 
the duty to give reasons because the common law right to a hearing did not provide for a judicial-
like opinion at the end of the proceeding, indeed it had nothing to say about the form of the final 
administrative decision.418  Thus, the statement of reasons that the Commission today gives in 
competition and international trade cases does not answer each and every point made by the 
parties in the administrative proceeding.419  Knowing the grounds for a Commission decision is 
one thing, obtaining a reply on every objection of fact, policy, and law is another thing.  The 
European Courts only require that the statement of reasons be complete enough to enable the 
parties to determine whether the administration acted according to law or whether it is necessary 
to go to court to vindicate their right to a government of laws and not of men.420
If we move beyond the category of individual decisions and consider the duty to give 
reasons for general acts, the European path has also taken an unexpected turn, at least compared 
to the American one.  With the right to civil society participation, the proceduralized sequence of 
public notice, opportunity to comment, and government response has been introduced for acts of 
a general nature but, for the time-being, only for European laws, not implementing regulations.  
The Commission, in reasserting authority after the resignation of the Santer Commission, needed 
the normative support of civil society to justify its role in making the fundamental, political 
choices contained in European legislation.  It had no strategic interest in involving civil society 
in what was perceived as the technical domain of rulemaking.  This is precisely the opposite 
from what would be expected based on American law.  In the U.S., regulations must adhere to 
notice and comment procedures but congressional statutes, as a matter of constitutional and 
statutory law, are free from requirements of public debate before they are passed.421  Although 
politically inconceivable, legislation could in theory be enacted by the President and Congress 
without any opportunity for public comment.
In sum, the pattern of rights that has emerged in Europe cannot be explained fully by the 
universal, or at least Western, anti-technocratic values and strategic interests identified by 
Shapiro.  The relative strengths of the historical institutionalist explanation are apparent.  By 
postulating a number of competing social understandings of good government and rights, based 
on different institutional experiences within the nation-state, and by assuming that the strategic 
interests of European actors will be defined by reference to historical events, historical 
institutionalism both gives a more complete account of the emergence of rights and a more 
accurate understanding of where European rights stand today, on the books and in practice.  
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decisions it has to take in order to ensure that the rules of competition are applied, the Commission is not obliged to adopt a 
position on all the arguments relied on by the parties concerned and it is sufficient if it sets out the facts and the legal 
considerations have decisive importance in the context of the decision . . . .”).  
420
 This difference between the American statement of basis and purpose and the European duty to give reasons is complemented 
by a difference in the procedure for judicial review of administrative decisions.  If the parties decide to challenge a Commission 
decision and they decide to make the same (sometimes unanswered) objections in court, the Commission is allowed to reply with 
new arguments, albeit not new factual evidence because that would breach the right to be heard.   See Case T-141/94, Thyssen 
Stahl AG v. Commission, 1999 ECR II-347, paras. 608-11.  By contrast, before an American court, as a general rule the 
administration can only rely on the explanations given in the administrative process, although especially in the rulemaking 
context, the courts will overlook the failure to respond to a party's objection in the administrative proceeding if it determines that 
it had no effect on the final rule and hence was not prejudicial.  See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 360 (1981).  
421
 See William N. Eskridge, Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation:  Statutes and the Creation 
of Public Policy 267-498 (2002).
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The specific predictions of the alternative theories, compared to the historical 
development of rights, are summarized below.
Table 2---Predictions of the alternative theories matched against the historical record
Legal 
constitutionalism
Intergovernmentalism Neo-functionalism Historical record
Individualized 
proceedings 
(rights,
institutions, 
timing)
--; European Courts; 
gradually after 1962.
Procedural rights of French 
and German traditions; 
Member States; 1962.
Rights under U.S. law; 
European Courts; gradually 
after 1962.
Originally rights 
of French and 
Germany 
traditions (1962 
and 1963) 
followed by 
English right to a 
hearing (1974); 
Member States, 
European Courts, 
Commission.
Transparency 
(rights, 
institutions, 
timing)
--; European Courts; 
gradually after 1957.
Limited or no access to 
documents as in French and 
German closed government 
traditions; Member States; 
1986 or before.
-- Originally no 
access to 
documents 
followed by 
northern right to 
transparency 
(1993); Heads of 
State and 
European 
Parliament.
Civil society 
participation 
(rights, 
institutions, 
timing)
--; European Courts; 
gradually after 1957.
Functional representation in 
certain policy areas as in 
France and Germany; 
Member States; 1986 or 
before
Procedure similar to U.S. 
notice and comment for 
implementing regulations; 
European Courts; gradually 
after 1957.
Originally 
functional 
representation on 
ESC (1957) and 
advisory 
committees 
(1960’s and 
1970’s), now 
routine and formal  
procedure for 
early consultation 
of public on all 
legislative 
proposals (2002); 
Commission.
To conclude this examination of the competing theories, let me point to some avenues of 
future research for historical institutionalism.  In essence, by reviewing the historical record of 
rights before the Commission, I selected a number of cases based on a range of values taken by 
the dependent variable, i.e. rights change or rights stasis.422  My theoretical claims, however, 
would be stronger if I had also included cases selected on the independent variable, namely the 
presence or absence of historical crisis.423  One promising line of future research, therefore, 
would be to examine other possible crises-- accessions, voter revolt, and strident opposition to 
the Commission from other European institutions—to see whether they indeed were crises and 
whether they too prompted rights change.  
422
 See King, Keohane & Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, supra note__ at 141.
423
 Id. at 140.  
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CONCLUSION
 I conclude by taking stock of rights before the European Commission and advancing 
some predictions for the future of rights in Europe and other systems of global governance.  
Before the Commission may issue adverse determinations against specific individuals, it must 
notify the parties of all aspects of the planned decision, allow the parties to examine the 
information in its files, accept written submissions, hold an oral hearing, and give a complete 
enough statement of the grounds for the final administrative decision so that the parties, and 
eventually the European Courts, can discern whether the Commission has adhered to the 
substantive requirements of European law.  As we have seen, this set of rights is most extensive 
in competition and anti- dumping proceedings, slightly less so in customs remissions 
proceedings, and even less so in the other, rare instances in which the Commission bypasses 
national administrations and makes adverse individualized determinations.  This is a set of rights 
inspired by the droit administratif tradition and the English right to a hearing.  When the right to 
a hearing migrated to Brussels, it guaranteed the parties more thorough-going disclosure of the 
government's case than in the administration of origin, the UK Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission.  It also operated largely free of political discretion after the parties were heard, 
contrary to British administration of competition policy.
Moving along to transparency, the Commission now is under a legal duty to maintain a 
public, electronic register of all the documents generated in the administrative and legislative 
process--technical studies, committee agendas, and reports that serve to prepare official acts--
together with the official acts.  The Commission is under a duty to make those documents 
immediately accessible through the register or, if not possible, as a second-best, to provide the 
documents upon a request from a European citizen or resident.  The right of citizens to know 
how government makes decisions day-to-day, before and after the public debates in a 
parliamentary assembly, expanded in its adoptive home.  None of the northern systems, where 
the right originated, combined the transparency guarantee of a public register, with full-text, 
immediately accessible electronic documents, with that of access to documents that are 
preliminary and political in nature.  
Lastly, when the Commission drafts proposals for European laws, it now must respect the 
right of civil society participation.  It is obliged to make an early draft of the proposal available 
to European civil society, accept comments, and explain in the final version why it did or did not 
modify the proposal in light of the comments.  The definition of which associations count as the 
civil society that must be taken seriously in the consultative process borrows from the European 
corporatist tradition of interest representation, although it is more inclusive than the corporatist 
model.  The systematic and cross-cutting procedure for involving civil society in Commission 
decisionmaking goes beyond any of the reforms yet undertaken by international organizations, 
the place where the demand for civil society participation originated.  
Notwithstanding the fact that procedural rights emerged in different historical periods and 
were informed by different cultural traditions and supranational interests, they display one, 
striking common characteristic: the right to a hearing, the right to transparency, and the right to 
civil society participation all afford citizens a greater set of entitlements against European 
government than in their place of origin.  What is the common thread that explains this 
surprising outcome?   It is the weak nature of the Commission as a government organization.  As 
we saw earlier, the Commission relies on cooperation from national administrations and national 
courts in enforcing European law.  It does not have a police force that it can call into action, 
European courts in which it can directly appear to seek the execution of orders, or jails into 
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which it can put recalcitrant citizens.  It does not have independent enforcement powers.  
Politically too the Commission is weak.  It is not led by a popularly elected official, as are 
executive branches at the national level, a directly elected president in presidential systems of 
government, or a prime minister and cabinet appointed after parliamentary elections in 
parliamentary systems of government.  It is led by a College of Commissioners, headed by a 
President, that is appointed by common consensus among the Member States, with some input 
from the European Parliament.  In no way can the Commission be said to enjoy an electoral 
mandate when it undertakes its mission.  In responding to challenges from national judges, 
lawyers, and statesmen, as in the case of a right to a hearing, the Commission cannot use legal 
enforcement powers.  In responding to challenges from national voters and elected officials, as in 
the case of the right to transparency and civil society participation, the Commission cannot use 
the political mandate of a popular vote.  The Commission cannot say, as generally national 
executive authorities do when faced with demands for rights, that it governs in the name of the 
people and therefore, the will of the majority and the greater good must, under the circumstances, 
prevail over the rights of the individual.
The history of procedural rights before the Commission is reassuring because it shows 
that as authority migrates beyond the confines of the nation-state, citizens, lawyers and judges 
with allegiances to their strong national--and to some extent international--rights cultures are 
vigilant in protecting rights in new political spaces.  Nonetheless, there also is a certain irony  to 
history that I have told in this Article.  The European project, at the heart of which is the 
Commission, was begun in response to one, calamitous failure of the political space of the 
nation-state:  war.  European leaders have given up exclusive powers over a variety of policy 
areas and transferred them to the EU on the belief that their countries do better by pooling 
sovereignty rather than going it alone.  Yet even though the Commission has obtained significant 
powers to carry out the European aims of the treaties, it is circumscribed by extensive procedural 
rights.  The institutional weakness responsible for this outcome is the result of the design of the 
same Member States that originally conferred powers upon the Commission.  No European Head 
of State wants competition from a directly elected President of the European Commission.  Nor 
would any national voter want to be arrested, tried, and sentenced by a public official who spoke 
a different language, had been schooled in a different legal system, and had allegiances to a 
different set of cultural and political institutions.  As I have shown, the extensive procedural 
guarantees have also been driven by an unexpected institutional competitor of the Commission:  
a directly elected European Parliament with extensive, treaty-based powers.  As the different 
dimensions of the still-uncertain right to civil society participation are decided, the margins of 
the right to a hearing and the right to transparency  are worked out in existing and novel policy 
areas, and new rights arise, this dynamic should kept in mind.  The Commission is not an 
ordinary executive branch and for that reason it might well be more dangerous, but for that 
reason too, it is less able to resist demands for rights.  
Now I turn to speculating about the future.  One possible objection to my historical 
analysis is that the forces that I identify as determinants of European rights are so culturally and 
historically specific that they do not count as elements of a general theory of constitutional 
change that can be applied going forward in time or in analyzing other international settings.  To 
the contrary, my study of the Commission has brought to light a number of features of rights in 
the era of global governance that are lasting and cross-cutting.  The national traditions that 
inspired European rights are quite stable.424  Comparatists have long been fascinated with the 
424
 There is an extensive literature on the “Europeanization” of national law, see, e.g., The Europeanisation of Law (Thomas G. 
Watkin ed., 1998), but most scholars find that divergence persists nothwithstanding the the adoption of facially similar or 
identical legal doctrines.  
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resilience of national legal cultures in the face of legal transplants from abroad and, even in a 
globalizing world, differences in language, legal education, and the national institutions in which 
lawyers and legal scholars pursue their careers, can be expected to produce continuity.425
Moreover, the distinctive, supranational interest in maintaining and extending authority that 
motivated European actors can be expected to persist in the EU and to drive organizations in 
international regimes.  Lastly, even the historical crises that provoked organizational change in 
the Commission have a certain generalizable quality:  a fundamentally different legal culture (the 
common law vs. the civil law), a new set of policy prerogatives in areas of high politics (the 
commitments to defense, immigration, and a single currency contained in the Maastricht Treaty), 
and the entrepreneurship of a supranational institution rendered newly powerful through a 
combination of the political authority of direct elections and the legal authority of new treaty 
powers (the Parliament).
What then might the future hold for European rights? The accession of Central and 
Eastern European countries on May 1, 2004 was a historic event for the EU.  To some extent, the 
dynamics of this accession are different from previous ones because of the enormous 
discrepancy in wealth between the new and old Member States.  The new states gain far more 
from becoming members of the European club than the old states gain from letting in the new 
members.426  Nevertheless, especially for supranational European institutions like the Court of 
Justice where power differentials do not animate decisionmaking to the same extent as in the 
intergovernmental institution of the Council, lessons can be drawn from the previous experience 
with rights before the Commission.  
After the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, all of those countries 
adopted new constitutions and established constitutional courts to safeguard rights.  Some, in 
particular the Hungarian Constitutional Court, have become very active.427  It is quite common 
for members of the legal establishment in newly democratized countries to be wed to 
fundamental rights, especially highly visible, sweeping, and symbolic statements of such 
rights.428  The Court will not be able to resist the pressure to engage in searching constitutional 
review of European acts because of the strategic need to reassure courts like the Hungarian one 
that fundamental rights have been protected.  In the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, 
therefore, even before the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty that would render the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, we should expect a marked shift in the rhetoric 
of fundamental rights.  
Furthermore, the distinction between European and national acts, which determines 
whether European fundamental rights apply, will come under siege.  (Currently European 
fundamental rights apply only to European acts, much like the U.S. Bill of Rights only protected 
individuals against acts of the federal government before incorporation against the states in the 
1960's.)  That is because the Central and Eastern European judges on the Court of Justice and 
those sitting on national courts can be expected to insist on ensuring respect for fundamental 
rights in their countries, regardless of whether government authorities are acting under national 
or European law.  The prestige and authority of the Court of Justice will be perceived as a unique 
institutional opportunity to do so.  The Court might be able to resist the pressure to serve as a 
425
 See Pierre Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (1999); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 
Int'l. & Comp. L.Q. 52, 81 (1996); Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy & Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 
Am. J. Comp. L. 5 (1997); John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 
Stan. J. Int'l L. 357 (1981), reprinted in John H. Merryman, The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer 17 (1994).
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 See generally Milada Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Revolution, Democracy and Integration after Communism (2004) 
(putting forward theory of asymmetric dependence in the context of enlargement to the East).
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 See Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Hungarian Constitutional Court, 8 East European Constitutional Rev. 81 (1999).
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 See Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes, supra note __ at 221-30.
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constitutional court for all acts, European and national, in those instances where the 
implementation of European policy is not at stake and hence there is no strategic need to 
accommodate local courts in order to ensure enforcement of European measures.
In other areas of global governance, predictions are complicated by the absence of any 
organization even matching the relatively weak  European Commission of the 1950's and 1960's 
and by the presence of one state, the U.S., that is significantly more powerful than the rest.  The 
WTO's  Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is one of the most likely international bodies to become 
an institution whose decisions will be executed at the national level as a routine matter, without 
extensive diplomatic politics and national debate.  Like the European Court of Justice, the DSB 
relies upon the cooperation of national authorities in implementing its decisions under the WTO 
agreements:  the government administrations that must change their laws and regulations to 
come into compliance and the courts that must uphold those laws and regulations.   Like the 
Court of Justice, the DSB also operates across widely divergent legal systems.  Therefore, the 
dynamics of national mental maps of rights, on the one hand, and the strategic interest in 
affirming supranational authority, on the other hand, that drove the adoption of the right to a 
hearing in the Court of Justice in the 1970's can be expected to animate the development of rights 
in the DSB as well.  
The DSB is often called upon to settle disputes among states involving highly technical, 
scientific issues.429  One state claims that another's domestic regulation in the area of consumer 
or food safety is an illegal barrier to trade and the other state replies that the regulation is 
justified by the need to protect the health or consumer welfare of its citizens.  The parties 
generally furnish extensive scientific evidence in their briefs.  The DSB can also appoint 
scientific experts to give their opinion on the matter and refer to the technical standards adopted 
by specialized international organizations, the UN's Codex Alimentarius Commission being the 
most commonly cited.  Because of the necessity of obtaining the cooperation of U.S. 
administrative agencies and courts in implementing DSB decisions, the procedure through which 
the DSB decides whether a national regulation legitimately furthers a public safety concern 
should take on some of the idiosyncratic aspects of American administrative law.  Unlike the 
administrative procedures of European WTO members,  DSB procedure should assume a highly 
formal, adversarial bent in which governments and interest groups have an opportunity to 
examine and object to the scientific evidence underlying the conclusions in the briefs, expert 
reports, and international standards.
Let me unpack this analysis a bit further.  Comparative studies show that one of the 
significant differences between American and European systems of administrative law is the 
extent to which scientific rulemaking is proceduralized and judicialized in the U.S.430  Under the 
notice and comment procedure outlined in Part III, American administrative agencies must  
publicly disclose the proposed rule, together with all of the underlying scientific facts, give the 
public the opportunity to submit written objections and observations, and furnish an exhaustive 
reply to the comments.  In most European systems, as explained in Part II, bodies composed of 
representatives of different producer and consumer interests are often consulted, but draft 
regulations are not made widely available to the public.  In anticipation of the reaction of 
American administrative agencies and reviewing courts, the DSB should gradually allow the 
429
 See generally Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:  (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 Tex. Int'l L. J. 405, 425 (2003) 
(describing DSB's use of international scientific standards); Christopher T. Timura, Cross-Examining Expertise in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process, 23 Mich. Int'l L. J. 709 (2002) (describing DSB's use of experts); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and 
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 See Ziamou, Rulemaking, Participation and the Limits of Public Law in the US and Europe, supra note __at 130-41 
(comparing U.S. rulemaking procedure with that of Germany, the UK, and Greece).
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state parties to the dispute and interest groups, through the device of the amicus curiae brief, 
extensive rights to participate in the scientific fact-finding process.  The DSB, however, walks a 
thin line.  To the extent that the procedure is perceived as overly politicized, driven by the 
interest groups submitting the amicus curiae briefs and the unelected trade specialists sitting on 
the DSB, administrations and courts on the European side of the Atlantic might call into question 
the legitimacy of the outcomes and, in turn, deny their cooperation.  
Prediction is always a hazardous intellectual exercise and especially so in the world of 
international law and politics. Nonetheless, it demonstrates how the experience with rights and 
citizenship in the world's only firmly established system of global governance can inform our 
understanding of other, emerging ones.
